Issue No. 178

Oromia’s war must end through renewed negotiations
 

On 25 April 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the commencement of peace talks with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) taking place in Zanzibar. For the first time, the Ethiopian government formally declared it would sit down for talks with the rebel group. Two days later the two sides met under the auspices of the Kenyan and Norwegian governments, with IGAD playing a supporting role. These preliminary negotiations lasted for 8 days, and while they did not end with an agreement, both camps sounded positive about future peace talks.
 
Yet renewed violence in recent weeks has since dashed optimism that peace might be on the horizon. Again, civilians across Oromia face instability, violence, and displacement as the Ethiopian forces clash with the OLA. A toxic mix of political and ethnic violence threatens to engulf Oromia just as Ethiopia navigates a tricky path to peace in Tigray.
 
This destructive conflict in Oromia could have been avoided. The September 2018 Agreement between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian Federal Government was never fully implemented. Negotiated by Lemma Megersa, then the Regional President of Oromia, the agreement promised pardons to armed opposition fighters, including the OLF, Ginbot 7, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), in exchange for laying down their weapons. A joint OLF-Ethiopian government committee was established to implement the agreement, specifically the OLA's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Yet no guidelines were established to undertake this critical DDR process, paving the way for a resumption of armed conflict.
 
Soon after, in October 2018, armed conflict between the OLA and the federal government began in earnest with the imposition of military command posts across western and southern Oromia. Declaring a “State of Emergency,” the military administration cracked down on civilians accused of harbouring OLA sympathies. Many farmers were prevented from cultivating their land and collecting their harvest for allegedly supporting OLA fighters. Early curfews shuttered towns and cities under this oppressive administration.
 
In January 2020, the conflict escalated further. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) launched a full-scale military offensive against the OLA, including 8 army divisions headed by General Berhanu Jula, then ENDF Deputy Chief of Staff. Intended to degrade OLA military capacity and leadership, the operation concluded without success after just a few weeks. Tens of thousands were displaced amidst fighting that failed to dislodge, what the Ethiopia analyst Mebratu Kelecha called, the “fast-paced, small-scale operations” of the OLA.
 
Another attempt to degrade the OLA began in April 2022. The Oromia Regional Government announced a campaign to lay siege to OLA forces and coerce residents of Oromia to expel them. ENDF, Ethiopian Federal Police, Oromia Regional Police, Oromia Special Forces, and Oromo militia were deployed to enclose and destroy OLA forces from multiple directions–- the Wallagga, Guji, Western Shewa, Bale-Hararge, and north and east Shawa fronts. Again the forces attacking the OLA failed.
 
In 2022, with the international community focused on the conclusion of the 2-year armed conflict in Tigray, the federal government restarted military operations in Oromia. Between 19 October and 26 November, near-daily drone strikes killed hundreds of civilians across the West Showa, East Wollega, West Wollega, North Showa, and Horo Guduru Wollega zones.

Repeated attempts to quash the OLA have failed. Indeed, the reverse has occurred, with each attempt strengthening OLA support. In October 2018, the OLA was perhaps 2,000 strong, mainly operating along the Ethiopia-Sudan border. OLA’s strength and numbers have increased considerably since then. The OLA now operates within 50 miles of Addis, striking towns and military posts across the region in areas once beyond their reach, such as Nekemte in November 2022.
 
Still, by January 2023, belligerent rhetoric began to subside. The OLA published a manifesto pledging its willingness to end armed conflict through an internationally sponsored peace process. Abiy also spoke in terms that opened the door to the possibility of peace talks. These easing tensions culminated in the Prime Minister declaring peace talks with the OLA in April.

But since the conclusion of the Zanzibar talks, violent conflict has restarted with worrying intensity. Fighting has mainly been reported in the West and East Shoa zones of Oromia, with dozens of civilians injured and killed in clashes between the OLA and federal government forces. In a statement on 17 May, the OLA urged the international community “to condemn the regime’s attempts to control the negotiation terms through military force.”
 
The military approach to the OLF’s political conflict with Addis has proven counter-productive, engendering sympathy amongst many Oromo for the OLA and perpetuating further violence. And it appears that there is yet another military stalemate; the faster both sides realise this, the better.

But this latest violence and the relative failure of the initial Zanzibar talks need not be fatal to peace in Oromia. The international community should seize this moment to press both sides to restart talks. One potential blueprint for negotiations may be the recent Pretoria Agreement that ended the fighting in Tigray. In December 2022, several stakeholders, including 80 Oromo Members of Ethiopia’s Parliament, urged the government to consider this model to end armed conflict in Oromia.

But if negotiations are to begin again, fighting must be halted, and talks approached with greater seriousness and commitment from both sides.