Brigade N'Hamedu and the fight against transnational repression
Today's editorial in The Ethiopian Cable is written by Aron Hagos Tesfai.
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Since mid-2022, thousands of Eritrean refugees and second-generation diaspora youth have mobilised against the authoritarian Eritrean regime in waves of protests across the world. In a matter of months, the pro-democracy, anti-regime activists, known as the 'Brigade N'Hamedu' or the Blue Revolution, have transformed the Eritrean diaspora opposition movement. Significant protests have been held in European countries, including Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as Canada, Israel, and Australia. Many have made international headlines, in large part due to the often violent confrontations that have followed. However, while prominent news outlets, including CNN and the BBC, have covered these protests, the reporting is typically skewed towards the violence that has ensued. Nuances around the reasons why Brigade N'Hamedu is targeting the pro-regime 'cultural festivals', who they are, and what they are demanding have been largely ignored.
Brigade N'Hamedu is not Eritrea's first diaspora opposition movement, but its scope and scale mark it out from its predecessors. Its name, 'Brigade N'Hamedu,' can be roughly translated into an action-oriented, tightly networked movement seeking to liberate their homeland (N'Hamedu means 'for the soil' in Tigriyna). The movement is also known for carrying a blue flag rather than the official national flag of Eritrea, a symbol that was first used by the autonomous region of Eritrea during its federation with Ethiopia between 1952 and 1961. Today, Brigade N'Hamedu fly the flag as a rejection of the un-elected dictatorship of Isaias Afwerki and as a sign of how it is seeking to bring parliamentary democracy to Eritrea.
The Blue Revolution movement began in earnest towards the end of 2022 and the conclusion of the Tigray War in November 2022. During the Tigray War, domestic repression and forcible conscription within Eritrea dramatically escalated. Former soldiers and deserters were rounded up alongside youths to increase the military capacity of the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF). Indefinite military service is not new in Eritrea, with the regime often jailing or punishing families whose members have sought to avoid conscription. This time, however, security forces seized livestock and evicted entire households until conscripts reported for duty. This heightened repression, alongside deteriorating socio-economic situations in Eritrea, has upset the relational dynamics that had previously meant many of those abroad kept their anti-regime sentiments private.
Most notably, the protests have sought to expose and resist the transnational and domestic repression of the Eritrean regime and its various diaspora institutions. Prominent among these are the 'cultural festivals' that have been organised in Western countries for decades to raise funds, intimidate possible opposition, and serve as a mouthpiece of the regime. During the Tigray War, for instance, the Eritrean government sought to mobilise the pro-regime diaspora to whitewash its crimes in Tigray through these 'festivals' that preached hate against Tigrayans. Eritrea diaspora opposition that criticised the participation and crimes of the EDF in Tigray were also targeted by regime loyalists and deemed as traitors. Brigade N'Hamedu has sought to expose the often illegal activities within these festivals and, in turn, to sever a vital revenue stream for the regime. This has taken place through public demonstrations but also by bringing legal action against regime loyalists who abuse countries' asylum systems by claiming experiences of human rights abuses. Activists have also attempted to expose venues that host fundraising events for the regime.
The Eritrean regime's diaspora policy is known for its transnational repression and exploitation of overseas communities for financial and political gain. The country's fragile economy is heavily reliant on diaspora remittances, with embassy and regime loyalists often threatening and coercing individuals into paying the infamous 2% diaspora tax or contributing funds for regime events. Meanwhile, Eritrean officials are routinely dispatched to organised music concerts, political conferences, and cultural festivals to spew the latest regime propaganda. For years, these festivals and concerts have been allowed to go ahead even though activists have warned that the Eritrea regime uses them to fundraise for its wars and threaten the diaspora.
Since the first protest in Giessen, Germany, in October 2022, activists have sought to engage with police and local authorities to shut down these festivals or pro-regime events. This has rarely worked, however, with the vast majority of the events continuing uninterrupted. Subsequently, if the events do go ahead, protests are mobilised at their venue and seek to physically disrupt the proceedings. At times, this has resulted in scenes of intense violence, such as in Israel in September 2023, where the police used live fire in an attempt to disperse the clashing groups of Eritreans. More than 150 people were injured in the ensuing violence. The clashes are certainly unfortunate, but they are arguably a manifestation of the raw emotion felt by unheard and disenfranchised communities whom the Eritrean regime has exploited.
Still, the opposition of the Eritrean diaspora has long lacked a united front. Prior to the arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu, the opposition had been largely influenced by an older generation of migrants and refugees, many of whom had fought in the Eritrean War of Independence. Other movements have also emerged in recent years, such as the Global Yialk Movement, which was founded in the wake of the deceptive reconciliation between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean regime in 2018. Years of divisions over issues such as the role and position of the Ethiopian government to the Eritrean regime remain today. Some view Ethiopia as a possible ally in removing Isaias and his cabal, while others consider the government untrustworthy. The Tigray War, too, proved divisive amongst elements of the opposition diaspora. And much of the older generations dislike younger refugees and use the dismissive Tigriyna term 'Nai Himamey' that insinuates that they are a negligent generation uninterested in the politics of Eritrea. The arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu is a significant departure from these older opposition elements. It is a youth-led movement, mostly made up of recent refugees but with a substantial proportion of second-generation Eritreans. The growing number of female activists and organisers in Brigad N'Hamedu is another marked departure from previous diaspora opposition movements.
The arrival of Brigade N'Hamedu is a powerful expression of the anger towards the Eritrean regime at home and overseas. The protests are also a way of asserting their identity and voice as Eritreans who care about the fate of their homeland and their fellow citizens. Though divisions remain and the violence often leads to negative headlines, the youth-led Blue Revolution has already proven itself to be a game-changer in Eritrean diaspora politics.
Aron Hagos Tesfai is a post-doctoral researcher at the School of Applied Human Science, University KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He works on diaspora politics and is a human rights activist. Contact him here: aribanov@gmail.com , Twitter (X) – AronT @aribanob
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