Issue No. 194

Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambitions 

In late July, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali told a gathering of business leaders that Ethiopia’s reliance on the Port of Djibouti was unsustainable in the long run. The costs are astronomical, and the port’s capacity inadequate to meet Ethiopia’s growing needs, Abiy said at the meeting in Addis Ababa. Nothing new here. Ethiopian governments have repeated this line for over 30 years since Eritrea became independent, and Ethiopia effectively lost access to the ports of Massawa and Assab on the Red Sea.
 
What has drawn attention to these seemingly typical remarks was a segment in which Abiy reportedly said, “We want to get a port through peaceful means, but if that fails, we will use force.” The suggestion of force has drawn some heat from critics of the Prime Minister and heightened nervousness in neighbouring states. Abiy, however, was speaking to a group of business leaders and likely wanted to emphasise his commitment to reducing Ethiopia's dependence on the Port of Djibouti. The suggestion of force may simply have been a colourful way of conveying his resolve.
 
The Port of Djibouti is a lifeline for Ethiopia. An estimated 95-98% of Ethiopia’s cargo is handled by Djibouti’s tiny port, with a 759-km Chinese-built rail network linking Addis to the Port of Doraleh, an extension of Djibouti’s port. But Ethiopian businesses complain of high port tariffs, inefficiency and transport costs. Discontent with the services and fees of using Djibouti continues to mount in Ethiopia, particularly as Abiy seeks to liberalise the Ethiopian economy.
  
Ethiopia is one of the Horn of Africa’s largest economies and its biggest market, with a growing population estimated at over 120 million people. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has explored the potential of using other regional ports to meet this growing demand. Port Sudan in Sudan, Lamu in Kenya, and Berbera in Somaliland have all been touted as possible solutions.
  
Today, Eritrea’s Assab and Massawa ports make the most geographical sense. But these ports require significant investment and dredging to bring them to a suitable standard for Ethiopian requirements. Negotiations with Eritrea would also likely be complicated, with relations between the two countries still tense since the Pretoria agreement in November 2022 concluded the Tigray War. Eritrea’s ongoing support for Amhara forces that occupy western Tigray also continues to undermine tentative peace in northern Ethiopia. Some have perceived Abiy’s comments as a veiled threat to Eritrea.
 
The Berbera Port in Somaliland is likely the best option for Ethiopia. The port has been expanded to handle containerised shipping and has a tarmac highway linking Somaliland and Ethiopia. In fact, much of the UAE’s and the Emirati-based Dubai Ports World’s enthusiasm and significant investment in Berbera was based on the assumption that Ethiopia would begin to divert some of its container traffic to Berbera from Djibouti. For unclear reasons, Ethiopia appears to have baulked at using Berbera.
 
Instead, Ethiopia is believed to be more interested in creating a naval and maritime outpost in Seylac. An ancient port in Somaliland, Seylac is located at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The location is ideal and coveted by many Ethiopian military strategists, particularly with the Egyptian navy expanding its expeditionary capabilities and deploying more ships to the Red Sea. Addis perceives this expansion as a strategic threat to its national security and wants a counterweight. But Somaliland is undecided and reluctant to lease out land on its coast without a major concession, such as unilateral recognition of Somaliland. Such an arrangement would be unusual and could bring its own complications, not least with Somalia, which claims sovereignty over Somaliland.
 
Abiy’s recent comments also come against the backdrop of landlocked Ethiopia attempting to rebuild its navy. In June 2018, PM Abiy announced plans to restore it, once the Horn’s largest but disbanded after Eritrean independence in 1993. In 2019, France agreed to support Ethiopia in this endeavour. Precise details of this agreement were unclear, but Ethiopia reportedly expressed an interest in purchasing naval ships from France alongside personnel training. Rear Admiral Kindu Gezu was subsequently appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy.
 
The Tigray War, however, slowed the pace of Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, with several European countries, including France, suspending military cooperation. The recent meeting between Abiy Ahmed and French President Emmanuel Macron in June 2023 is believed to have raised the possibility of France resuming support for Abiy’s plans.
 
Whatever its naval ambitions, Ethiopia undoubtedly needs alternative ports for its use and Berbera remains the most attractive option. Somaliland needs no force or arm-twisting to allow Ethiopia to use Berbera. That agreement already exists. It simply needs resolve. 

By the Ethiopian Cable team