South Sudan’s Peace Talks Stall Again
The Tumaini Initiative suffered its latest setback this week after South Sudan’s government delegation failed to attend peace talks scheduled for 18 November, despite assurances from chief mediator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo that negotiations would resume following a similar no-show last week. Launched in May 2024, the Kenya-led initiative was widely hailed as a positive effort to counter South Sudan's long history of conflict, following the collapse of Rome-based talks in March 2023. The Rome talks, which aimed at engaging opposition groups that were non-signatories of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), broke down without conclusive agreement. This prompted South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir’s request to Kenyan President William Ruto in December 2023 to take over and restart negotiations. Tumaini – Swahili for hope – was intended to break the cycle of failed mediation efforts, but its own recent setbacks suggest it could very well fall victim to the same obstacles that derailed previous processes.
Hailed as a Pan-African model of "African solutions to African challenges," the Tumaini Initiative aimed to foster an inclusive peace process for South Sudan. Building on Kenya’s legacy of hosting the talks that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan's independence in 2011, Tumaini recorded early success with the signing of the Declaration of Commitment just days after its launch in May. This agreement brought together South Sudan's government, hold-out groups under the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), religious leaders and civil society. However, the absence of General Thomas Cirillo, leader of the powerful National Salvation Front (NAS), for ‘security reasons,’ marked Tumaini’s first setback, as the NAS was one of the most militarily significant holdout factions from the initial Rome talks. Still, Tumaini achieved key milestones. By July, the government and opposition groups had signed 8 protocols addressing critical issues, including a permanent ceasefire, security arrangements, humanitarian access, and political reforms. The progress then unravelled, just a day later, when First Vice President Riek Machar announced that his SPLM-IO faction was withdrawing from talks. Machar accused the initiative of overstepping its mandate, duplicating provisions of the 2018 R-ARCSS, and infringing on national laws.
The SPLM-IO’s withdrawal further stalled negotiations, prompting parallel conversations between Kiir and Machar in Juba while Kenyan mediators struggled to secure buy-in from holdout groups and existing R-ARCSS signatories. The talks were further plunged into uncertainty following the postponement of South Sudan’s December 2024 elections. While the initiative was primarily focused on resolving outstanding issues and promoting inclusivity in the peace process, including critical input into the National Constitutional Review Commission, the contentious topic of national elections became entangled in discussions. Amidst growing uncertainty, Kenyan President Ruto – serving as the guarantor of South Sudan's peace process – visited Juba on 6 November. where he met with President Kiir, First Vice President Machar, and other key government officials. Following these high-level talks, Ruto announced that the Tumaini Initiative parties had agreed to resume mediation in Nairobi to address outstanding issues.
Despite the reconstitution of mediation teams, South Sudan’s government delegation failed to attend two critical meetings on 11 and 18 November, leaving the Tumaini Initiative in limbo. Meanwhile, other internal dynamics appear to be undermining the process; President Kiir has sacked senior government officials across key sectors, including security, intelligence, customs and revenue and finance, as well as some state governors. These developments are indicative of South Sudan’s pre-occupation with power struggles and regime survival, which effectively relegated commitments to initiatives like Tumaini to the back burner.
The political environment in South Sudan has grown increasingly volatile. Kiir’s consolidation of power, combined with the visible detachment of First Vice President Riek Machar from the central government, risks an already fragile political landscape. These dynamics also risk alienating participating factions in the peace process, as both leaders now appear disengaged and non-committal. The absence of genuine leadership and collaboration fosters mistrust and uncertainty surrounding the initiative. The lack of political will to prioritise reconciliation and consensus-building deepens the challenge of advancing the peace process, leaving the Tumaini Initiative out in the cold.
By the Horn Edition Team
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