Issue No. 231

Published 30 Apr 2024

Jaysh al-Habash in Ethiopia

Published on 30 Apr 2024 16:44 min

Jaysh al-Habash in Ethiopia

In late February 2024 in Dire Dawa in Ethiopia, 41 individuals were sentenced to varying lengthy prison sentences for their involvement with Al-Shabaab. The case had been heard back in October 2022, with dozens of witnesses interviewed on the stand over allegations that these men were responsible for a string of attacks in the Ogaden Region the year prior. Several of the convicted men were accused of arms smuggling and operating in the Afdheer zone in the Somali region. Most prominent, though, was their conviction for purported involvement in the deaths of 265 Ethiopian citizens.

For years, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Liyu police, Somali regional special forces, were able to secure their border from significant Al-Shabaab incursions. Though the militant group had been actively seeking to establish a presence in Ethiopia and Kenya since 2013, when former Amir Ahmed Abdi Godane called for jihad against the "Ethiopian crusaders and their apostate brothers," they faced repeated setbacks. The political turmoil and armed conflict that has consumed Ethiopia in recent years, however, particularly the war in Tigray and the ongoing insurgency in Oromia, offered Al-Shabaab the space to recruit more heavily and increase its activities in the country.

This dynamic radically accelerated in July 2022 with the significant cross-border incursion of fighters into Ethiopia from Somalia, as Al-Shabaab sought to establish a major presence in several areas in south-eastern Ethiopia. Over 2,500 fighters took part in the first attack of its kind that lasted 10 days, after months of careful planning and infiltration. Though much of the heaviest fighting of the Liyu and ENDF against Al-Shabaab fighters took place near the Somali border, a significant militant contingent was able to reach 200 km into Ethiopia, with additional clashes near El Kere.

More than several hundred Al-Shabaab militants are believed to have remained in south-eastern Ethiopia following the successful offensive, which had been intended to establish a bridge-head for future attacks and a significant base of operations. An estimated 1,500 were able to embed themselves across the Bale, Liban and Afdheer zones, forming the heart of Jaysh al-Habash in Ethiopia, which had been formally established in April 2022. Since July 2022, these forces have primarily sought to recruit new militants and develop militant networks and capacity rather than conduct high-profile attacks. The expectation that a significant attack akin to the July 2022 incursion would take place in early 2023 came and went. This does not mean that Al-Shabaab has been dormant or that it has abandoned its ambition of growing a stronghold in south-eastern Ethiopia. The remote and undeveloped Bale Mountains in Oromia remain key to Al-Shabaab as it increases its covert operations.

Of most concern perhaps is that Al-Shabaab is continuing to increase its membership and operational capacity by radicalising and recruiting Ethiopian nationals. It uses much the same techniques it has been using in Somalia, seeking out disenfranchised communities and offering various incentives. Its targets include the large number of persons who have become internally displaced due to intermittent, low-level armed conflicts in the Somali region and the ongoing insurgency in Oromia. These operations typically fall under the auspices of the Amniyaad, which establishes relations and networks among Quranic teachers, imams, and other like-minded community leaders.

In Oromia, Al-Shabaab has sought to recruit Muslim converts to Salafism in remote Borana communities. Many are of both Kenyan and Ethiopian nationality, allowing them to move freely in and between both countries to Al-Shabaab's advantage. In the Somali region, meanwhile, Al-Shabaab has largely targeted Hawiye and Dir communities in the Afdheer zone, communities that have been repeatedly marginalised by successive regional Ogadeni leaders.  The remoteness of these areas, geographically, politically, and economically, has allowed the militant group to penetrate them and establish a presence. Moreover, since 2019, the twin threats of drought and growing violence in Ethiopia have made these communities more amenable to financial and other incentives offered by the extremist group.

In turn, Al-Shabaab's media wing 'Al-Kataib' routinely produces sophisticated extremist propaganda in Oromo and Amharic, 'interviewing' alleged Ethiopian nationals about their persecution and recording a litany of militant talking points. Such videos are then shown to constituencies in both Somalia and Ethiopia by Al-Shabaab militants whose role involves travelling from village to village, disseminating propaganda, and recruiting new jihadists to the cause.

Still, Jaysh al-Habash is far from a fully autonomous wing of Al-Shabaab and remains far less sophisticated than its Kenyan counterpart, Jaysh al-Ayman, which routinely conducts IED attacks in Lamu County and elsewhere. Al-Shabaab's Ethiopian operations remain dependent on personnel, weaponry, and financial support from its Somalia bases, while it seeks to become more self-sufficient. Many Jaysh al-Habash supplies are brought through the porous and unstable tri-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, and to a lesser extent through Somaliland. And it has yet to establish the level of 'taxtortion' seen in Somalia, in part due to the poverty of communities in south-eastern Ethiopia 

In the immediate future, the main security concern for both Ethiopia and Somalia is the impending African Union draw-down of 4,000 soldiers scheduled to take place by the end of June 2024. Al-Shabaab's influence is set to expand across southern Somalia into 'buffer zones' currently secured by the ENDF in Bay and Bakool. Further, with diplomatic relations between Addis and Mogadishu at their worst level in years, there are concerns that Somalia may seek to replace Ethiopian forces with Eritrean and Rwandan troops. The likely deterioration of Somalia's security and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia's withdrawal could yet allow Al-Shabaab to support and expand its Jaysh al-Habash operations in Ethiopia.

Another concern pertains to the possibility of a Qatari-negotiated' peace' between Al-Shabaab and Mogadishu. Doha continues to bring to an end the nearly two-decade-long Islamist insurgency through a carefully choreographed series of secretive negotiations. Should this happen, what would become of Jaysh al-Habash and Jaysh al-Ayman? Would they become clandestine and deniable arms of Somalia's security forces populated by jihadists? Or would they be pulled back to base, while Al-Shabaab places its irredentist ambitions on hold? The latter is surely unlikely, considering that the militant group has long framed itself in opposition to the neighbouring 'Christian imperialists' and Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006.

A repeat of July 2022 may not yet be on the cards, but there can be no doubt that Al-Shabaab remains a potent and growing force in Ethiopia. The recent prosecution of a few dozen men in Dire Dawa and the combination of charges against them provide an insight into just how varied Al-Shabaab's operations in the country have become.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

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