A historical claims to western Tigray
Ethiopia’s long, complex history of internal conquest and subjugation has led to myriad territorial claims and counter-claims. Today this is perhaps most clearly seen in the occupation of western Tigray by Amhara nationalists. Amhara forces have displaced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans into overcrowded, under-resourced internally displaced persons (IDP) camps across Tigray and eastern Sudan. Despite the promised removal of non-Ethiopian National Defence Force fighters as part of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022, there has to date been little progress in removing them. Displacement and other reported human rights violations are ongoing. As Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has recently suggested negotiations between the Amhara and Tigray regional administrations over the occupation, it is now worth returning to the ethnic and administrative history of western Tigray.
The occupation has been repeatedly framed by Amhara nationalists who claim western Tigray as the restoration of fertile land to its rightful owners. In July 2021, one revealing online comment by a supporter of the war claimed the “defeated Great Tigray had to abandon the fertile regions it had stolen from the Amharas in the 1990s, and had to retreat to its arid [land].” Professor Jan Nyssen and Ghent University’s analysis of dozens of maps spanning 1607 to 1967 sheds light on some of these controversial claims. Beginning in the late 17th century, administrative and other boundaries were increasingly displayed in these maps. Between 1683 and 1941, 39 maps of northern Ethiopia show Tigray’s western border far below the Tekeze River, a major waterway stretching from the Simien Mountains into Sudan, and even south of the Simien Mountains. Much of this territory is now under Amhara control.
Another controversial claim– Welkait, bordered by Humera and Tsegade– is only briefly depicted under the Amhara administration, between 1891 and 1894. By comparison, it is consistently shown under different Tigrayan authorities. Welkait was also shown to be part of Gondar between 1944 and 1990, a legacy of Emperor Haile Selassie’s reorganisation of northern Ethiopia, partly in response to Tigray’s ‘Woyane rebellion' in 1943. The Emperor used territorial reorganisation to reward supporters and punish enemies. But imperial administration was not based on ethnic composition, as seen in Gondar itself, where a third of its population was made up of Tigrinya speakers. And during the Derg, a message between the Ministry of Defence and military command in 1984 complained that Welkait and Tsegade residents supported the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), because most spoke Tigrinya.
Most important, a meta-analysis of these maps reveals that for most of the last three centuries, western Tigray has been either semi-autonomous or under Tigrayan administration. This is not to deny that parts of western Tigray have come under Amhara administration at certain times, but the charge that there has been an unbroken line of Amhara cultivation of these fertile lands is ahistorical.
Still, mapping ethno-linguistic demographics is limited by its generalised nature. Areas with intermingled communities, and where there is significant cooperation between ethnic groups, are not easily defined by generalised boundaries. Tigrinya is not the only language spoken in western Tigray; these maps also reveal Kunama along the southern part of the Tekeze River. The meta-analysis does, however, indicate a predominance of Tigrayans and Tigrinya-speaking communities there.
Reconstituting administrative control of western Tigray along the borders established by Haile Selassie and Derg would be both ahistorical and unconstitutional. And cementing a contravention of the Pretoria agreement, with armed conflict, and trauma, still so recent for so many, would be a mistake for several reasons. First, it would likely embolden Amhara nationalism, and irredentism across Ethiopia. Territorial claims by irregular forces like the Fano militia have already displaced thousands along the borders of the Amhara region, particularly in Oromia.
Second, there is little stomach for handing over Tigrayan land to Amhara forces. The frustration of IDPs and other civilians continues to grow in relation to the perceived inability of the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) and Tigrayan authorities to compel Amhara forces to leave western Tigray. Tigray’s still-abysmal humanitarian situation-- due in large part to the recent suspension of international aid-- further imperils the Pretoria agreement. Concerns that occupying forces and others accused of human rights violations are unlikely to see prosecution or even removal from service, are growing. These concerns are becoming increasingly voiced by Tigrayan leaders. Ato Mulwork Kidanemariam, former chair of the Tigray Electoral Commission, recently emphasised that the “Tigray region should be [fully] restored.”
All involved parties must become involved in genuine reconciliation efforts, but this will only be possible by addressing the intentional misinterpretation of Ethiopian history by Amhara nationalists and other propagandists. With Ethiopian narratives so greatly contested and so deeply entrenched, this will be far from straightforward. Examining maps is an important place to start. While the FGE and interim Tigrayan authorities have made critical strides in restoring the relationship between Addis and Mekelle, far more must now be done to make peace between Mekelle and Bahir Dar.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.