Unstable Ethiopia
Hopes have faded that last November’s Pretoria agreement, which ended armed conflict in Tigray, might usher in a new period of Ethiopian stability. Today, sporadic armed clashes mark nearly every region of the country. Recent ethnic violence between the Anwak and Nuer communities in the Gambella region is symptomatic of Ethiopia’s broader instability. But these security dilemmas present a different type of challenge than the large-scale Tigray War and thus require a fundamentally different approach. Ethiopia has made significant progress in reconciling Addis and Mekelle. It is now important to take different steps across the country.
The recent annual report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) paints a worrying picture. While recognising the conclusion of the Tigray War, the report also highlights incidents of excessive force used by federal and regional security in responding to insurgencies and civilian protests in other areas. Demonstrations in Addis over demolished mosques in Sheger City saw four protesters shot dead in early June. On 16 May, overzealous local police killed a civilian in Sidama. And in Addis, students were arrested and held in adult facilities during protests about Afaan Oromo courses in public schools. Of particular concern are reports of regional Oromia regional forces attacking civilians they suspect of supporting the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Residents in the Ambo district of the West Shoa zone of Oromia said regional forces killed four members of one family after accusing them of feeding the OLA on 19 June. While such reports are difficult to verify, they remain alarming. Heavy-handed policing of communities already disenchanted with Addis only serves to compound the complexity of combating the OLA’s low-level insurgency.
The armed conflict between the OLA and Ethiopian security forces rumbles on. The positive signs that emerged from rapprochement and negotiations between the insurgent group and the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) after talks in Zanzibar in late April are all but gone. In a recent speech celebrating the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces Birhanu Jula accused the OLF of “working to jeopardise the sovereignty of Ethiopia” and “killing the Oromo people.” He struck a conciliatory tone towards Fano, however, asking the Fano militia to return home and lay down their weapons. He said that the ENDF, “does not have an agenda to fight Fano militia.”
But Fano does have an agenda to fight the ENDF. Deadly clashes continued into July, which has seen Fano militants reportedly throw grenades at a police station in Kobo in the Semien Wollo zone in the Amhara region, freeing prisoners and fighting with police. On 21 July, Fano ambushed ENDF soldiers playing sports in the North Showa zone in the early morning, killing an unknown number. The Amhara nationalist ethnic militia continues to attack and displace civilians across three regions of Ethiopia– Tigray, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Oromia.
Perhaps the most visible indication of Ethiopia’s instability is an increase in kidnappings, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia regions. Historically a tactic used by the OLA to collect ransom, there has been an alarming up-tick in kidnappings in recent weeks. Dozens have been abducted by kidnappers demanding huge ransoms ranging from USD 3,000 to 20,000. Unidentified assailants have also shown a grim willingness to kill victims whose families or employers cannot or will not pay their ransom.
Random civilians are not the only ones being targeted. The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) has said that four of its members have gone missing. OFC Secretary General Tiruneh Gamta has said the party had declared a local official, Melesse Chala, dead after being missing for two years. Some opposition members were reportedly seized by Ethiopian security forces, including regional police. Seven senior Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) leaders presumably remain in an undisclosed location in police custody despite several judicial orders for their release.
Gambella, historically one of Ethiopia’s more stable regions, has seen a deadly flare-up of ethnic tensions between Nuer and Anuak communities. Armed clashes between the region’s two dominant groups have left dozens dead. Ethnic Anuak militia were reportedly responsible for attacking two public buses on the outskirts of Gambella City on 13 July. Just days later, over 30 people were killed in an attack on a Nuer village. An indefinite curfew across much of Gambella has since been declared, with the Head of Gambella’s Communication Bureau saying that, “ethno-nationalism and tribalism are threatening the region.”
The heavy-handed response of regional and federal forces to the ethnic militia in the Oromia and Amhara regions has backfired, with no signs of violence abating. The disconnect between communities and their regional administrations has allowed armed groups to fill the void. Bringing regional forces under greater federal supervision could help decrease human rights violations. Community-led responses to armed clashes, rather than curfews and mass arrests, could also help restore trust. The FGE should also restart talks with the OLA to help bring stability to Oromia.
Finally, greater humanitarian support across Ethiopia is vitally needed. Local authorities are struggling to provide services in a country where 20 million people rely on food aid. The ongoing suspension of international humanitarian assistance further compounds the problem.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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