South Sudan’s Peace Talks Stall Again
The Tumaini Initiative suffered its latest setback this week after South Sudan’s government delegation failed to attend peace talks scheduled for 18 November, despite assurances from chief mediator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo that negotiations would resume following a similar no-show last week. Launched in May 2024, the Kenya-led initiative was widely hailed as a positive effort to counter South Sudan's long history of conflict, following the collapse of Rome-based talks in March 2023. The Rome talks, which aimed at engaging opposition groups that were non-signatories of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), broke down without conclusive agreement. This prompted South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir’s request to Kenyan President William Ruto in December 2023 to take over and restart negotiations. Tumaini – Swahili for hope – was intended to break the cycle of failed mediation efforts, but its own recent setbacks suggest it could very well fall victim to the same obstacles that derailed previous processes.
Hailed as a Pan-African model of "African solutions to African challenges," the Tumaini Initiative aimed to foster an inclusive peace process for South Sudan. Building on Kenya’s legacy of hosting the talks that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan's independence in 2011, Tumaini recorded early success with the signing of the Declaration of Commitment just days after its launch in May. This agreement brought together South Sudan's government, hold-out groups under the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), religious leaders and civil society. However, the absence of General Thomas Cirillo, leader of the powerful National Salvation Front (NAS), for ‘security reasons,’ marked Tumaini’s first setback, as the NAS was one of the most militarily significant holdout factions from the initial Rome talks. Still, Tumaini achieved key milestones. By July, the government and opposition groups had signed 8 protocols addressing critical issues, including a permanent ceasefire, security arrangements, humanitarian access, and political reforms. The progress then unravelled, just a day later, when First Vice President Riek Machar announced that his SPLM-IO faction was withdrawing from talks. Machar accused the initiative of overstepping its mandate, duplicating provisions of the 2018 R-ARCSS, and infringing on national laws.
The SPLM-IO’s withdrawal further stalled negotiations, prompting parallel conversations between Kiir and Machar in Juba while Kenyan mediators struggled to secure buy-in from holdout groups and existing R-ARCSS signatories. The talks were further plunged into uncertainty following the postponement of South Sudan’s December 2024 elections. While the initiative was primarily focused on resolving outstanding issues and promoting inclusivity in the peace process, including critical input into the National Constitutional Review Commission, the contentious topic of national elections became entangled in discussions. Amidst growing uncertainty, Kenyan President Ruto – serving as the guarantor of South Sudan's peace process – visited Juba on 6 November. where he met with President Kiir, First Vice President Machar, and other key government officials. Following these high-level talks, Ruto announced that the Tumaini Initiative parties had agreed to resume mediation in Nairobi to address outstanding issues.
Despite the reconstitution of mediation teams, South Sudan’s government delegation failed to attend two critical meetings on 11 and 18 November, leaving the Tumaini Initiative in limbo. Meanwhile, other internal dynamics appear to be undermining the process; President Kiir has sacked senior government officials across key sectors, including security, intelligence, customs and revenue and finance, as well as some state governors. These developments are indicative of South Sudan’s pre-occupation with power struggles and regime survival, which effectively relegated commitments to initiatives like Tumaini to the back burner.
The political environment in South Sudan has grown increasingly volatile. Kiir’s consolidation of power, combined with the visible detachment of First Vice President Riek Machar from the central government, risks an already fragile political landscape. These dynamics also risk alienating participating factions in the peace process, as both leaders now appear disengaged and non-committal. The absence of genuine leadership and collaboration fosters mistrust and uncertainty surrounding the initiative. The lack of political will to prioritise reconciliation and consensus-building deepens the challenge of advancing the peace process, leaving the Tumaini Initiative out in the cold.
By the Horn Edition Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.
On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.