From Ritual to Reform: Unpacking FGM in Djibouti
Djibouti continues to face a silent crisis where young girls are being robbed of their health, autonomy and futures. Around 93% of women and girls in the country are estimated to have undergone Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C), and although it was made illegal in 1995, a lack of enforcement allows the harmful practice to persist. As is the case in several other cultures across the Horn, FGM/C has deep roots in Djiboutian society and is widely considered a rite for pre-pubescent girls in their passage to womanhood. Yet the psychological and physical scars that are left tell a different story - one of suffering and the denial of basic human rights. FGM/C is not simply a 'cultural' practice-- it is an issue that desperately needs stronger intervention and prevention.
Today, FGM/C remains commonplace amongst the Somali and Afar communities in Djibouti that comprise the majority of the population, with both carrying out the practice on young girls. In Afar communities, FGM/C is carried out before babies are 18 months old, while it typically takes place between 5 and 9 years of age in Somali communities, with women in the family overseeing the procedure. In both, these young children cannot consent to the life-altering and irreversible procedures being performed upon them.
Over the years, there have been some shifts in FGM/C procedures in Djibouti, according to a UNICEF study, including a small drop of around 90% of girls and women between 15 and 49 who have undergone the procedure to 78% of those currently aged between 15 and 19. Over time, the type of FGM/C has also shifted, with Type III or infibulation becoming far less common– only 10% of circumcised girls aged 15 to 19 reported infibulation compared to 75% of circumcised women aged 45 to 49. In Djibouti and other parts of the Horn, Type I is commonly referred to as 'sunna,' which is now the overwhelming FGM type carried out, and though it has less serious health implications attached than Type II and III, it nevertheless remains highly problematic, and involves the partial or total removal of the clitoris.
The risk of infection, long-lasting health implications, and even death remain, particularly since the practice is largely carried out by traditional practitioners rather than licensed professional medics. There are numerous dangers associated with FGM, including debilitating pain as well as problems with childbirth, urinating, and sex. Many older women in Djibouti have undergone infibulation, which includes the sealing or narrowing of the vagina, and consequently, many have to suffer through subsequent cuttings to permit sex or childbirth in later life. This also comes with greater risks of both cutting and re-stitching multiple times, increasing dangers for women in the immediate and longer term. Moreover, accompanying these health impacts are the often overlooked educational and socio-economic consequences, with girls and women having to wrestle with health concerns alongside the challenges of womanhood in Djibouti's patriarchal society.
While FGM/C is illegal today, it has been a slow journey. The 1992 Djiboutian Constitution makes no reference to FGM, though stating that "no one may be subjected to... inhuman, cruel, degrading or humiliating actions or treatments." Three years later, the Penal Code of Djibouti became the first piece of national legislation to outlaw the act of FGM/C but still did not criminalise those aiding in the practice nor define FGM/C. In 2009, further legislation was passed to strengthen the outlawing of FGM/C, but prosecutions remain essentially non-existent in Djibouti.
It is not as if FGM/C is a wildly popular procedure, with the majority of both men and women under 50 opposing its continuation. Yet despite growing opposition to the practice, it remains widely carried out, with the pressure from older family members and society on women to continue these traditions outweighing the awareness of the harmful effects of FGM/C. The justification for the practice is strongly linked to notions of preserving a girl's modesty and purity and, by extension, making them more 'marriageable.' Moreover, for some Djiboutian men in a highly patriarchal society, FGM/C is a part of their vision for an 'ideal' wife. While some consider the procedure hygienic and aesthetic, others ascribe it to Islamic teaching and, by embracing it, are fulfilling a religious duty. Djibouti remains an overwhelmingly Islamic society, and while many Imams, as well as Islamic leaders and organisations, have condemned the procedure as it harms the body without justification, some local religious figures still promote it. Moreover, Type I is referred to as Sunna as an attempt to vest the procedure with religious legitimacy even while female circumcision is not mentioned in the Qu'ran.
While older generations may have accepted FGM/C as a rite of passage, increasing access to information and education are proving to be powerful tools in the fight against it. Led by Djiboutian women, new grassroots organisations and community-based programmes that stand against the practice are emerging. For instance, earlier this year, a support group called Rasmy was formed by two women intent on opening up conversations on topics considered 'taboo,' such as FGM/C, within their communities. Starting as a small group, Rasmy has grown into a movement where women come to express themselves without fear of judgment and to feel supported. Through groups such as Rasmy, increasing people's knowledge and awareness of its harms makes it more difficult for those who support FGM/C to justify it as a 'cultural' or 'religious' necessity. And by engaging with local leaders and particularly educating men on the impact of FGM/C, there can be a societal shift from not just opposition to the practice but actively eradicating it.
In truth, FGM/C controls and restricts women's sexuality while acting under the guise of 'cultural tradition.' With minimal regard for women's health, this practice serves to subordinate women in Djibouti's deep-set gender inequality. FGM/C is far from the only challenge facing women in Djibouti in 2024. For instance, although the legal age for marriage in Djibouti is 18, forced marriages at a young age are still practised. Domestic violence, including physical and emotional abuse, continues to happen across the country. These forms of gender-based violence also tend to go unreported because of fear of social stigma and cultural practice, much like FGM/C.
The law criminalising FGM/C was implemented nearly three decades ago, yet enforcement remains virtually non-existent. Rigorous enforcement is urgently needed alongside both community education and more accessible support services for survivors. Respect for cultural heritage does not mean protecting harmful traditions but rather providing room to evolve. It is beyond time for FMG/C to be more firmly tackled, not just in Djibouti but across the Horn. Ending FGM/C is about affirming the rights and voices of millions of women around the world.
By The Horn Edition Team
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