Refugees who fled Western Tigray now face war in Sudan
The situation of Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum is dire. Ongoing armed conflict in Sudan’s capital has made life even worse for those who already lacked basic necessities, and for those who were forced to cope with human trafficking, and with other forms of severe exploitation. This situation has become especially challenging for those who cannot afford to find a new home. As a result, many have become urban refugees, struggling to survive in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in large cities like Gedarif and Khartoum.
The latest influx of Ethiopian refugees to Gedarif, where many had already been residing, has presented a new set of challenges. The Refugee Consultation Forum estimated that there were over 69,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan as of mid-May 2023. Local authorities have struggled to prioritize refugee needs and to make swift decisions about where to place them more permanently. This has prevented international non-governmental organisations from building necessary structures such as latrines, and reasonable sanitation being a basic right that these refugees are denied. The lack of effective protection mechanisms has exposed them to abuse, including gender based violence, exploitation, and discrimination.
Many of these refugees have fled from another dire situation in Western Tigray. That area is still occupied by Amhara Fano militia, Eritrean forces, and not-yet-federalised Tigray Defence Forces, often living in what used to be these refugees’ homes. Fano is a vigilante militia, which has committed atrocities against Tigrayans, and made it impossible for many refugees to return home. While there are areas in Central Tigray that are now relatively safe, many refugees cannot afford the transport from Sudan to Ethiopia.
Since the conflict erupted in Sudan on 15 April, nearly 75,000 individuals have been displaced from Khartoum to Gedarif State, according to the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. Most of the displaced are Sudanese, who are often housed with friends and relatives, while non-Sudanese– many Ethiopians residing in Khartoum for work-- have gathered in refugee camps.
One of the most pressing issues facing Ethiopian refugees-- across Sudan-- is the prevalence of human trafficking and other forms of severe exploitation. Vulnerable and desperate, refugees become easy targets for unscrupulous individuals and criminal networks. Many are driven into forced labour, including domestic slavery, farm labour, and informal industries. Others fall victim to human trafficking, particularly at border points. Smugglers are currently charging around 400,000 SDG (665 USD) to transport Tigrayans through Al Debazene, a price not affordable for the majority of refugees.
Sudan remains in conflict which has caused internal displacement and secondary movement of refugees. It has severely reduced the capacity of international aid organisations to provide assistance, and the country’s critical infrastructure has been largely damaged or destroyed. This has led to reduced availability of drinking water, lack of fuel and medical supplies, rising commodity prices, and worsening inflation. The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) recently reported that approximately one-third of the population of Sudan was already facing hunger before 15 April. As the conflict jeopardises the planting season, Sudan’s already dire food insecurity is likely to grow even worse.
International aid organisations have reported that their offices have been ransacked and looted since the start of the conflict, leaving them without materials, goods, or vehicles, and their staff fearing for their safety and well-being. Many organisations have relocated from Khartoum to Port Sudan in an attempt to continue operations despite the conflict. WFP reported in early May that a total of 17,000 metric tonnes of their food aid (worth at least USD 13 million) had been looted in the first few days of the conflict. Despite such challenges, WFP recently restarted its food distribution in the states of Gedarif, Kasalla, and White Nile.
The challenges faced by Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum and other areas of Sudan require immediate attention-- and action-- from multilateral institutions, governments, and humanitarian organisations. Aside from providing access to basic services such as emergency health care, food, water, shelter, and settlement, efforts should focus on strengthening protection mechanisms, improving access to education, advocating rights, and providing holistic support to survivors of violence of any kind.
The need for essential humanitarian assistance across Sudan was already at record levels before April 2023, with 15.8 million people in need according to estimates by IFRC. As the Sudanese economy is facing high inflation and rising costs for basic commodities, organisations operating in Sudan and offering assistance to refugees are also facing financial requirements. It is critical for the international community to come together to address funding shortfalls and to provide long term, sustainable and predictable funding to national and international organisations operating in Sudan, to allow them to adequately address the urgent needs of refugees and internally displaced persons.
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