Crisis in Amhara region
Armed clashes between the Amhara nationalist militia ‘Fano’ and Ethiopian security forces dramatically escalated last week after months of unrest. While details are still unclear, major urban centres, including the regional capital Bahir Dar, Gondar, Woldiya, and Debre Berhan have all reportedly experienced violence in recent days. Internet access has been severed in much of the region, alongside reports of enforced curfews and blocked roads. Irreconcilable historical claims, opposing narratives, and unsettled power struggles threaten to escalate the conflict further.
In recent months, there have been numerous cases of Fano militants targeting and displacing civilians in the Oromia, Tigray, and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. The ongoing clashes in the Amhara region that began last week, however, mark a worrying escalation. On Friday 4 August, the federal Council of Ministers declared a 6-month state of emergency in the Amhara region to “protect the safety and peace of the people and to enforce law and order.” Amhara regional President Yilkal Kefaya, operating from Addis Ababa, had called for federal intervention after claiming that “regular peace-enforcing mechanisms” were “impossible” in this context. Security forces have now been given sweeping powers to crack down on the militia group, with the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) ramping up preparations for a large-scale offensive against Fano.
These fresh clashes appear to have been triggered by an attempt by ENDF forces to quash the Fano presence in Kobo town, and nearby areas. Fano militants responded by seizing the holy town of Lalibela and its airport. They also attacked federal security forces in Gondar and elsewhere. Director General of Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Temesgen Tiruneh, while not mentioning Fano by name, confirmed on 7 August that armed groups control some areas in the region. Temesgen has been placed in charge of the four military command posts that will oversee the region’s state of emergency.
Fano is an irredeemably violent militia. It is not an organised outfit, agitating for greater representation or economic prosperity through democratic routes. It has burned and destroyed property, killed hundreds of civilians, and displaced thousands across several regions. Many of these attacks are motivated by an attempt to reclaim what it perceives as ‘stolen lands’ from Amhara. The militant group poses a grave threat to the country’s stability, both by its actions and as a trend. An unorganised militia that targets civilians without qualms could upend Ethiopia completely if allowed to continue its destabilising campaign. Non-Amhara within the region may also face an escalation in violence from Fano forces, as they have done before during intense periods of conflict in Tigray and Oromia.
Fano was also responsible for some of the worst human rights violations during the Tigray War, with most perpetrators yet to see prosecution. Tragedies like the one on 17 January 2021, where Fano militia and others rounded up and killed dozens of Tigrayan men in Adi Goshu town in western Tigray, were numerous. And despite the Pretoria agreement stipulating the removal of all non-ENDF forces from western Tigray, Fano militiants have continued to occupy the territory and displace thousands of ethnic Tigrayans.
In mid-July, Fantu Tesfaye, speaker of Amhara’s regional council, said that the federal and regional governments would press on with the “law enforcement operation” to disarm Fano. Government officials repeatedly used the term ‘law enforcement operation’ during the Tigray War. But Fano is not the Tigray Defence Force (TDF). It is seemingly without a centralised command or clear military structure. And it has also shown little to no interest in actually governing any areas Fano displaces thousands from.
Fano’s lack of centralised command and seemingly popular base among the Amhara has made it difficult to subdue. The proliferation of weapons across the region and grievance narratives pushed by Amhara-nationalist media outlets have also sustained months of simmering violence. In April, a massive operation was undertaken to dissolve the country’s regional Special Forces into the national security architecture. But the decision to dissolve regional Special Forces into the police and national army proved controversial in the Amhara region. Perceived as specifically targeting Amhara forces, widespread protests and instability rocked the region. Senior Amhara government and military officials were targeted, including Girma Yeshitila, the Head of the Amhara Prosperity Party, who was assassinated on 27 April.
Whether this conflict spirals further may be shaped by any potential Eritrean involvement. Eritrea has trained and armed thousands of Fano fighters since the beginning of the Tigray War. Asmara’s support for the militant group has also continued past the Pretoria agreement, which it also opposed. While Eritrea has not yet thrown its full support behind its ally, it may yet do so. This would significantly widen the conflict and likely drag Tigray back into violence.
The situation is extremely volatile. What is clear, however, is that these fresh clashes are a concerning development from a brutal militia group that has shown a tendency for indiscriminate violence. There are also concerns that this conflict might further inflame other conflicts in Ethiopia. The intensifying ethnic violence in Gambella, ongoing Oromo Liberation Army activity, and countrywide lawlessness will likely be impacted by the repositioning of ENDF forces and attention.
The declaration of a state of emergency should also not be a carte blanche for federal and regional security forces to ignore human rights, however. Previous abuse of these emergency powers through similar military command posts in the Oromia region has raised concerns. Beginning to rebuild relationships with disillusioned Amhara communities will also be critical to responding to the threat of Fano. Protecting civilians must be front and centre in any campaign against Fano, which will undoubtedly seek to exploit any division.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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