Reorganizing Special Forces in Ethiopia
On 6 April, 2023, the Ethiopian government announced the integration of Liyu Hayil, the special forces organized by regional governments, into Ethiopia’s wider security architecture. The announcement explicitly stated that this new arrangement was not meant to disarm, dissolve or dismantle the regional forces, but rather to create a centralized military and a professionalized law enforcement apparatus, to more effectively defend the country and maintain public order.
But members of the ethno-nationalist political party National Movement of the Amhara objected. They accused Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government of endangering Amhara residents of the Oromia and Amhara regions by allowing the Oromia and Tigray regions to keep their special forces. They also charged that the measure was designed to hand back to Tigray territories the Amhara region had annexed during the Tigray war.
Leaders of the Amhara Fano militia, an influential paramilitary group, exhorted Amhara Special Forces (ASF) to evacuate their camps to avoid being rounded up by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). They also appealed to the Amhara people to stand with them in the impending battle with the federal government. In response, protesters demonstrated in several Amhara cities, vowing to resist the dismantling of the ASF until the Ethiopian constitution had been abrogated or thoroughly revised. Several areas reported clashes between federal and Amhara regional forces, including Kobo town near the Tigray border, where two aid workers were killed in heavy fighting. The Amhara region seemed on the verge of long-term armed conflict.
Then the unexpected happened. On 15 April, Field Marshall Berhanu Jula, ENDF Chief of Staff, declared the integration process complete and the regional special forces defunct. He stated that there was no longer any force under the command of regional governments. The era of the special forces thus ended without a protracted fight.
What does this mean for Ethiopian politics? First, the dismantling of unconstitutional security forces heralds a possible return to constitutionality. The Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that the federal government is responsible for national defence and maintaining domestic public security. It also entrusts the task of maintaining public order in each state to its regional police force. But there is no clear provision for authority to be given to the federal or regional governments to establish special forces.
The first special force was created to combat the threat of counter-insurgency in the Somali region. In April 2007, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked the Abole oil field in Deghabour, killing 74 Ethiopian forces and 9 Chinese oil workers. The Ethiopian government responded by launching a counter-insurgency campaign to isolate and destroy the ONLF. That campaign saw severe human rights abuses, including displacement, forced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killings.
After three years of deadly and destructive conflict, the ENDF decided to hand over its operations to a local group. Somali regional police were effectively dismantled and replaced by an armed group called the Somali Special Force, also known as Liyu. The Liyu were a constitutional anomaly, designed to localise atrocities and develop the perception of the violence as an intra-Somali conflict.
The end of special forces may relieve potential conflict between regional states. The establishment of the Liyu had a cascading, negative effect on other regions. The Oromia regional government created its own special forces to fend off Liyu incursions and subsequent atrocities. The Tigray region built a large contingent of special forces to resist what the region’s leaders perceived as an imminent attack by federal forces. The Amhara region built its own special force as one element of resurgent Amhara nationalism. Other regions followed suit, each convinced that they needed their own defence forces.
Bringing all of these special forces under a single, centralized command could indeed diminish the likelihood of conflict between Ethiopia’s regional states. The tendency to use force to solve political conflicts would likely dissipate. Since the rise of Abiy Ahmed in 2018, regional special forces have engaged in significant political violence. In 2019, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, Commander-in-Chief of the ASF, staged an attempted coup using the forces under his command. This resulted in the death of the regional president Ambachew Mekonnen and other government officials. Special forces from nearly all regions were involved in the Tigray war, in which the ASF took the opportunity to advance their own agenda. In general, the existence of special forces has been the source of mutual confrontation and distrust between regional states, and has posed a grave danger to the peace and security of Ethiopia.
Overall, the integration of regional special forces can be seen as a positive step towards avoiding political chaos and the politics of localised conflict. But this does not mean that integration alone will lead to sustainable peace in Ethiopia. Political centralization and the concentration of power at the centre are themselves potential threats to peace.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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