Crisis in Amhara region
Armed clashes between the Amhara nationalist militia ‘Fano’ and Ethiopian security forces dramatically escalated last week after months of unrest. While details are still unclear, major urban centres, including the regional capital Bahir Dar, Gondar, Woldiya, and Debre Berhan have all reportedly experienced violence in recent days. Internet access has been severed in much of the region, alongside reports of enforced curfews and blocked roads. Irreconcilable historical claims, opposing narratives, and unsettled power struggles threaten to escalate the conflict further.
In recent months, there have been numerous cases of Fano militants targeting and displacing civilians in the Oromia, Tigray, and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. The ongoing clashes in the Amhara region that began last week, however, mark a worrying escalation. On Friday 4 August, the federal Council of Ministers declared a 6-month state of emergency in the Amhara region to “protect the safety and peace of the people and to enforce law and order.” Amhara regional President Yilkal Kefaya, operating from Addis Ababa, had called for federal intervention after claiming that “regular peace-enforcing mechanisms” were “impossible” in this context. Security forces have now been given sweeping powers to crack down on the militia group, with the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) ramping up preparations for a large-scale offensive against Fano.
These fresh clashes appear to have been triggered by an attempt by ENDF forces to quash the Fano presence in Kobo town, and nearby areas. Fano militants responded by seizing the holy town of Lalibela and its airport. They also attacked federal security forces in Gondar and elsewhere. Director General of Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Temesgen Tiruneh, while not mentioning Fano by name, confirmed on 7 August that armed groups control some areas in the region. Temesgen has been placed in charge of the four military command posts that will oversee the region’s state of emergency.
Fano is an irredeemably violent militia. It is not an organised outfit, agitating for greater representation or economic prosperity through democratic routes. It has burned and destroyed property, killed hundreds of civilians, and displaced thousands across several regions. Many of these attacks are motivated by an attempt to reclaim what it perceives as ‘stolen lands’ from Amhara. The militant group poses a grave threat to the country’s stability, both by its actions and as a trend. An unorganised militia that targets civilians without qualms could upend Ethiopia completely if allowed to continue its destabilising campaign. Non-Amhara within the region may also face an escalation in violence from Fano forces, as they have done before during intense periods of conflict in Tigray and Oromia.
Fano was also responsible for some of the worst human rights violations during the Tigray War, with most perpetrators yet to see prosecution. Tragedies like the one on 17 January 2021, where Fano militia and others rounded up and killed dozens of Tigrayan men in Adi Goshu town in western Tigray, were numerous. And despite the Pretoria agreement stipulating the removal of all non-ENDF forces from western Tigray, Fano militiants have continued to occupy the territory and displace thousands of ethnic Tigrayans.
In mid-July, Fantu Tesfaye, speaker of Amhara’s regional council, said that the federal and regional governments would press on with the “law enforcement operation” to disarm Fano. Government officials repeatedly used the term ‘law enforcement operation’ during the Tigray War. But Fano is not the Tigray Defence Force (TDF). It is seemingly without a centralised command or clear military structure. And it has also shown little to no interest in actually governing any areas Fano displaces thousands from.
Fano’s lack of centralised command and seemingly popular base among the Amhara has made it difficult to subdue. The proliferation of weapons across the region and grievance narratives pushed by Amhara-nationalist media outlets have also sustained months of simmering violence. In April, a massive operation was undertaken to dissolve the country’s regional Special Forces into the national security architecture. But the decision to dissolve regional Special Forces into the police and national army proved controversial in the Amhara region. Perceived as specifically targeting Amhara forces, widespread protests and instability rocked the region. Senior Amhara government and military officials were targeted, including Girma Yeshitila, the Head of the Amhara Prosperity Party, who was assassinated on 27 April.
Whether this conflict spirals further may be shaped by any potential Eritrean involvement. Eritrea has trained and armed thousands of Fano fighters since the beginning of the Tigray War. Asmara’s support for the militant group has also continued past the Pretoria agreement, which it also opposed. While Eritrea has not yet thrown its full support behind its ally, it may yet do so. This would significantly widen the conflict and likely drag Tigray back into violence.
The situation is extremely volatile. What is clear, however, is that these fresh clashes are a concerning development from a brutal militia group that has shown a tendency for indiscriminate violence. There are also concerns that this conflict might further inflame other conflicts in Ethiopia. The intensifying ethnic violence in Gambella, ongoing Oromo Liberation Army activity, and countrywide lawlessness will likely be impacted by the repositioning of ENDF forces and attention.
The declaration of a state of emergency should also not be a carte blanche for federal and regional security forces to ignore human rights, however. Previous abuse of these emergency powers through similar military command posts in the Oromia region has raised concerns. Beginning to rebuild relationships with disillusioned Amhara communities will also be critical to responding to the threat of Fano. Protecting civilians must be front and centre in any campaign against Fano, which will undoubtedly seek to exploit any division.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.