Facing its bleakest nadir in decades, every country in the Horn of Africa is currently grappling with some form of constitutional or succession crisis. Over several years, the region has gradually slid into a state of near-permanent emergency, with armed conflict, major humanitarian disasters, and political instability all rife. In turn, the legitimacy and presence of the 'state' is contracting across the board, driving nearly every debt-saddled regional government to the Gulf for discreet patronage to prop up their fragile ruling coalitions. This combination of state capture and broad insecurity is both compounding and undermining attempts at a coherent regional response to issues such as the war in Sudan.
In mid-June, a highly choreographed show of bonhomie was organised at the Mereb Bridge in Tigray, which connects Ethiopia's northernmost region to Eritrea. Waving Eritrean and Tigrayan flags, communities seemingly came together in an attempt to display a buried hatchet at the local level, over two years on from the calamitous war that left hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans dead. These bizarre images, rather than reflecting any genuine move towards reconciliation or justice and accountability, are instead part of the deepening ties between the dominant faction within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Mekelle and Asmara. Behind the warming relations, however, are eerie similarities with the current rhetoric of Mekelle, Addis, and Asmara, and that of the months leading up to November 2020 and the outbreak of war.
With national elections anticipated in Ethiopia in 2026 and the country facing immense turmoil, it is worth considering how they might shape up. While a year is plenty of time, there is little to currently suggest that they will be free, fair, or open, but instead-- much like their predecessors-- a highly choreographed affair that can imbue little to no legitimacy on the ruling Prosperity Party. Instead, internal armed conflict, shrunken democratic space, and the ongoing throes of state contraction are all highly likely to frustrate the democratic will of the Ethiopian people. And despite an appearance of contestation that may be permitted at the ballot box itself, the possibilities of genuine political alternation will be virtually none, with PM Abiy Ahmed having cemented his grip on power since the last set of polls in 2021.
Last week, it was reported that landlocked Ethiopia-- with Russian assistance-- was nearing completion of a glittering new complex to house the country's naval headquarters. Constructed in Addis over three hectares at seemingly vast expense, the building personifies a kind of 'Potemkin Village,' the fake construct designed to mislead outsiders into believing in something more impressive than its reality. It appears set to play a central role in the ongoing ambition of the federal government to restore vaguely-worded Ethiopian 'access' to the sea, which may yet involve the invasion of Eritrea, as well as the supposed beautification of the capital.
ONLF Eyes Armed Struggle as Peace Falters Addis's national strategy of divide and conquer towards legitimate political opposition is pushing the Somali Regional State (SRS) to the brink of renewed conflict. Months of escalating tensions between the SRS administration led by Mustafa Mohammed Omar 'Agjar' and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) have taken another dangerous turn in recent days. Yet another attempt to remove the ONLF Chairman Abdirahman Maaday underhandedly appears to have definitively pushed the former insurgents towards a return to armed mobilisation, imperilling nearly 7 years of fragile peace in the SRS.
Since its inception, Brigade N'Hamedu, also known as the 'Blue Revolution,' has focused on targeting the pro-Eritrean regime's cultural festivals-- long used to fundraise, intimidate potential opposition, and serve as propaganda tools. While Brigade N'Hamedu is not Eritrea's first diaspora-based opposition movement to challenge these notorious events, its scale and scope have set it apart from previous efforts. The movement gained particular momentum toward the end of 2022, with protests aimed at exposing and resisting the transnational and domestic repression orchestrated by the Eritrean regime and its diaspora institutions garnering significant attention.