Tel Aviv and Hargesia: Implications for the Horn of Africa
Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Dr Ngala Chome.
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On 26 December 2025, Israel officially became the first country to recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign state. This decision appears to be connected to the broader geopolitical shifts following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The ensuing conflict saw the Houthis, who control parts of Yemen, launch missiles targeting Israel and disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in solidarity with Hamas. This escalation of disturbances in the Red Sea not only poses a significant risk to international oil and merchant shipping but also highlights the increasing integration of the Horn of Africa into the security systems of the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the wider Gulf region and Middle East. This integration is driven by intensifying competition for influence over the Red Sea's trade and transit routes. But it is also about competing political visions for the future direction of the Muslim world, between different versions of Islamism and their detractors.
The geopolitical shift following the 2011 Arab Spring has seen traditional Middle Eastern powers like Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Iraq eclipsed by the rise of Gulf states as the region's primary competing influences. In the mediation of the conflict in Gaza, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have assumed central roles, though their differing agendas have contributed to an unstable ceasefire. Significant diplomatic divisions persist among these states. For instance, the UAE remains the only one of the three to have signed the 2020 Abraham Accords to normalise relations with Israel. Furthermore, varying levels of commitment to countering Islamist causes and differing diplomatic stances toward Iran—the leader of the "Axis of Resistance" involving Hezbollah, the Houthi Movement, and Hamas—continue to shape regional relations. These internal suspicions among the Gulf powers have hindered the mediation process between Israel and Hamas, as exemplified by the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha on 9 September 2025, highlighting the fragility of the current diplomatic framework around the crisis in Gaza.
It appears that Israel is pivoting towards the Emirati-led "Axis of secessionists," which aligns with the UAE's established foreign policy strategy across the Southern Arabian periphery, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Aden. This shift involves supporting various non-state, often separatist, actors to generate influence and strategic depth for the UAE. This approach frequently puts the UAE in opposition to established central governments or rival regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Notably, before moving to recognise Somaliland (a UAE ally and breakaway region of Somalia), Israel also pivoted toward the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. The STC is an autonomous region seeking independence and international recognition.
This new relationship seems to have encouraged the STC's leadership to embark on an expansionist program, recently taking the oil-rich areas of Hadhramaut and al-Mahran in Western Yemen, close to the Saudi border, which has clearly generated concern in Riyadh. And while Riyadh has moved to retake areas recently claimed by the STC, and UAE security personnel in the area withdrawn, the resulting UAE-Saudi rift parallels a similar situation in Sudan. This rupture bears major implications for the entire Horn of Africa. The Horn is now firmly part of a wider geopolitical confluence involving the Gulf and the Middle East, where rivalries among Gulf monarchies—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—are spilling over. These rivalries carry significant consequences for the region's peace and security landscape.
In particular, Israel's recent recognition of Somaliland on the Horn of Africa risks escalating regional tensions, reminiscent of the situation following the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. That MoU, which involved a stretch of Somaliland coastline in exchange for international recognition for Hargeisa, previously generated fears of imminent conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.
With Ethiopia now closely aligned with the UAE—similar to Somaliland, the autonomous Somali federal member state of Puntland, and Somalia's federal member state of Jubaland—Israel's involvement introduces further complexity. This could heighten the risk of open conflict, not only between Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu, but potentially also involving Ethiopia. Moreover, these events jeopardise the Turkish-brokered rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu concerning the 2024 MoU. They also lend renewed impetus to the 2024 "Tripartite Alliance" between Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, which was designed to counter Ethiopia's ambitions for sea access via the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden. This regional dynamic is further complicated by the ongoing disagreement between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
It is notable that the "Tripartite Alliance" originally included countries that have since aligned with states traditionally opposed to Israel. Specifically, Iran (rumoured to be pivoting towards Asmara), Turkiye and Qatar (both strong allies of the Federal Government of Somalia), and Saudi Arabia (allied with Sudan's Armed Forces, also regarded as an ally of the FGS and Eritrea) now appear to be aligned on one side. Conversely, the UAE and Israel appear to be aligning on the other side, supporting secessionist causes such as Somaliland, Puntland, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
This story primarily focuses on the geopolitical competition for influence and resources in the Horn of Africa, encompassing hydrocarbons, minerals, agricultural land, and strategic access to vital waterways and ports. However, beyond these material factors, the conflict also reflects a deeper ideological contest regarding competing visions for the future of the Muslim world. This contest is currently demonstrated by Islamist causes—represented in groups like the SAF—and their opposition, which is most notably symbolised by the emerging alliance between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, an alliance that is now extending its influence through strategic locations such as Hargeisa.
