Remember al-Fashaga
Sudan is facing collapse. The destruction of Khartoum, the displacement of millions and spreading armed conflict have sidelined any hope of transition to civilian governance. A lengthy conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now seems inevitable.
And the conflagration in Sudan threatens to pull in its neighbours, including Ethiopia. Sudan’s armed conflict is raging alongside divisions between Amhara nationalists and the Ethiopian federal government, against an unstable border, making the area extremely combustible. While neither Addis nor Khartoum is interested in escalating tensions, potential spoilers remain.
Some 260 square kilometres of fertile agricultural land between the Atbara and Setit Rivers, al-Fashaga lies between the Amhara Region of Ethiopia and Gedaref State in Sudan. Until 2020, Ethiopian-- largely Amhara-- farmers, settled the area, growing sunflowers, gum Arabic and cotton, despite colonial-era treaties that designated the ‘al-Fashaga triangle’ as Sudan’s.
In 2008, Sudan and Ethiopia reached a compromise establishing a ‘soft border,’ to leave the thousands of civilians living in al-Fashaga. Ethiopia would recognise Sudan’s claim to al-Fashaga, and Ethiopian citizens could continue farming there undisturbed. But subsequent regime changes in Ethiopia and Sudan have renewed uncertainty in al-Fashaga.
Since the removal of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from Ethiopia’s ruling coalition in 2018, an emboldened Amhara nationalist movement has renewed its territorial claims on historical lands. Amhara nationalism is deeply connected with the fertile borderlands of Ethiopia’s Tigray Region and Sudan, including al-Fashaga.
Clashes resumed in al-Fashaga, with Fano militia carrying out cattle raids as well as attacks on Sudanese farmers near Gallabat town in Gedaref. Several particularly intense skirmishes between fighters from Sudan and Ethiopia forced Ethiopian farmers from much of al-Fashaga. And in December 2020, 6,000 SAF soldiers seized the area while Ethiopian federal forces and their Amhara allies were occupied by the Tigray war.
Today, chaos in Sudan provides another opening for Amhara militia, now backed by Eritrea. Threatened by ongoing rapprochement between the Ethiopian federal government and the transitional administration of Tigray, and with Amhara control of western Tigray under threat, these militia could choose to resume focus on al-Fashaga.
Continual conflict over al-Fashaga is also symptomatic of a broader problem across the Horn. Colonial-era boundaries were hammered out in Europe without regard for fluid borders across the Horn of Africa. And disputed borders are particularly prone to violence, with profoundly destabilising consequences. The Horn has seen several armed conflicts over disputed borders, including the 1977 Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, the 1998 Badme War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the 2008 Djiboutian-Eritrean border conflict.
High-level engagement between Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Sudan’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander of the SAF, had recently begun to ease tensions between them before conflict broke out in Sudan. Abiy’s visit to Khartoum in January 2023 signalled a detente, after years of hostility over both al-Fashaga, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and alleged Sudanese support for the rebel Tigray Defense Forces during the two-year war.
This detente is now under threat from civil conflict in Sudan. Without a definitive agreement, al-Fashaga will remain a threat to Ethiopia’s border security. Further talks on al-Fashaga and other regional concerns are currently unrealistic. Ethiopia should instead seek means to support an end to the fighting in Sudan and continue its humanitarian support for those affected. All parties should also remain vigilant against Eritrea’s continued interest in exploiting opportunities in Ethiopia and potentially Sudan.
Al-Fashaga is now one small concern among many in Sudan. But its potential for cross-border conflict, political manipulation by interested parties, and further destabilisation in the two countries remains.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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