Issue No. 912

Somalia is far from a happy federation, with 2026 having already picked up from the political nadir of 2025. Constitutionally split in twain, with elections just a few months away and no agreement in sight, the auspices could not be much more challenging. And while Israel's unilateral recognition of Somaliland may have dropped a bombshell, it has only accentuated the already chasm-like divides in Somalia, with urgent work required to facilitate the coming months and avoid possible bloodshed and political collapse. A clear, actionable election timeline with an independent electoral body is undoubtedly the only way out of this contorted political cul-de-sac-- not a term extension for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Kicking the electoral ball down the road will not solve the issues facing Somalia, including, but not limited to, the constitutional and federal crisis, the atrophied war against Al-Shabaab, and the vassalisation of Somalia's politics to Middle Eastern meddling. Indeed, any unjustified delay to the May poll would not prove a salve to such issues, but accentuate them further and push the fraying political settlement to the brink. There are just a few days left before the Council for the Future of Somalia's deadline —20 January —for Villa Somalia to lay out a feasible timeline and process, or risk a parallel exercise, but the government's lukewarm response suggests it intends to plough ahead with its own scheme. At today's opening of the Jubaland parliament, Ahmed Madoobe underscored his intention to proceed with elections in his Federal Member State if Hassan Sheikh does not meet the 20 January deadline. To be held on time, talks must begin immediately to facilitate an indirect election in the first half or early second of 2026. However disappointing it is to return to the tent, it is the only feasible way to hold peaceful elections on time—arguably the most crucial constitutional responsibility of the federal government.

But it is hardly a secret that the federal president has been angling for an extension for several months, cajoling his putative allies within the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) to lay the groundwork for at least two more years in office. Garnishing these closed-door manoeuvrings has been the public framing of direct elections, with the government insisting that the groundwork can be laid for a one-person, one-vote poll. At the same time, Villa Somalia has been yearning for any reason to hang a term extension, be it a transition to direct democracy or another, and has since sought to rally nationalist sentiment against the 'existential threat' posed by Israel's recognition of Somaliland in the past weeks. But with much of the political response to recognition in Somalia proving muted, Mogadishu has instead quickly pivoted to capitalise on the geopolitical fallout, inviting Türkiye to establish a military base in Laas Qoray and Riyadh to bomb Somaliland. 

Even so, it remains possible to separate Somalia's tortured domestic politics from the increasingly entangled geopolitics of the region. Without a clear electoral timeline, an extension is not merely an unfortunate delay of a presidential election but would represent a continued degradation of Somalia's politics and could embolden the incumbents to pursue their domestic policies with zeal. The political settlement of Somalia is far from elastic, and the longer this grinding stasis continues, the more difficult it will be to restore Puntland and Jubaland to the federation and roll back the swathes of centralising legislation and reform. On a host of other issues, a broader mandate is urgently required as well, from responding to Somaliland recognition to the prospect of Ankara drilling for hydrocarbons as part of the unbalanced pact with Mogadishu.

Beyond the political considerations, Somalia's security organs continue to be pulled into the centre, weaponised and deployed against the political opposition and peripheries rather than Al-Shabaab. Operation Eagle Eye may have found some nominal success in Lower Shabelle, but it is hard to look across the battlefield with much optimism. Indeed, it appears there has been little serious fighting in Lower Shabelle and, as in the past, Al-Shabaab appears to have withdrawn in good order-- ready to fight another day. Opportunities for necessary security sector reform, too, have dwindled due to a lack of political will, while the leadership of the Somali National Army (SNA) and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) have sought to repurpose their forces to the behest of Villa Somalia. A parallel process is daunting, but a term extension without clear, enforceable, and, crucially, short timelines for an election risks bloodshed in Mogadishu as well between such forces and opposition-aligned groups. The national opposition has repeatedly made it explicit that it will not countenance such a term extension, unwilling to return to the rigmarole of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's last months.

Meanwhile, the occasional boilerplate diplomatic statement calling for dialogue between the opposition and the government has done little to move the needle. Indeed, if internationals were to facilitate a term extension without bringing any coordinated pressure to bear on Villa Somalia, it would be abandoning the dance of Somalia's elections before it has truly begun in earnest. Yet the international community, by and large, appears unable to forge a coherent position at this juncture, with the UN politically de-fanged, the US retreating, and many European powers distracted or disengaged. Ankara, Doha, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Abu Dhabi have no such qualms, happy to reach into the morass to advance their own competing interests-- and with Somali politicians happy to take advantage of their varying largesse in turn.

In a year's time, it is difficult to know if any public land would be left in the capital to sell off or whether Al-Shabaab would have moved decisively to attack Mogadishu. Concerns about a parallel administration or process in the coming months are understandable, but they cannot justify granting the incumbent president a carte blanche term extension in the coming months. Twelve more months of an administration without a clear roadmap to an election may quickly become 18 months, and then two years are upon us, with potentially irreparable damage having been wrought on Somalia's domestic and international positions in the meantime. 

Instead, a new leader and an election would imbue the incoming president with a renewed mandate to begin talks with Somaliland, to start repairing the badly frayed federation, and to take the battle to Al-Shabaab again, in earnest. In a fragile and conflict-ridden political framework like Somalia's, elections are not a luxury that can be easily postponed; they are arguably the last remaining guardrail against collapse. And once such a guardrail is breached, no amount of nationalist rhetoric or foreign patronage can hold the system together.