How Eritrea could upend peace in Ethiopia
Late last week, Getachew Reda, president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, accused Eritrea of seeking to undermine the ongoing peace process in the region. Hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced due to the continued occupation by Eritrean forces, making some areas “off limits”, said Getachew. On 12 May, Tigray’s Eastern Zone security head, Kidu Gebretsadkan, also accused Eritrean forces of continuing to commit human rights violations in occupied areas, citing reports of killings, looting, and sexual violence. Eritrea’s presence in Tigray and its connections to potential spoilers across the region threaten the nascent peace.
Eritrean troops still occupy significant parts of Tigray. Precisely where is a matter for debate. The African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM) is yet to make a formal announcement regarding the occupation, despite its contravention of the Pretoria peace accord. Getachew’s recent comments follow Eritrean forces' reportedly blocking access to the AU-MVCM team at a checkpoint near Zalambesa and Dewhan towns in northern Tigray on 11 May. Ironically, the AU-MVCM team was reportedly there to verify the presence of Eritrean forces.
But there is enough anecdotal and satellite evidence to suggest that nearly all districts along the Eritrean-Tigray border are under some form of Eritrean military and administrative control. Eritrean troops are particularly visible in the historically contested Badme town and surrounding villages, the heart of two previous border conflicts.
And in western Tigray, Eritrean troops are reportedly continuing to provide combat support and training for occupying Amhara forces. This toehold is vital for Eritrea, allowing them to both support their Amhara allies and seal off Tigray’s access to Sudan. Control of the critical Humera Triangle on the Sudan-Ethiopian border has long been a key Eritrean national security imperative. Eritrean troops are also present in Tselemti, a border district with the Amhara Region in southern Tigray. In effect, Eritrean troops are maintaining a network of outposts and garrisons across Tigray which suggests an implicit strategy of encirclement.
Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have steadily deteriorated since the signing of the Pretoria peace accord between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). There is no formal acceptance of this accord by Eritrea, which feels under no obligation to commit to it or peace. Rhetorically, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki still talks of support for peace in Ethiopia. But in reality, he is reportedly furious at the ongoing reconciliation between the federal government and Tigray. Attempts to repair relations in Addis by the head of the Eritrean National Security Agency, General Abraha Kassa, in April 2023 are widely believed to have failed.
Asmara still has several levers it can pull to undermine the peace in Ethiopia. It could stoke anger amongst its Amhara allies over a number of issues, including the Pretoria peace accord, and potentially trigger armed conflict. However, the speed with which the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) has moved to disband the Amhara Special Forces and Fano militia suggests Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking to pre-empt that prospect. Eritrea could also use its Afar militia allies, believed to roughly number 17,000 fighters, to potentially destabilise northern Ethiopia and disrupt Ethiopia’s vital road and rail links to the Port of Djibouti. Eritrea is also likely to be maintaining a military footprint in Afar Regional State, having previously operated two training camps for Afar forces and militias.
Eritrea is also reportedly aggrieved that Ethiopia is seemingly unwilling to support Asmara's attempts to reassert itself in the Horn. Diplomatic sources have suggested that Addis is lukewarm to Isaias’s recent attempts to project himself as regional kingmaker. In February this year, Eritrea launched a fresh bid to rejoin the regional Intergovernmental Regional Authority on Development. But its efforts have since petered out, possibly due to meagre support from Addis and the wider region.
A wider conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is not inevitable. Both countries are militarily and financially exhausted, and there is little appetite for large-scale armed conflict at this stage. In Tigray, Getachew Reda, in his recent speech to foreign military attaches, said, “peace is the only game in town.” And on 23 May, thousands of demonstrators across Tigray called for the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces, many holding placards saying, "invaders must leave our homeland." The international community cannot allow this issue of Eritrean occupation to fester and undermine the positive steps made by the FGE and TPLF towards peace.
Eritrea must be compelled to leave Tigray - now.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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