The Return of Trump
While the dust from the re-election of Donald Trump as US president will continue to swirl for some time, diplomats and politicians in capitals around the world have long been sizing up the implications for their countries and regions. The return of the 'America First' leader to the White House comes at a moment of global polycrises– proliferating armed conflict, intensifying climate crisis, waning multilateralism, the rise of authoritarianism, and a shift from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world. Many of these trends pre-dated the first Trump administration but were turbo-charged and accentuated between 2016 and 2020. And one of the epicentres and regions most impacted by these buffeting winds of geopolitical change is the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea, heavily driven by the rise of assertive, transactional 'Middle Powers' in the Gulf. Still, while the 'Pax Americana' of the 2000s may have waned, the US remains the global pre-eminent superpower, underwritten by the largest economy and military.
First, Trump follows a disinterested Biden administration awkwardly caught between a realpolitik instinct to respond to growing Chinese and Russian influence in Africa and normative pressures on democracy, good governance, and human rights. This often led to a contradictory and self-sabotaging set of policies, lecturing African leaders on their neutrality towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine while providing carte blanche for Israel to raze Gaza. Some have speculated that a Trump administration unburdened by these concerns and with an affinity towards 'strong men' may pursue a more pragmatic and reciprocal foreign policy on the continent. Certainly, many autocrats around the world and those rolling back democratic gains in Africa will be relieved at the revival of an administration that is less likely to challenge them on their democratic or human rights records. Egypt, for instance, is a probable beneficiary of Trump's return, with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi a preferred ally and a perceived bulwark against Trump's reviled Iran.
We shouldn't expect too many immediate drastic US policy changes toward African countries, though. For Sudan, the Biden administration was unwilling to use its geopolitical clout to bring pressure to bear on the belligerent's foreign backers, and it is unlikely that a Trump government will either. However, a Trump administration is also more likely to throw its weight behind one of the principal belligerents, unlike the Biden administration, which sought to avoid offending either to its own detriment. For Somalia, meanwhile, there is a risk that Trump could again decide to suddenly withdraw all US forces from the country as part of his first term's haphazard campaign to end America's 'forever wars.'
Large parts of the US foreign aid budget may well be slashed, including money for contraceptives and the PEPFAR programme, for instance, as well as funding for tackling the climate crisis in Africa. The latter is sure to be scrubbed from the domestic and foreign agenda of the incoming administration. Trump pulled out of the 2016 Paris Agreement and may well do so again, while he also gutted the Environmental Protection Agency and expanded oil drilling and fracking rights. Even if some money for climate adaptation remains, a more polluting America spells ill for the extremely climate-vulnerable populations in the Horn.
American Middle East and North Africa (MENA) policy is unlikely to drastically change, with Trump offering full-throated support for Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu in his campaign to destroy Tehran's proxies. The knock-on impact of the Gaza war and broader Middle Eastern conflagration on the Horn has been much underappreciated but will continue to spill over and become more apparent in the coming months and years. During Trump's first term, Washington ceded significant influence and decision-making in the Horn to its closest allies in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It has allowed Riyadh and Abu Dhabi free reign of the Horn to engage and invest in a myriad of political and social constituencies for their own, often overlapping and competing, geostrategic interests. And these trends have only intensified under the Biden government, as witnessed by the September US-UAE accord despite Gulf powers playing a central role in the ongoing devastation of Sudan.
There is no indication that a Trump presidency would seek to reign in these powers; it is likely to only accentuate them further. We are entering a new global multi-polar order, perhaps comparable to the 19th century and best encapsulated by the rise of the BRICS multilateral, in which the member states resist the supremacy of the US Dollar and post-World War II international order. The incoming administration's clear preference for bilateralism over multilaterals like NATO and the UN will further amplify this transition to a global order more explicitly defined by reciprocity.
In February 2002, when answering a question about the lack of evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld delivered the enduring line of the dangers of the "unknown unknowns." These words ring particularly true today, with the geopolitical era defined by a certain degree of chaos, and there are innumerable and unknowable ways in which the next Trump term will impact the Horn's governments and populations. Much like the Biden government, steering the Trump administration to prioritise the Horn when they can see few easy wins will be challenging. US officials can understand the humanitarian concerns, the dangers of jihadist proliferation, the backsliding of democracy, and much more, but elevating these issues to the same level of geostrategic competition with Russia or China has proven far more difficult.
By the Horn Edition Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.