Ethiopia's Overlooked Conflict: Afar-Somali Violence
A years-long territorial dispute between the Afar and Somali regions has escalated into full-blown conflict once again. Despite two ceasefire agreements having been negotiated between the Afar and Somali governments in recent months, militias continue to clash, and dozens of civilians have been killed. Much of the conflict has been brutal and indiscriminate, with reports of entire settlements being razed and children slain.
Land and resource disputes between neighbouring Afar and Somali communities, predominantly from the Issa clan, have been the historical centre of violent contestation in arid eastern Ethiopia. Since the early 1990s, with the creation of the current ethnic federal system by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the Afar and Somali regional governments, these conflicts have become increasingly formalised. In particular, the armed conflict has concentrated on the settling of Somali communities in the Adeyitu, Gadamaytu, and Undufo kebeles within the Afar region along the arterial Ethiopia-Djibouti highway and railway. This expansion is part of a longer history, where, over the past 200 years, the Somali Issa communities have settled increasingly northwards from Dire Dawa, displacing the Afar from the eastern Alighedi plain.
Already critical for Ethiopia's import-export, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war between 1998-2000 deepened Addis's economic reliance on Djibouti's port and, in turn, further developed the highly profitable smuggling networks along the route. Over the 2000s, increasing violence was recorded in the three kebeles over access to these networks and the Awash river that is used by Afar and Somali pastoralists between respective militias. The interruptions to Ethiopia's principal trade route led the then-EPRDF-controlled federal government in 2014 to strike a deal that saw the Somali-inhabited areas recognised as 'special kebeles' in Afar.
An unsteady peace was established for the next 5 years despite both communities having reservations about the agreement. With the Somalis having forcibly settled on land deep within the Afar territory, many Afar were opposed to the creation of 'special kebeles' that granted a degree of self-governance to the Issa. The Oromo special kebeles in the Amhara region have experienced similar dynamics, with thousands displaced by intermittent clashes between armed Oromo and Amhara militias.
The situation changed for the worse in May 2019 when Mustafe Muhamed Omar, the incumbent president of the Somali region and ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, pulled out of the 2014 agreement. Major Somali protests erupted in the contested kebeles, which were brutally crushed by the Afar forces, who then began asserting control over the villages and towns in the subsequent months. Fighting was particularly intense between rival militias in the build-up to the national elections in 2021, with some believing that the federal government was tacitly supporting the Afar in exchange for the regional government's backing of the federal government during the Tigray war. By 2022, the Afar government controlled all major settlements in the three kebeles.
Today, fighting is predominantly concentrated along the borders of the contested kebeles. Repeated attempts by Somali militias to retake the kebeles have failed, with high numbers of casualties reported on either side. And news of the violence is barely eking out of the Somali/Afar regions, let alone Ethiopia as a whole. Internet connection is patchy at best and often choked by the regional governments to limit the spread of information. Much like the Tigray war and the ongoing insurgency in Amhara, no international journalists have been granted permission to travel to the impacted communities. The limited local media outlets are controlled by the regional and federal governments, with the only private TV station in the Somali region having been shut down by Mustafe.
In April 2023, Addis ordered the dismantling of the Regional Special Forces to cover the disempowering of the Amhara Special Forces (ASF). The Somali Regional Forces, otherwise known as the Liyu, were partially retained, in large part due to their competence in securing the Ethiopian border from Al-Shabaab. However, many of the Liyu have been transferred to the regional police, while the remaining forces have faced dwindling financial and logistical support– driving high numbers of defections. A significant number have travelled to Jubaland in Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab with the Ahmed 'Madoobe' administration, while others have returned to their villages to avoid urban centres and potential arrest. But many Liyu, too, have been involved in the fighting with the Afar, raising concerns about a broader conflagration between the regional administrations. Hundreds of Liyu that were policing the Ethiopian-Somali border have travelled to the Afar-Somali internal boundary to participate in the clashes, adding further alarm about possible cross-border Al-Shabaab penetration.
A significant number of Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops were deployed to the contested areas in 2023, but federal forces have been absent for much of this year. And while successive peace talks in recent months have reached ceasefire agreements, they remain unimplemented. In April, the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council brokered a deal between the Somali-Afar regional governments, but it lasted only a brief few weeks until fighting erupted again in June. And while the federal government in Addis hosted another round of ceasefire talks in mid-July, it has only resulted in another, yet unimplemented, agreement. Without the deployment of substantial numbers of federal troops, it is unlikely that fighting will ease. But with insurgencies raging in Oromia and Amhara, and instability rising across much of the country, the ENDF is badly overstretched.
The conflict is a heady mix of economic incentives emanating from smuggling networks, deep inter-communal distrust, land grievances, and explosive violence. There are no simple or quick solutions to the situation, but the ENDF's absence and the federal government's inability or indifference to enforce the negotiated ceasefires have allowed the conflict to simmer for weeks. Finding a comprehensive and constitutional solution to the disputed kebeles, as well as the broader questions about Somali encroachment into Afar territory toward the Awash river, will take time. The overlooked conflict in eastern Ethiopia may not be grabbing the headlines, but it is continuing to extract a grim humanitarian toll that requires an immediate response.
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