Issue No. 56

Weaponising Sudan

For months, senior commanders from the two principal warring parties in Sudan have traded accusations of foreign actors arming one another. In September, when Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan addressed the 79th UN General Assembly as Sudan's representative, in a series of thinly veiled remarks, he accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with military equipment. More recently, RSF commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' broadcast a lengthy, unscripted tirade in which he accused a number of states, including Iran and Egypt, of aiding the SAF.

The myriad of regional powers and those further afield involved in Sudan's devastating civil war is glaringly obvious. In recent weeks, Egyptian aircraft, whoever pilots them, have been documented as involved in SAF's bombing campaign, while Emirati servicemen were killed in an attack on Nyala Airport in Darfur in late September. Early on Monday morning in the Malha area of North Darfur, RSF fighters managed to shoot down what they thought was an enemy aircraft. Videos of exultant fighters celebrating the burning wreckage were quickly shared on social media, with RSF commander Ali Rizkallah 'Savannah' claiming to have shot down an Egyptian military plane. Instead, as apparent by analysis of the wreckage, it appears the plane was an Ilyushin-76 and, rather than intending to bombard RSF positions, was transporting military material from the UAE designed to support their efforts. Beyond being an apparent episode of mistaken identity in the chaos of civil war, it has drawn fresh attention to the ongoing flood of weapons into the country, which continues to define this 'internationalised' conflict. 

Iran, too, has delivered Qods Mohajer-6 drones to the SAF, which proved instrumental in the retaking of much of Omdurman earlier this year. Moscow, keen to reap the benefits of any conflict, is arming both sides, with the Africa Corps mercenary group, formerly 'Wagner,' having long-established ties with the RSF. In a lengthy report published in late July, Amnesty International implicates others, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, in the arming of the belligerents, many months after human rights atrocities were documented, some with weapons tied to these particular powers. And it is not just weapons that are flooding into the world's largest humanitarian crisis. The RSF has recruited mercenaries from the Sahel, including Chad, Mali, Niger, Libya, and the Central African Republic. Some of these have been motivated by tribal allegiance to the RSF's nomadic Arab groups, such as Hemedti's Rizeigat camel herders, as well as the typical promises of payment.

This internationalisation of the conflict, including the delivery of sophisticated weapons to the belligerents, has, unsurprisingly, only had a negative impact on the civilian population and diminishes the prospect of any substantive return to law and order-- even if a ceasefire were to come about. Sudanese civilians are facing innumerable threats to their lives and livelihoods, as evidenced by the recent UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission report. In the report, torture, killings, arbitrary detention, and sexual violence are attributed to both of the principal belligerents, though the RSF, in particular, is highlighted for its violence targeting ethnic groups in Darfur, such as the Masalit and Zaghawa.

In the absence of a ceasefire or even safe havens, any serious efforts at protecting the civilian population in a warzone depend nearly entirely on the commanders' intentions and, crucially, on a functioning chain of command within each force. While senior commanders have publicly expressed their intent to protect non-combatants, both the RSF and SAF have been accused of deliberately targeting civilians as part of their military strategies, either through the paramilitaries 'scorched-earth' tactics in Darfur or the denying of humanitarian aid into RSF-controlled territories. Moreover, there are legitimate questions about whether the respective chains of command are still functioning down to the unit and individual engaged in combat. Both warring forces are coalitions, with the SAF reliant on fighters drawn from the reformed Islamist militias known as the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and those trained by the Eritrean military in the east. And, as seen in countries like Yemen and Somalia, the mass proliferation of weapons can ease the rise of new militias and armed factions-- many months or years after the signing of any formal peace agreement. While we are currently dealing with the RSF and SAF today, it may be a very different host of actors in 10 years.

It is the RSF, however, that has faced particular accusations of poor command and control as well as predatory behaviour. In the early months of the conflict, the assembled paramilitary forces essentially handed their allied militias carte blanche in Darfur to replicate the tactics of their Janjaweed forebears two decades ago. There is an awareness within the RSF military leadership that this has damaged their image, but the questions remain about the extent to which the paramilitaries can control their forces and allies, particularly when retreating to areas that have been stripped of their worth. Recent days have seen paramilitary forces withdrawing in Gezira under pressure from SAF, and with it have come fresh reports of extreme human rights violations.

All the while, the formation of yet another international body in August, the 'Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan' known as the ALPS Group, comprised of the UN, AU, US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Switzerland, has meant little for the battlefield realities in Sudan. Several of the ALPS members are actively involved in Sudan's civil war, including by delivering weapons. And despite the refusal by al-Burhan to attend, the US-driven talks in Geneva nevertheless imagined an all-encompassing ceasefire as a solution to the total lack of humanitarian access to the civilian population. Yet the discussions brought nothing beyond brief access to Darfur from Chad, while the dramatic lack of protection of civilians remains largely off the table. Placing the emphasis on a ceasefire failed again, as it did in earlier talks, and there remains no likelihood of any significant pause in the fighting in the immediate future. The ALPS members are unsure whether the next round of negotiations will even occur.

Still, while an overall ceasefire is unlikely, there is a minimum requirement for establishing safe local areas for civilians and securing humanitarian access. The likelihood of any civilian protection force being deployed to Sudan in the near future is slim to none. There are, nevertheless, options for the international community beyond deploying a civilian protection force – as recommended by the UN fact-finding mission. For example, since several members of the ALPS Group are among the most egregious purveyors of arms to the belligerents, their renewed commitment to the lacklustre and oft-broken arms embargo on Darfur would be an important place to start. Broadening it to encompass all of Sudan would be much harder, but even the prospect of wider sanctions could exert considerable leverage over the RSF and SAF to afford civilians the respect and protection all deserve in conflict.

By The Horn Edition Team