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The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.
The worm, it seems, has finally turned. After years serving as a prop for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's monocratic aspirations, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has clapped back against Villa Somalia, accusing the federal government of – among other things - dividing the country, monopolising public resources, colluding with Al-Shabaab, and leading Somalia back into state failure.
Last April, General Sheegow Ahmed Ali-- once the highest-ranking military officer hailing from the Somali Bantu-- died in ignominy in a Mogadishu hospital. A senior commander who had previously spearheaded operations in south-central Somalia, Sheegow had been summarily sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2023 for operating a militia in the capital. His death-- mourned widely and protested in Mogadishu and Beledweyne-- returned the spotlight to the pernicious issues of discrimination in the Somali National Army (SNA).
The Horn of Africa's political fate has always been wired to external commercial interests, with its expansive eastern edge on the Red Sea serving as an aorta of trade for millennia. A Greek merchant's manual from the 1st century AD describes the port of Obone in modern-day Puntland as a hub of ivory, tortoiseshell, enslaved people and cinnamon destined for Egypt. Today, as so often quoted, between 12-15% of the world's seaborne trade passes along the arterial waterway, with the Suez Canal bridging Europe and Asia. But well before the globalised world or the vying Gulf and Middle Powers over the Red Sea's littoral administrations, the logic of 'gunboat diplomacy' underpinned the passage over these seas.
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.
The Greek philosopher and historian Plutarch recounts that King Pyrrhus of Epirus, after defeating the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC, lamented, "One more such victory over the Romans and we are completely done for." After almost four torturous years, the same might be said for any more supposed 'victories' for the incumbent federal government of Somalia. To nobody's surprise, the constitutional 'review' process undertaken by Somalia's federal government was never about implementing direct democracy after all. It was, as widely anticipated, a thinly veiled power grab intended to centralise political power, eviscerate Somalia's federal system, and extend the term of the incumbent president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). And so, at the 11th hour and with less than 70 days remaining in his term of office, HSM declared Somalia's new constitutional text 'complete' and signed it into 'law.'
On 4 March 2026, Somalia's Federal Parliament hastily ratified dozens of controversial constitutional amendments, thus finalising President Hassan Sheikh's tailor-made Constitution. Speaker Aden Madobe has now declared the new revised Constitution effective immediately. In doing so, the speaker and his government have deliberately destroyed the existing social contract agreed upon by the people of Somalia.
Ramadan is known as the 'Month of Mercy', typically characterised by forgiveness and reconciliation within the Islamic world. Not so in Somalia, where Villa Somalia's ruinous push to 'finalise' the Provisional Constitution has taken another grim twist in recent days. The collapse of opposition-government talks on 22 February was inevitable, with Villa Somalia's flippancy evident in the needless arguments over venue and security personnel.
Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, is home to an estimated four million people and supports a vibrant commercial sector. Yet behind the façade of what appears to be an up-and-coming African capital is the specter of insurgents hiding in plain sight. Although Somalia’s government has had a run of success in the fight against Al-Shabaab over the past year, Mogadishu’s security is highly questionable, as the city’s suburbs have become a safe haven and base of operations for militants. Al-Shabaab is not the only problem. The crisis is deeper. Somalia’s security institutions remain disorganized and corrupt, and Mogadishu’s robust business community is often an accomplice to Al-Shabaab funding.