Issue No. 285

Ethiopia 2026: Elections Without Democracy?
 

With national elections anticipated in Ethiopia in 2026 and the country facing immense turmoil, it is worth considering how they might shape up. While a year is plenty of time, there is little to currently suggest that they will be free, fair, or open, but instead-- much like their predecessors-- a highly choreographed affair that can imbue little to no legitimacy on the ruling Prosperity Party. Instead, internal armed conflict, shrunken democratic space, and the ongoing throes of state contraction are all highly likely to frustrate the democratic will of the Ethiopian people. And despite an appearance of contestation that may be permitted at the ballot box itself, the possibilities of genuine political alternation will be virtually none, with PM Abiy Ahmed having cemented his grip on power since the last set of polls in 2021.

Several opposition parties are already raising concerns about the government's handling of the next elections. On 12 May, a multi-party opposition coalition, including the Enat Party, criticised government repression and escalating armed conflict, warning that it poses risks to electoral integrity. Among other issues, the parties also accused the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) of failing to lay the groundwork for polls. The parties further called for the immediate release of political prisoners, the removal of restrictions on political activities, and the deployment of international observers. 

The last set of national and regional elections held in June and September 2021– which Addis justified delaying due to the COVID-19 pandemic-- came amid the devastating Tigray war. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) conducted its own regional elections in September 2020 as scheduled, which proved part of the justification by the federal government to launch the 'law enforcement operation' that left over 500,000 people dead. These elections were effectively annulled by the Pretoria agreement at the end of the Tigray war in November 2022. Still in post-conflict limbo and lying partially outside of the federal architecture, the prospect of holding elections in Tigray in 2026-- particularly the militarily contested western part of the region-- presents a number of complex questions. Not least because the NEBE revoked the TPLF's legal status in May, a move that the historic Marxist party has warned could lead to renewed conflict. Whether the TPLF will be allowed to contest elections, if they are even held in Tigray, is likely to be an enduring flashpoint in the coming months ahead of the polls. So, too, is the continued politicisation of the NEBE, which now effectively serves at the government's beck and call to 'legitimise' the stifling of any genuine political opposition. 

Coming amid war, the 2021 elections were overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling Prosperity Party-- and widely dismissed as illegitimate. Reforms to the NEBE, the participation of over 35 million people and more than 40 political parties mattered little, with PM Abiy's party winning 96.8% of the seats in the federal parliament. Part of this reason is the first-past-the-post voting system used by Ethiopia, which naturally shuts out smaller opposition groups through a 'winner takes all' method. For instance, despite opposition parties in Addis winning 32% of the vote, they achieved no representation in parliament. Since 2021, however, the political space within the capital has continued to shrink, with the federal government repeatedly restricting demonstrations, reporting, and opposition gatherings in Addis. And with the government's presence across the country having contracted in Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, and elsewhere, so too has the concurrent importance of the capital grown.

The unevenness of Ethiopia's regional political model will also likely play a key role in the elections, as it did in 2021. Then, gerrymandering, vote-rigging, and repression were commonplace in certain regions– such as the Somali Regional State (SRS), while others enjoyed something closer to a genuine contest. In the more ethnically diverse regions, such as the now-dissolved Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples region, opposition parties performed more competitively. But in both Oromia and the SRS, major parties boycotted the elections, refusing to legitimise these pre-ordained elections by competing in them. Handed carte blanche, regional leaders and allies of the federal government worked to curtail the opposition in these politically significant regions. As such, the Prosperity Party was the only option for voters at the ballot box in around 75% of regional seats and 66% of federal seats. 

A similar story could well play out next year, with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) repeatedly warning of Ethiopia's and the SRS's continued democratic slide, as have the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). One of the major criticisms of these parties-- with the ONLF and OLF both former insurgent groups-- is that the political space in Ethiopia has deteriorated, with the legitimate avenues of opposition to the government having been choked off. Justified through dubious counter-terror and state-of-emergency legislation, senior opposition leaders and parliamentarians like Christian Tadelle, who have criticised the government, have been arrested. 

Ethiopia's rising instability, coupled with state contraction, further complicates any likelihood of genuinely open polls. In particular, with insurgencies raging in Oromia and Amhara, the prospects of holding elections in these parts of Ethiopia may well still be improbable next year. But a dozen other dormant or simmering ethnic bushfires across the country, such as Gumuz militants in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region, could also well become enflamed violence during a contested electoral cycle. As was the case in 2021, the federal government may well justify postponing or abrogating elections in parts of the country for 'security reasons.' A major war with Eritrea– threatened for much of 2025– could do the same. 

Ethiopia has held 6 elections since 1995– and each one has been dominated by the ruling political party, first by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and since 2019, the Prosperity Party. One of the more contested elections of recent decades was in 2005, where opposition parties won over 30% of the vote, but this, too, precipitated another shrinking in Ethiopia's democratic space. Although PM Abiy Ahmed came to power almost by accident, his Prosperity Party soon abandoned the promises of democratic reform and liberalisation that helped endear him to the international community —and parts of Ethiopia's peripheral regions — early in his tenure. Seven years later and following a destructive civil war as well as two major insurgencies, as part of its efforts to reform its tarnished international image, Addis will want to hold elections and 'justify' Abiy's quasi-imperial authority over Ethiopia. Even in the most authoritarian regimes, it is rare for no elections to be held, with Eritrea being one of the few exceptions globally. But it is highly improbable that elections next year could serve to legitimise the actions of the federal government in the eyes of the Ethiopian people, with the country so badly adrift. 

The 2026 elections may also prove a stepping stone in the broader political agenda and reform by PM Abiy Ahmed to entrench his hold on government. On paper, Ethiopia remains a parliamentary democracy operating within an ethnic federal constitution that elects a Prime Minister and a largely symbolic President. But it is widely understood that PM Abiy Ahmed intends to radically amend and replace the EPRDF Constitution from 1995 with his own vision of a centralised Ethiopia through his political movement known as medemer (coming together). Though the federal government has routinely ignored the constitution and the principles of devolved governance in Ethiopia, it appears likely to seek to officially centralise authority in the capital-- with a shift from a parliamentary to a presidential model being touted. The federally overseen National Dialogue Commission is expected to play a role in advocating and advising on these sweeping changes to Ethiopia's political model. So, despite the broader instability roiling the country and the probability that the polls could well be manipulated, elections in 2026 could help 'legitimise' any such constitutional amendments. At just 48 and already having been in power for 7 years, PM Abiy has shown little interest in relinquishing his grip, and he is likely to wield these next set of elections to cement his apparent ambitions to remain in power indefinitely-- no matter the cost to the country.