Eritrean refugees: Between a rock and a hard place
For the second time in just three years, Eritrean refugees have been caught in armed conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Tigray War that broke out in November 2020 saw an estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees across camps in Tigray targeted by Eritrean security forces. Now, with Sudan engulfed in civil war, and with limited humanitarian aid, Eritrean refugees are facing another deteriorating situation.
The direct threat of violence to Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan is edging nearer. The conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is broadening and deepening, despite sporadic ceasefires. There is little sign of it abating. The Sudanese state is collapsing, and the most vulnerable, including Eritrean refugees, are facing several dangers.
Eritrean refugees have fled one of the world’s most deeply repressive countries, the ‘hermit kingdom’ of Africa. Every year thousands of citizens flee Eritrea to avoid being pressed into indefinite military service. Even before Sudan’s most recent conflagration, the routes taken by Eritrean refugees were already dangerous. Long and treacherous, largely to the Middle East and Europe, these routes are populated by human traffickers.
Before the outbreak of armed conflict, there were an estimated 136,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan, 11% of the country’s refugee population. According to UNHCR, nearly 80% of Eritrean refugees have stayed in Sudan’s Kasalla state, the majority in three Shagarab camps on the Eritrean border. A Médecins Sans Frontières report from 2021 highlighted the already unforgiving environment in these camps. Built on soil like ‘black cotton,’ the camps were hard and cracked during the dry season and muddy in the rainy season.
Reports emerging from these camps at this time paint a bleak picture of a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis. Recent support has been limited to just a handful of camps; with supply routes increasingly dangerous, aid is sporadic at best. One camp near Kasalla town, Wad Sharife, has reported refugees’ deteriorating health amidst the spread of disease. In another, Um Gargour, refugees are sheltering in abandoned school buildings with no clean water and limited food. Those outside of camps are receiving even less support, if any.
Eritrean refugees outside of camps are at greatest risk from Eritrea’s National Security Agency (NSA). One Eritrean human rights activist has claimed that thousands of Eritrean refugees have been forcibly deported by the NSA into the Eritrean town of Teseney. While such numbers are difficult to verify, there are increasing numbers of stories of refugees disappearing. This is not the first time Eritrean refugees have been forcibly abducted near Kassala town. In 2014, 14 civilians, including 6 children, were kidnapped by unidentified armed men.
And this is tragically reminiscent of what happened in Tigray from the early stages of the war. Eritrean refugees were specifically targeted by Eritrean forces, with many either killed or forcibly repatriated. The Shimela and Hitsats refugee camps were destroyed; they had sheltered some 20,000 Eritreans who were then further displaced deeper into Tigray, or into Sudan where they are now caught in conflict again.
There must now be a concerted effort to support the safe passage of Eritrean refugees, and others, out of Sudan and into more stable countries. Eritreans are particularly in need of support, with Asmara unwilling to guarantee the safety of its citizens, and Eritrean refugees afraid to return. Reports of Eritrean refugees being turned away from neighbouring countries should be fully investigated.
As for the Kasalla camps, it is important to re-envision the means and type of support provided to the refugees there. Providing direct cash assistance could help alleviate dependence on sporadic aid and help lift some of the immense pressure from humanitarian organisations, including UNHCR, delivering critical aid. Vanessa Tsehaye, Executive Director of One Day Seyoum- an advocacy group for Eritrean refugees-- has also called for a rethinking of the camps’ locations, considering reports of “forced returns… that should be taken seriously.”
The current fate of Eritrean refugees, many caught for the second time in another country’s armed conflict, speaks to a disturbing level of international disinterest. The ongoing war in Ukraine and recent Sino-US tensions have sucked much of the diplomatic oxygen out of humanitarian crises in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. Significant humanitarian aid and serious political attention are required to adequately address the unfurling human catastrophes on the ground. Not just reactive policies.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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