Eritrean refugees: Between a rock and a hard place
For the second time in just three years, Eritrean refugees have been caught in armed conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Tigray War that broke out in November 2020 saw an estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees across camps in Tigray targeted by Eritrean security forces. Now, with Sudan engulfed in civil war, and with limited humanitarian aid, Eritrean refugees are facing another deteriorating situation.
The direct threat of violence to Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan is edging nearer. The conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is broadening and deepening, despite sporadic ceasefires. There is little sign of it abating. The Sudanese state is collapsing, and the most vulnerable, including Eritrean refugees, are facing several dangers.
Eritrean refugees have fled one of the world’s most deeply repressive countries, the ‘hermit kingdom’ of Africa. Every year thousands of citizens flee Eritrea to avoid being pressed into indefinite military service. Even before Sudan’s most recent conflagration, the routes taken by Eritrean refugees were already dangerous. Long and treacherous, largely to the Middle East and Europe, these routes are populated by human traffickers.
Before the outbreak of armed conflict, there were an estimated 136,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan, 11% of the country’s refugee population. According to UNHCR, nearly 80% of Eritrean refugees have stayed in Sudan’s Kasalla state, the majority in three Shagarab camps on the Eritrean border. A Médecins Sans Frontières report from 2021 highlighted the already unforgiving environment in these camps. Built on soil like ‘black cotton,’ the camps were hard and cracked during the dry season and muddy in the rainy season.
Reports emerging from these camps at this time paint a bleak picture of a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis. Recent support has been limited to just a handful of camps; with supply routes increasingly dangerous, aid is sporadic at best. One camp near Kasalla town, Wad Sharife, has reported refugees’ deteriorating health amidst the spread of disease. In another, Um Gargour, refugees are sheltering in abandoned school buildings with no clean water and limited food. Those outside of camps are receiving even less support, if any.
Eritrean refugees outside of camps are at greatest risk from Eritrea’s National Security Agency (NSA). One Eritrean human rights activist has claimed that thousands of Eritrean refugees have been forcibly deported by the NSA into the Eritrean town of Teseney. While such numbers are difficult to verify, there are increasing numbers of stories of refugees disappearing. This is not the first time Eritrean refugees have been forcibly abducted near Kassala town. In 2014, 14 civilians, including 6 children, were kidnapped by unidentified armed men.
And this is tragically reminiscent of what happened in Tigray from the early stages of the war. Eritrean refugees were specifically targeted by Eritrean forces, with many either killed or forcibly repatriated. The Shimela and Hitsats refugee camps were destroyed; they had sheltered some 20,000 Eritreans who were then further displaced deeper into Tigray, or into Sudan where they are now caught in conflict again.
There must now be a concerted effort to support the safe passage of Eritrean refugees, and others, out of Sudan and into more stable countries. Eritreans are particularly in need of support, with Asmara unwilling to guarantee the safety of its citizens, and Eritrean refugees afraid to return. Reports of Eritrean refugees being turned away from neighbouring countries should be fully investigated.
As for the Kasalla camps, it is important to re-envision the means and type of support provided to the refugees there. Providing direct cash assistance could help alleviate dependence on sporadic aid and help lift some of the immense pressure from humanitarian organisations, including UNHCR, delivering critical aid. Vanessa Tsehaye, Executive Director of One Day Seyoum- an advocacy group for Eritrean refugees-- has also called for a rethinking of the camps’ locations, considering reports of “forced returns… that should be taken seriously.”
The current fate of Eritrean refugees, many caught for the second time in another country’s armed conflict, speaks to a disturbing level of international disinterest. The ongoing war in Ukraine and recent Sino-US tensions have sucked much of the diplomatic oxygen out of humanitarian crises in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. Significant humanitarian aid and serious political attention are required to adequately address the unfurling human catastrophes on the ground. Not just reactive policies.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.