Brigade N'Hamedu and the fight against transnational repression
Today's editorial in The Ethiopian Cable is written by Aron Hagos Tesfai.
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to the Ethiopian Cable in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Ethiopia crafted as editorials.
Please contact us for more information if interested.
Since mid-2022, thousands of Eritrean refugees and second-generation diaspora youth have mobilised against the authoritarian Eritrean regime in waves of protests across the world. In a matter of months, the pro-democracy, anti-regime activists, known as the 'Brigade N'Hamedu' or the Blue Revolution, have transformed the Eritrean diaspora opposition movement. Significant protests have been held in European countries, including Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as Canada, Israel, and Australia. Many have made international headlines, in large part due to the often violent confrontations that have followed. However, while prominent news outlets, including CNN and the BBC, have covered these protests, the reporting is typically skewed towards the violence that has ensued. Nuances around the reasons why Brigade N'Hamedu is targeting the pro-regime 'cultural festivals', who they are, and what they are demanding have been largely ignored.
Brigade N'Hamedu is not Eritrea's first diaspora opposition movement, but its scope and scale mark it out from its predecessors. Its name, 'Brigade N'Hamedu,' can be roughly translated into an action-oriented, tightly networked movement seeking to liberate their homeland (N'Hamedu means 'for the soil' in Tigriyna). The movement is also known for carrying a blue flag rather than the official national flag of Eritrea, a symbol that was first used by the autonomous region of Eritrea during its federation with Ethiopia between 1952 and 1961. Today, Brigade N'Hamedu fly the flag as a rejection of the un-elected dictatorship of Isaias Afwerki and as a sign of how it is seeking to bring parliamentary democracy to Eritrea.
The Blue Revolution movement began in earnest towards the end of 2022 and the conclusion of the Tigray War in November 2022. During the Tigray War, domestic repression and forcible conscription within Eritrea dramatically escalated. Former soldiers and deserters were rounded up alongside youths to increase the military capacity of the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF). Indefinite military service is not new in Eritrea, with the regime often jailing or punishing families whose members have sought to avoid conscription. This time, however, security forces seized livestock and evicted entire households until conscripts reported for duty. This heightened repression, alongside deteriorating socio-economic situations in Eritrea, has upset the relational dynamics that had previously meant many of those abroad kept their anti-regime sentiments private.
Most notably, the protests have sought to expose and resist the transnational and domestic repression of the Eritrean regime and its various diaspora institutions. Prominent among these are the 'cultural festivals' that have been organised in Western countries for decades to raise funds, intimidate possible opposition, and serve as a mouthpiece of the regime. During the Tigray War, for instance, the Eritrean government sought to mobilise the pro-regime diaspora to whitewash its crimes in Tigray through these 'festivals' that preached hate against Tigrayans. Eritrea diaspora opposition that criticised the participation and crimes of the EDF in Tigray were also targeted by regime loyalists and deemed as traitors. Brigade N'Hamedu has sought to expose the often illegal activities within these festivals and, in turn, to sever a vital revenue stream for the regime. This has taken place through public demonstrations but also by bringing legal action against regime loyalists who abuse countries' asylum systems by claiming experiences of human rights abuses. Activists have also attempted to expose venues that host fundraising events for the regime.
The Eritrean regime's diaspora policy is known for its transnational repression and exploitation of overseas communities for financial and political gain. The country's fragile economy is heavily reliant on diaspora remittances, with embassy and regime loyalists often threatening and coercing individuals into paying the infamous 2% diaspora tax or contributing funds for regime events. Meanwhile, Eritrean officials are routinely dispatched to organised music concerts, political conferences, and cultural festivals to spew the latest regime propaganda. For years, these festivals and concerts have been allowed to go ahead even though activists have warned that the Eritrea regime uses them to fundraise for its wars and threaten the diaspora.
