Issue No. 286

Last week, it was reported that landlocked Ethiopia-- with Russian assistance-- was nearing completion of a glittering new complex to house the country's naval headquarters. Constructed in Addis over three hectares at seemingly vast expense, the building personifies a kind of 'Potemkin Village,' the fake construct designed to mislead outsiders into believing in something more impressive than its reality. It appears set to play a central role in the ongoing ambition of the federal government to restore vaguely-worded Ethiopian 'access' to the sea, which may yet involve the invasion of Eritrea, as well as the supposed beautification of the capital.

The term 'Potemkin Village' emerged from a story about a Russian field marshal, Grigory Potemkin, who supposedly adorned Empress Catherine II's visit to Crimea with fake settlements to disguise the poverty of the region. This new quasi-imperial naval headquarters, and particularly Ethiopia's Corridor Development project-- set across 56 cities but concentrated in Addis-- is precisely that, a poor attempt to mask the growing state dysfunction, humanitarian emergencies, and armed conflict blighting the country. Furthermore, both Addis's threat to seize the Eritrean port of Assab and the demolition of historic sites in the capital are part of a broader attempt to reconstruct a new image of Ethiopia, with PM Abiy Ahmed as the supreme and historic leader.

The federal government's Corridor Development Project is intended to modernise cities across Ethiopia, widening and building roads to facilitate the movement of people and goods. Primarily based in Ethiopia's major cities, the project has come under heavy criticism for a number of reasons, including the displacement of people without sufficient compensation. In Addis, entire neighbourhoods, such as the historic Piazza district built by the Italian occupiers in the early 20th century, have been razed. New lighting, bike lanes, and gentrified urban squares have been erected, while major highways now crisscross parts of the city. The scale of change in the former resort town has been dizzying. However, much of the development has further accentuated the capital's acute economic inequalities. Many of those displaced have been given little warning, while the contracts for development have been awarded to allies of the federal government. Reports have further suggested that residents have been repeatedly lowballed by government officials as a means to siphon off money set aside for compensation.

Further, many of these developments ring hollow with so much of the country either still wrestling with the brutal consequences of armed conflict-- such as in Tigray-- or still consumed by it-- such as in Amhara and Oromia. Lush, electric-lit streets jar with the everyday realities for many Tigrayans, where power is intermittent at best. This was accentuated by the recent barring of deliveries into the region amid the tussle between Addis and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) over the successor to Getachew Reda as head of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA). Following negotiations between Tadesse Werede, the newly appointed president, and the federal police commissioner, trucking has now resumed into Tigray from Afar and Amhara, which were banned due to fears of 'smuggling.' But it was an apparent shot across the bow by the federal government, and a chilling reminder of the total blockade on the region during the war. Meanwhile, across the country, over 20 million people still require humanitarian assistance, and for many, the Corridor Development project is an extraordinary misuse of funds. And with the evisceration of USAID, many teetering on the edge of malnutrition and hunger have fallen into it.

While there may be new roads, new buildings celebrating the Battle of Adwa, which is in itself a coopting of Ethiopian history, and new cycle lanes, it remains impossible to drive across much of the country. Travelling by road from Addis to Bahir Dar in the Amhara region, say, cannot be done out of fear of abduction by a range of armed groups and militias. In this regard, building tarmacked new roads can do little for Ethiopia's broader development amid the enduring political dysfunction that shows no sign of easing. Simultaneously, the militarisation of the capital has been readily apparent alongside its development. Any prospects of widespread protests have been heavily curtailed, opposition and journalists routinely jailed and harassed, and mass detentions of ethnic Amhara have continued. The importance of Addis, meanwhile, has continued to grow for the federal government as the presence of the state has shrunk across Ethiopia.

Yet, though corroded, the architecture of the Ethiopian state itself remains powerful, and there is currently no single unified threat to Addis. The divide-and-conquer strategy of the Ethiopian federal government has proven highly effective, and though it is battling major insurgencies in Amhara and western Oromia, it is currently improbable that either could topple the government. Amidst this, preparations for war with Eritrea are ongoing-- and still through the Afar region to reach Assab. Significant numbers of Ethiopian military personnel remain mobilised, and senior officials have resumed their clamouring for the Red Sea, continuing to make dubious historical claims. And pro-government channels persist in their commentary about Eritrea's destabilisation of the region. 

In turn, the building of the naval headquarters-- with Russian help-- points to Abiy's enduring vision of Ethiopia as a genuine power on the arterial waterway. The apparent involvement of Moscow in the headquarters construction follows a bilateral Ethiopian-Russian agreement signed in March 2025, which particularly focused on training and capacity-building. Russia remains actively interested in expanding its presence on the Red Sea, having signed a logistical base agreement with the Sudanese army last year and maintaining a close and active relationship with Eritrea.

The building of this new naval headquarters jars with both the socio-economic and political realities consuming much of Ethiopia, but is highly revealing about the objectives of the federal government. Unable to deliver services or stability to most of the country, the most Addis can offer its citizens is this Potemkin Village, which in itself lies the threat of a renewed conflict with Eritrea.