Issue No. 155

Published 07 Mar 2023

A Seat at the Table

Published on 07 Mar 2023 17:08 min
A Seat at the Table
 
There is an unseemliness to the current power struggle among Tigrayans on the composition of the Interim Regional Administration (IRA), mandated in the November 2022 peace accord signed by the federal government of Ethiopia and the Tigrayan regional administration. According to Article 10 of the agreement, “…until elections for the Regional Council and the House of Peoples’ Representatives are held under the supervision of the Ethiopian National Election Board, the establishment of an inclusive Interim Regional Administration will be settled through political dialogue between the Parties.” 
 
The ink on the agreement had hardly dried when three opposition parties, the Tigray Independence Party, Salsay Weyane, and the National Congress for Greater Tigray, began jockeying for positions in the new interim administration. Each of the parties made clear they will not accept a TPLF-led organizing committee to oversee the establishment of the interim regional administration. The three also questioned the legitimacy of the current TPLF-led regional government, which is leading the initiative to establish the IRA, including the committee.
 
There is a need for inclusiveness in Tigray’s political future. Post-war Tigray will be different, and the people of Tigray will determine, through the electoral process, who will govern and how. 
 
In the meantime, the TPLF—elected by Tigrayans in September 2020—has begun to do the work of governance, within the constraints of the peace accord. General Tsadkan Gebretensae laid out ideas on the formation of this IRA in a piece called, “Towards the Formation of an Acceptable Interim Administration in Tigray.” In it, he commends the government for taking the initiative to form a committee to study the issue of setting up a transitional regional administration. At the same time, he criticizes the composition of the committee, calling them “handpicked and assigned by the government.” He concludes that “…the lack of legitimate representation is undeniable.” 
 
The organizing committee is composed of three representatives from the TPLF government, three scholars, and three representatives from the Tigraya Defence Forces (TDF). General Tsadkan frequently uses the term “stakeholders” to describe them. But aren’t all Tigrayans “stakeholders” in this process? He also enjoins the committee to appoint “technically competent and politically motivated” team leaders and members. Fair point. But are any of the individuals suggested for the interim regional administration technically incompetent and politically unmotivated? There is an automatic assumption here that the regional government’s appointments are based on “personal and political affiliation” only.
 
It is easy to write about “stakeholders,” “inclusiveness,” and “merit.” Yet, operationalising these concepts in a process to begin Tigray’s massive reconstruction and rehabilitation is quite different. Should there be a referendum to elect the technocrats responsible for various sectors? Is this operationally feasible? Is it in the best interests of the Tigrayan people? Would it delay reconstruction and rehabilitation?
One-third of the organizing committee seats were allocated to the TDF. Why? The region is still technically at war, though the Pretoria agreement constituted “the cessation of hostilities.” There are still significant gaps in the conditions of the agreement and the facts on the ground. Eritrean troops remain in parts of Tigray. Amhara militia remains in parts of Tigray. A great deal of humanitarian aid remains blocked. Tigray is still at war until these conditions change. It makes sense that Tigray at war still requires the participation of its military in organizing an interim regional administration. 
 
The organizing committee has held 15 meetings— 8 in the diaspora and 7 in Tigray— to discuss the modalities, structure, responsibilities, and conduct of the interim regional administration. Its focus on the views of the diaspora was a clear acknowledgment of the important role the diaspora played in the war. The diaspora can also play a central role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Tigray. But it cannot govern. Tigray will be governed by Tigrayans who live there. This is fundamental to democracy.
 
The organizing committee decided on the composition of the interim regional administration: 30% TPLF; 30% scholars; 25% TDF; and 15% opposition parties. It also decided there would be 50 observers from civil society. No members of the Prosperity Party were included. The Tigray regional government is now waiting on the agreement of the federal government, a condition of the Pretoria accord.
 
The fact that the opposition parties have refused to take their seat at the table underscores the political motivations of the three parties. It appears they are more interested in power than the well-being of their people. 
 
The Tigrayan regional government was elected by the people of Tigray. Its leaders have begun the process of setting up the interim administration. The government has reserved seats at the table for Tigray’s opposition parties. The opposition should take their seat and begin the hard work of reconstructing and rehabilitating Tigray. 
 
By the Ethiopian Cable team

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