Since the first protest in Giessen, Germany, in October 2022, activists have sought to engage with police and local authorities to shut down these festivals or pro-regime events. This has rarely worked, however, with the vast majority of the events continuing uninterrupted. Subsequently, if the events do go ahead, protests are mobilised at their venue and seek to physically disrupt the proceedings. At times, this has resulted in scenes of intense violence, such as in Israel in September 2023, where the police used live fire in an attempt to disperse the clashing groups of Eritreans. More than 150 people were injured in the ensuing violence. The clashes are certainly unfortunate, but they are arguably a manifestation of the raw emotion felt by unheard and disenfranchised communities whom the Eritrean regime has exploited.
Still, the opposition of the Eritrean diaspora has long lacked a united front. Prior to the arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu, the opposition had been largely influenced by an older generation of migrants and refugees, many of whom had fought in the Eritrean War of Independence. Other movements have also emerged in recent years, such as the Global Yialk Movement, which was founded in the wake of the deceptive reconciliation between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean regime in 2018. Years of divisions over issues such as the role and position of the Ethiopian government to the Eritrean regime remain today. Some view Ethiopia as a possible ally in removing Isaias and his cabal, while others consider the government untrustworthy. The Tigray War, too, proved divisive amongst elements of the opposition diaspora. And much of the older generations dislike younger refugees and use the dismissive Tigriyna term 'Nai Himamey' that insinuates that they are a negligent generation uninterested in the politics of Eritrea. The arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu is a significant departure from these older opposition elements. It is a youth-led movement, mostly made up of recent refugees but with a substantial proportion of second-generation Eritreans. The growing number of female activists and organisers in Brigad N'Hamedu is another marked departure from previous diaspora opposition movements.
The arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu is a powerful expression of the anger towards the Eritrean regime at home and overseas. The protests are also a way of asserting their identity and voice as Eritreans who care about the fate of their homeland and their fellow citizens. Though divisions remain and the violence often leads to negative headlines, the youth-led Blue Revolution has already proven itself to be a game-changer in Eritrean diaspora politics.
Aron Hagos Tesfai is a post-doctoral researcher at the School of Applied Human Science, University KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He works on diaspora politics and is a human rights activist. Contact him here: aribanov@gmail.com , Twitter (X) – AronT @aribanob
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
On Monday, a politician widely regarded as Ankara’s primary proxy in Somalia was inaugurated as a Member of Parliament (MP) under circumstances that Somali citizens and political observers are denouncing as a brazen institutional theft. This unprecedented case of electoral misconduct occurs in the twilight of the current parliament’s mandate, signaling a deep-seated crisis in legislative integrity.
The sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architectThe sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architecture in the Middle East has been upended, as have the globalised hydrocarbon networks that long served as the financial lifeblood of energy-importing states.
Apathy pervades the Djiboutian population. A week tomorrow, on April 10, the country will head to the polls, with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh seeking a 6th— essentially uncontested — term in office. With his coronation inevitable, his family's dynastic rule over this rentier city-state will be extended once more. But in a region wracked by armed conflict and geopolitical contestation, the ageing Guelleh's capacity to manage the familial, ethnic, and regional fractures within and without grows ever more complicated. And Djibouti's apparent stability is no product of institutional strength, but rather an increasingly fractious balance of external rents and coercive control-- underpinned by geopolitical relevance.
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Why have one mega-dam when you can have three more? Details are scarce, but Ethiopia has unveiled plans to build three more dams on the Blue Nile, just a few months after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
In early 1987, the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), John Garang, is reported to have issued a radio order, instructing his field officers to gather children to be dispatched to Ethiopia for military training. Garang's command conveyed the rebels' institutionalisation of a well-established practice of child soldiering; a dynamic that has been reproduced by virtually every major armed actor in Sudan-- and later South Sudan-- since independence. Today, as war has continued to ravage and metastasise across Sudan, few communities and children have been left untouched by the ruinous violence.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.