A historical claims to western Tigray
Ethiopia’s long, complex history of internal conquest and subjugation has led to myriad territorial claims and counter-claims. Today this is perhaps most clearly seen in the occupation of western Tigray by Amhara nationalists. Amhara forces have displaced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans into overcrowded, under-resourced internally displaced persons (IDP) camps across Tigray and eastern Sudan. Despite the promised removal of non-Ethiopian National Defence Force fighters as part of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022, there has to date been little progress in removing them. Displacement and other reported human rights violations are ongoing. As Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has recently suggested negotiations between the Amhara and Tigray regional administrations over the occupation, it is now worth returning to the ethnic and administrative history of western Tigray.
The occupation has been repeatedly framed by Amhara nationalists who claim western Tigray as the restoration of fertile land to its rightful owners. In July 2021, one revealing online comment by a supporter of the war claimed the “defeated Great Tigray had to abandon the fertile regions it had stolen from the Amharas in the 1990s, and had to retreat to its arid [land].” Professor Jan Nyssen and Ghent University’s analysis of dozens of maps spanning 1607 to 1967 sheds light on some of these controversial claims. Beginning in the late 17th century, administrative and other boundaries were increasingly displayed in these maps. Between 1683 and 1941, 39 maps of northern Ethiopia show Tigray’s western border far below the Tekeze River, a major waterway stretching from the Simien Mountains into Sudan, and even south of the Simien Mountains. Much of this territory is now under Amhara control.
Another controversial claim– Welkait, bordered by Humera and Tsegade– is only briefly depicted under the Amhara administration, between 1891 and 1894. By comparison, it is consistently shown under different Tigrayan authorities. Welkait was also shown to be part of Gondar between 1944 and 1990, a legacy of Emperor Haile Selassie’s reorganisation of northern Ethiopia, partly in response to Tigray’s ‘Woyane rebellion' in 1943. The Emperor used territorial reorganisation to reward supporters and punish enemies. But imperial administration was not based on ethnic composition, as seen in Gondar itself, where a third of its population was made up of Tigrinya speakers. And during the Derg, a message between the Ministry of Defence and military command in 1984 complained that Welkait and Tsegade residents supported the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), because most spoke Tigrinya.
Most important, a meta-analysis of these maps reveals that for most of the last three centuries, western Tigray has been either semi-autonomous or under Tigrayan administration. This is not to deny that parts of western Tigray have come under Amhara administration at certain times, but the charge that there has been an unbroken line of Amhara cultivation of these fertile lands is ahistorical.
Still, mapping ethno-linguistic demographics is limited by its generalised nature. Areas with intermingled communities, and where there is significant cooperation between ethnic groups, are not easily defined by generalised boundaries. Tigrinya is not the only language spoken in western Tigray; these maps also reveal Kunama along the southern part of the Tekeze River. The meta-analysis does, however, indicate a predominance of Tigrayans and Tigrinya-speaking communities there.
Reconstituting administrative control of western Tigray along the borders established by Haile Selassie and Derg would be both ahistorical and unconstitutional. And cementing a contravention of the Pretoria agreement, with armed conflict, and trauma, still so recent for so many, would be a mistake for several reasons. First, it would likely embolden Amhara nationalism, and irredentism across Ethiopia. Territorial claims by irregular forces like the Fano militia have already displaced thousands along the borders of the Amhara region, particularly in Oromia.
Second, there is little stomach for handing over Tigrayan land to Amhara forces. The frustration of IDPs and other civilians continues to grow in relation to the perceived inability of the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) and Tigrayan authorities to compel Amhara forces to leave western Tigray. Tigray’s still-abysmal humanitarian situation-- due in large part to the recent suspension of international aid-- further imperils the Pretoria agreement. Concerns that occupying forces and others accused of human rights violations are unlikely to see prosecution or even removal from service, are growing. These concerns are becoming increasingly voiced by Tigrayan leaders. Ato Mulwork Kidanemariam, former chair of the Tigray Electoral Commission, recently emphasised that the “Tigray region should be [fully] restored.”
All involved parties must become involved in genuine reconciliation efforts, but this will only be possible by addressing the intentional misinterpretation of Ethiopian history by Amhara nationalists and other propagandists. With Ethiopian narratives so greatly contested and so deeply entrenched, this will be far from straightforward. Examining maps is an important place to start. While the FGE and interim Tigrayan authorities have made critical strides in restoring the relationship between Addis and Mekelle, far more must now be done to make peace between Mekelle and Bahir Dar.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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