Jaysh al-Habash in Ethiopia
For years, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Liyu police, Somali regional special forces, were able to secure their border from significant Al-Shabaab incursions. Though the militant group had been actively seeking to establish a presence in Ethiopia and Kenya since 2013, when former Amir Ahmed Abdi Godane called for jihad against the "Ethiopian crusaders and their apostate brothers," they faced repeated setbacks. The political turmoil and armed conflict that has consumed Ethiopia in recent years, however, particularly the war in Tigray and the ongoing insurgency in Oromia, offered Al-Shabaab the space to recruit more heavily and increase its activities in the country.
This dynamic radically accelerated in July 2022 with the significant cross-border incursion of fighters into Ethiopia from Somalia, as Al-Shabaab sought to establish a major presence in several areas in south-eastern Ethiopia. Over 2,500 fighters took part in the first attack of its kind that lasted 10 days, after months of careful planning and infiltration. Though much of the heaviest fighting of the Liyu and ENDF against Al-Shabaab fighters took place near the Somali border, a significant militant contingent was able to reach 200 km into Ethiopia, with additional clashes near El Kere.
Of most concern perhaps is that Al-Shabaab is continuing to increase its membership and operational capacity by radicalising and recruiting Ethiopian nationals. It uses much the same techniques it has been using in Somalia, seeking out disenfranchised communities and offering various incentives. Its targets include the large number of persons who have become internally displaced due to intermittent, low-level armed conflicts in the Somali region and the ongoing insurgency in Oromia. These operations typically fall under the auspices of the Amniyaad, which establishes relations and networks among Quranic teachers, imams, and other like-minded community leaders.
In turn, Al-Shabaab's media wing 'Al-Kataib' routinely produces sophisticated extremist propaganda in Oromo and Amharic, 'interviewing' alleged Ethiopian nationals about their persecution and recording a litany of militant talking points. Such videos are then shown to constituencies in both Somalia and Ethiopia by Al-Shabaab militants whose role involves travelling from village to village, disseminating propaganda, and recruiting new jihadists to the cause.
Still, Jaysh al-Habash is far from a fully autonomous wing of Al-Shabaab and remains far less sophisticated than its Kenyan counterpart, Jaysh al-Ayman, which routinely conducts IED attacks in Lamu County and elsewhere. Al-Shabaab's Ethiopian operations remain dependent on personnel, weaponry, and financial support from its Somalia bases, while it seeks to become more self-sufficient. Many Jaysh al-Habash supplies are brought through the porous and unstable tri-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, and to a lesser extent through Somaliland. And it has yet to establish the level of 'taxtortion' seen in Somalia, in part due to the poverty of communities in south-eastern Ethiopia
In the immediate future, the main security concern for both Ethiopia and Somalia is the impending African Union draw-down of 4,000 soldiers scheduled to take place by the end of June 2024. Al-Shabaab's influence is set to expand across southern Somalia into 'buffer zones' currently secured by the ENDF in Bay and Bakool. Further, with diplomatic relations between Addis and Mogadishu at their worst level in years, there are concerns that Somalia may seek to replace Ethiopian forces with Eritrean and Rwandan troops. The likely deterioration of Somalia's security and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia's withdrawal could yet allow Al-Shabaab to support and expand its Jaysh al-Habash operations in Ethiopia.
Another concern pertains to the possibility of a Qatari-negotiated' peace' between Al-Shabaab and Mogadishu. Doha continues to bring to an end the nearly two-decade-long Islamist insurgency through a carefully choreographed series of secretive negotiations. Should this happen, what would become of Jaysh al-Habash and Jaysh al-Ayman? Would they become clandestine and deniable arms of Somalia's security forces populated by jihadists? Or would they be pulled back to base, while Al-Shabaab places its irredentist ambitions on hold? The latter is surely unlikely, considering that the militant group has long framed itself in opposition to the neighbouring 'Christian imperialists' and Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006.
A repeat of July 2022 may not yet be on the cards, but there can be no doubt that Al-Shabaab remains a potent and growing force in Ethiopia. The recent prosecution of a few dozen men in Dire Dawa and the combination of charges against them provide an insight into just how varied Al-Shabaab's operations in the country have become.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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