Issue No. 235

Published 21 May 2024

Amb. Massinga Gets Tongue Wagging

Published on 21 May 2024 14:50 min

Amb. Massinga Gets Tongue Wagging


A recent speech by US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ervin J. Massinga, has set tongues wagging in Addis and provoked a variety of responses from political actors in Ethiopia. On 15 May, at the 'American Gibbi,' the former site of the American Embassy in Addis Ababa, Massinga laid out the US position on the state of human rights and national dialogue in Ethiopia today. In particular, he called upon Ethiopian authorities and regional leaders to undertake sincere efforts to achieve peace and foster reconciliation, and further proposed a nationwide temporary ceasefire. Massinga later elaborated on his speech, emphasising the importance of promoting peace through dialogue rather than violence.

Although, on the surface, the comments seem innocuous and echo several of Addis's talking points, what was unusual was the degree of pointed criticism of Ethiopian political stakeholders, which went beyond the customary norm. Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly rebuked the Ambassador, calling his comments "ill-advised," containing "uninformed assertions" and "unsolicited advice." The statement further noted that it would seek to work with the US Embassy to correct these "errors and inconsistencies."

Yet despite the strongly worded response, we should take the remarks with a pinch of salt and not interpret them as a significant falling out. It has long been customary for any Ethiopian government to feel compelled to react to any perceived criticism with forceful rhetoric. The assertion of dignity in international relations comes particularly naturally in Ethiopia, where aspects such as its non-colonisation are central in articulating collective national identity. 

Reading between the lines, the comments from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not indicate any retaliatory actions would be taken. Even as Addis responded critically, it also made sure to reaffirm its commitment to maintaining "mutually respectful bilateral dialogue and relations with the United States." The federal government is likely reticent to overly antagonise the US, with Addis still keen to court Washington's strategic support at a time of deep political and economic fragility. There is every chance to expect that the furore will quickly die down. 

Yet the Ambassador did not confine his comments to Addis alone, but delivered a message to other Ethiopian actors too. Massinga further urged the assorted Amhara Fano militias to embrace talks with the federal government and encouraged the insurgent Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) to also return to the negotiation table. He further called on the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to resolve the control of the still-occupied territories in Tigray peacefully rather than by military means. He also voiced support for the controversial national dialogue process and urged political actors to participate, even as Massinga acknowledged that concerns had been expressed about the National Dialogue's Commission fairness and impartiality.

Responses from the armed opposition in Oromia and Amhara to Ambassador Massinga's comments were also generally critical, if for starkly different reasons than the government's. The OLA used the occasion of the Ambassador's remarks to reiterate their opposition to a dialogue process that they view as performative and disingenuous, reaffirming their decision not to participate.

The disparate Fano faction's response was far stronger, with one characterising Massinga's remarks as supportive of a failed and compromised process. Once again, they insisted they would not negotiate with Addis while military operations were continuing in the Amhara region and called on the US to pressure the federal government to halt its state of emergency in the northern region. The decentralised nature of these assorted militias, both in their competing interests and leadership structure, has complicated the prospects of any peace process in the near future. There is a sense that if a faction displays a readiness to support the dialogue and any possible peace process, it will become compromised and lose political standing within Fano's Amhara nationalist base.

The myriad Amhara nationalist groups are not presently in a position to be represented under a single banner. Despite their destructive role in Western Tigray during the war, some factions still see Tigray as a possible ally against Addis, while others remain stirred by territorial desires for what are perceived to be ancestral lands in Western Tigray. For these militias, Tigray is an implacable enemy, only incensed further by the recent constitutional restoration of Tigrayan lands in Southern Tigray under Mekelle's control.

More significant is that the Ambassador's speech is part of a broader signal of the US taking a renewed interest in Ethiopia's political developments. While it has played a less active role in Amhara, the US is one of the principal guarantors of the Pretoria agreement that concluded fighting in the Tigray War in November 2022. After months of limited progress and an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Tigray, progress is now finally being made, albeit slowly, on the restoration of constitutionally Tigrayan lands. The US Special Envoy to the Horn, Mike Hammer, has played a particularly notable role in recent months, shuttling back and forth from Addis and Mekelle to push for the implementation of Pretoria. And in Oromia, the US has further advocated for talks with the OLA, participating in the two separate rounds of negotiations between the federal government and the insurgent group that went nowhere in 2023.

Compared to other external actors, the United States has long held an outsized degree of leverage in Ethiopia. The economic sway it holds over Ethiopia has particularly grown as the debt burden and financial challenges facing the country have deepened. In 2022, Washington suspended Ethiopia from its free trade 'African Growth and Opportunity Act' (AGOA) over its conduct in the Tigray War. With Addis still suspended and likely remaining so in 2024, the US has retained a significant degree of leverage. Still, one should question why it has not sought to wield this leverage as effectively as it might have done during the Tigray War.

Yet, despite the leverage it holds, it is highly unlikely that US influence can translate into broad and inclusive participation in a peace and dialogue process. While the Americans may see the Addis-led dialogue and the peace process as a flawed but necessary instrument in the absence of any other political or diplomatic processes, it is clear that other key stakeholders do not currently hold the same opinion. More broadly, within Ethiopia, there is also a sense that most would welcome Massinga's proposed ceasefire and be amenable to political settlements in a country exhausted by conflict and uncertainty.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

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