Rifts in Ethiopia’s oldest church
The conflict consuming Ethiopia’s ancient Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) rumbles on. Its schism with the now-independent Tigray Orthodox Tewahedo Church (TOTC) has widened with the 16 July election of 10 episcopates to serve in Tigray and overseas. This is not the first severing of the ETOC this year, however. The election of 10 Tigrayan candidates by the TOTC coincided with the anointing of 9 episcopates by the traditional Holy Synod for dioceses in Oromia and southern Ethiopia. As one division widened, another was partially resolved. The EOTC’s anointing of episcopates appears to have closed the chapter on internal EOTC violence earlier this year. But the divisions between religious leaders in Tigray and Addis appear as large as ever, despite some attempts at reconciliation by the traditional Holy Synod.
On 22 January, three archbishops ordained 26 bishops for dioceses in Oromia and southern Ethiopia in defiance of the Holy Synod, forming the ‘Holy Synod of Oromia and Nations and Nationalities.’ The EOTC swiftly excommunicated the three Archbishops and 25 of the episcopates, one returned to the EOTC before the excommunication, involved in this “illegal anointment.” The conflict escalated into deadly clashes between supporters of the two synods in Shashemene City, and regional security forces who were accused by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission of using ‘excessive force’ in subduing protesters. Some within the Church accused the federal government of interfering in the crisis in support of the breakaway synod. Whatever the government’s earlier involvement, an agreement brokered by them was peacefully reached in mid-February and the divided parties reconciled. This week’s EOTC anointment appears to solidify this reconciliation.
On the same day as this anointment, however, the election of Tigrayan episcopates in Aksum solidified what the EOTC has called a “new illegal regional structure.” The severed relationship between the EOTC and TOTC may have started with the secularisation of Ethiopia after the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991. Some Orthodox leaders saw explicit secularisation and federalisation as an existential threat to the country, as well as to their interests. One new sect, Mahibere Kidusan, was subsequently founded in the 1990s, looking to recapture Orthodox Church power. It essentially sought to merge church and state, as in Imperial Ethiopia. This proved deeply controversial. Orthodox Christianity had been wielded as an instrument of oppression by Ethiopia’s Imperial rulers. Mahibere Kidusan members and other EOTC leaders opposed to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), were also vocal in their support for the federal government in the 2020-2022 Tigray War. Daniel Kibret, now a political advisor to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, is believed to have been a senior figure in Mahibere Kidusan. He was subject to international condemnation after he called for the “total erasure” of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in June 2021.
Early on in the Tigray War, numerous monasteries, ancient sites, and churches were destroyed by federal forces and their allied militia. In one particularly tragic incident, the ancient Waldeba Monastery was ruined, and many of its members were killed. The Debre Damo, Mahberedego, Aksum, and Mariam Dinglat monasteries were also damaged, and their contents looted. EOTC's silence in the wake of this destruction was seen by many Tigrayan citizens, as well as their religious leaders, as tacit acceptance of, if not complicity, in these crimes. By January 2022, TOTC leaders thus decided to sever relations with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.
Since the end of the Tigray War in November 2022, the traditional Holy Synod has attempted to make amends. Its leaders apologised for “not giving a timely declaration to stop the war” and not “comforting the… people of the region.” In May 2023, it announced a contribution of ETB 20 million in humanitarian support in Tigray, and it recently provided salaries and a budget for the Kessate Berhan Spiritual College in Mekelle. But a delegation led by EOTC Patriarch Abune Matthias to Mekelle in early July was unsuccessful in its attempt to restore good relations. The Patriarch was rebuffed by Nebure’ed Tesfay Tewolde, Executive Member of the Tigray Orthodox Church, who said the “apology was a good thing, but it is too late and not enough.”
Reconciliation between the EOTC and the TOTC is unlikely to be quickly achieved. The trauma of the Tigray War served to unify TOTC leadership and members against resolution. The traditional Holy Synod’s apology has been perceived by many to be insufficient, failing to address the destruction that some in the Church previously supported. If the EOTC is genuine in its pursuit of reconciliation, it could take action against those involved in inciting violence in Tigray, particularly from within the Mahibere Kidusan sect. Tigray holds some of the Orthodox world’s most ancient and cherished relics, including the Seat of Zion in Aksum, where the Ark of the Covenant is believed to reside. The EOTC would be remiss to abandon a real chance at Church reconciliation.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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