Between 2010 and 2016, over 6,000 Somali children were forcibly recruited into armed groups, and 2,000 in 2018 alone — the highest number recorded globally. Some were as young as 8. Since the collapse of the state in the early 1990s, Somalia has served as an example of how instability and social fragmentation can fuel the exploitation of children in conflict. Today, Al-Shabaab is widely regarded as the most culpable of Somalia's myriad armed forces for their indoctrination and abduction of children into their ranks.
Reports of a government offensive in the Hiiraan region recall the heady days of the 2022 ma'awiisley offensive against Al-Shabaab that left the jihadists bloodied and on the back foot. At that time, community defence forces from the Hawaadle rose up against Al-Shabaab in protest against the group's pitiless 'taxtortion' during a time of brutal drought, and succeeded in dislodging the extremists from significant parts of Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle and Galmudug. Known as the 'ma'awiisley' for the typical 'ma'wiis' (sarongs) that Somali men wear, it was a clan and community-led offensive that the fresh Hassan Sheikh administration eagerly appropriated as a 'success story' for the federal government. Today, once again, scenes of young men with AK-47s battling Al-Shabaab along the Shabelle River valley are being touted as a token of Villa Somalia's counterterrorism zeal.
On 21 November, the next phase of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of 75,000 Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) soldiers commenced in Mekelle. Over two years have passed since the signing of the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, with the DDR process intended as one of their central elements, but federally-driven progress to date has been slow.
Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, access to justice has been a major challenge, leaving a vacuum that Al-Shabaab has exploited. The militant group operates shadow Islamic courts in territories under its control, ruling on land disputes, contracts and criminal cases. These tribunals are perceived by many Somalis as faster, cheaper and less corrupt than official government courts. While government judicial systems often suffer from delays, backlogs and high legal costs, Al-Shabaab’s courts are accessible, free to file cases and enforce rulings swiftly, albeit under a harsh interpretation of Sharia law. Their perceived impartiality, even toward minority clans, has helped them gain acceptance in some government-controlled areas and even among diaspora communities. In contrast, Somalia’s official judiciary is plagued by corruption, political interference and lack of enforcement capacity. Many Somalis, especially in rural areas, turn to Al-Shabaab’s system for swift resolutions. To counter this influence, Somalia’s federal government must reform its judiciary to be transparent, efficient and accessible. Eliminating reliance on militant courts will require significant investment, professional training and a renewed commitment to justice that serves all Somalis equally.
Last week, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) flew to Asmara and spent four days in the country in an audacious bid to secure the return of thousands of Somali troops languishing in military camps in the Red Sea state.