Issue No. 233

The Gastro-Politics of Ethiopia

Food insecurity is stalking the Horn of Africa from Sudan to South Sudan to Ethiopia. Within Ethiopia, Tigray, north-eastern Amhara, and western Afar - not incidentally areas wracked by or overcoming periods of conflict - have been particularly affected. The situation becomes even more stark when we consider the latest bleak FEWSNET reporting on food security in Ethiopia and the fast-approaching July to September 'hunger' or 'lean' season. Repeated warnings from Tigray's Interim Administration President, Getachew Reda, of the still-growing humanitarian disaster in the region is not an isolated call but rather part of a growing cascade of politicians, humanitarian workers, and multilateral institutions raising the alarm.

And wherever the growl of hunger is heard, it is often a warning sign of current or impending political instability. Armed conflict and food security are mutually reinforcing, and hunger is often conflict-induced, as illustrated by the fact that the most food-insecure places in the world are invariably those areas most affected by conflict. This link between food security and political stability is why programs such as Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), one of the largest food resilience programs in Africa, are important not just from a humanitarian standpoint but also from a political stability and security one.

Yet, in the face of donor fatigue, corruption concerns, and competing sites of humanitarian attention, the program is coming under increased financial pressure, even at a time of acute humanitarian need and political uncertainty in Ethiopia. In 2024, it is expected that the majority of those receiving assistance from the PSNP will access just four months of support rather than the typical 6. In Tigray, whose food infrastructure remains devastated by the war, the PSNP public works program only recommenced in March 2024, with ongoing delivery complications. The delivery of humanitarian aid to the region remains deeply lacking even after the resumption of assistance by USAID and the World Food Programme, with hundreds having died of starvation in recent months.

It's worth recalling that historically, food price spikes and food shortages have often precipitated revolts and political unrest. A government's ability to deliver food for its citizens is an integral, if overlooked, part of the social contract. In 2011, a global spike in food prices provoked a wave of unrest and revolutions stretching from Peru to Tunisia to Egypt. At the time, an International Monetary Fund working paper confirmed increases in food prices in lower-income countries led to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. Indeed, as researchers have noted, it makes better sense to characterise the Arab Spring phenomenon not simply as a long-incubated revolt against an authoritarian environment, but also as an uprising that was triggered by cost of living and food price surges. 

Governance crises resulting from food insecurity - or 'gastro-politics,' as some have termed it - is nothing new. There's a case to be made that the right to food is one of the earliest human rights. In Ancient China, an abiding social principle, latterly taken up by Sun-Yat-Sen in the early 20th Century, was that of 'minsheng' (welfare), a principle that the State primarily conveyed through the distribution of food to citizens from large state granaries in times of humanitarian need. The 'mandate of Heaven' granting authorities the divine authority to rule would slip quicker in times of food insecurity than at any other moment. In Ethiopia, a cornerstone of Mengistu Hailemariam's efforts to dethrone Emperor Haile Selassie involved the instrumentalisation for propaganda purposes of his perceived contempt and greed, with Haile Selassie's lavish birthday celebrations being juxtaposed with the famines that raged in Wollo in the early 1970s. 
  
Established in 2005 by the Ethiopian People's Ruling Democratic Front (EPRDF), the PSNP was an effort to move beyond the incessant emergency food appeals, which had become a predictable annual event in Ethiopia. It represented a shift from food security towards food resilience intended to make Ethiopia's chronic food insecurity a thing of the past. It provided cash and food for work for vulnerable communities while also building up community assets. It was acknowledged at its inception that it wouldn't immediately put an end to chronic humanitarian needs. Still, by providing predictable and reliable transfers to food insecure populations, alongside contingency mechanisms to scale up in times of crisis, it was hoped it could 'move the dial' in a way other programs had not. 

The PSNP, which has evolved and gone through several iterations, is certainly not perfect. There are credible claims and findings that it has been a site of aid diversion and is prone to political instrumentalisation. The program is overstretched, with benefits spread unevenly across regions, and the suspension of support to Tigray for three years had a devastating impact. Even as a rigorous independent assessment carried out in 2021 noted that it has proven to ultimately be beneficial, its shortcomings are apparent.  
   
Yet in contrast to some other donor-supported development programs, there has never been a question of the program being owned by Ethiopians. The PSNP has consistently been identified as an essential and integral component of Ethiopia's broader policy considerations regarding sustainable land use, poverty alleviation, agriculture, and development.
 
One challenge of the program, which brings together the Ethiopian federal government and multiple donors, chief of which is the World Bank, is the shrouding of discussions surrounding its management and implementation because of perceived political sensitivities. Further, although internationally heralded as an embryonic social safety net, successive Ethiopian governments have been compelled to deny this was the case out of a sensibility to avoid the perception it is creating dependency. Consequently, the bugbear of 'graduation' from the program, a currently aspirational rather than realistic prospect, has consumed much internal attention. 

Beyond the immediate material support it provides, the PSNP has now been around so long that it forms part of the rural social fabric in Ethiopia. On a cultural level, it helps knit the fabric of everyday life together for many, an element especially valuable in moments of political fragility. 

Whether concerned from a humanitarian or political perspective, and even bearing in mind the obvious need to maintain scrutiny and oversight, donors would be well-advised to continue supporting the PSNP. It has generally been successful on its own terms, and donors should additionally be wary for their own sake of any reputational fallout if it fails. The World Bank has shifted in recent decades towards social protection as a mainstay of its work, and the PSNP represents a flagship program in this respect.

Still, donors, including the World Bank, are now actively considering their support levels for the PSNP, even as it already faces a nearly USD 200 million funding shortfall over the next two years. Difficult choices must clearly be made amid conflicting demands, but it would be short-sighted not to maintain appropriate levels of support for the PSNP. We are at an inflexion point in Ethiopia from both a political and humanitarian perspective, and any significant reduction would be disastrous. The benefits of maintaining support go far beyond food security. The last thing a combustible Ethiopian needs is more fuel for the fire.  

By the Ethiopian Cable team