Issue No. 55

Published 17 Oct 2024

Elite Pacts vs Youth Movements in Kenya

Published on 17 Oct 2024 19:04 min

Elite Pacts vs Youth Movements in Kenya

Kenya's politics has been embroiled in turmoil since the mass youth-led protests of June. Though the protests have since eased, the consequences rumble on, including the recent impeachment of Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua– the first invocation of such powers under Kenya's 2010 Constitution. The fallout between President William Ruto and his deputy mirrors a long-standing pattern of discord between Kenyan presidents and their deputies. 

On 7 October, the night before Parliament approved the impeachment motion, Gachagua held an explosive two-hour press conference, vehemently denying the charges against him, including accusations of corruption, undermining the government, and divisive ethnic politics. The first and most notable charge against the Deputy President centres on alleged gross violations of the Constitution, including marginalising specific communities through public appointments and resource allocation. The motion highlights comments Gachagua made suggesting that government jobs and projects were distributed based on ethnic groups' support in the 2022 election, terming it a "shareholding company." 

During his press conference, Gachagua defended his widely cited remarks, arguing that his comments had been weaponised despite President Ruto agreeing to a similar "shareholding pact" before his 2022 victory. Gachagua went on to assert that within the Kenya Kwanza coalition, both National Assembly Speaker Moses Wetangula and Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi negotiated their positions in exchange for securing 70% of the Western region's votes for Ruto. According to Gachagua, regional leaders and coalition members bargained for their share of power, with party leaders demanding their portion of the financial Kenya Kwanza 'cake.'

These latest comments have once again highlighted Kenya's long-held political settlement dominated by elite pacts, often colloquially referred to as 'the handshake.' A legacy of the British colonial occupation and the authorities, often violent, co-opting of certain elites from ethnic groups to cement their hold over Kenya, such elite power-sharing has characterised the country's politics since 1963. These pacts have historically been instrumentalised to acquire power and maintain it, but also to revive legitimacy and stabilise regimes when discord between government and the public grows. And they have also been critical in resolving political crises through power sharing, particularly when powerful ethnic elites clash. 

After independence, significant ethnic groups led by their respective leaders coalesced around the Kenya African National Unity (KANU), which won power, while minority groups mobilised themselves around the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Many of these leaders still draw their influence from the belief among their constituencies that they transact on behalf of the community. Commanding the ability to mobilise communities, local, regional, and national administrations have drawn on these leaders to maintain power, entrenching patronage flows through specific networks. When KADU dissolved and its leader, Daniel Moi, joined KANU, he eventually ascended to the presidency in 1978 upon Jomo Kenyatta's death. What then stabilised the political elite would be class solidarity, particularly during the era of Moi's one-party rule (1982–2002). Afterwards, class elites continued to share power through informal coalition governments (2003–2007), a formal coalition government (2009–2013), and renewed informal coalitions (2013–2022).

A new form of elite pacts emerged in 2018, however, when the ruling Jubilee Party began cohabiting with the main opposition, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Ruto's 'broad-based government' has taken this one step further, incorporating ODM directly into the government as he seeks to neutralise both the youth protests and a future challenge to the presidency. It is clear the Kenyan president has an eye on the next presidential elections and is wielding the latest alliance to mitigate the possible threat of Raila Odinga, ODM's leader and long-serving opposition figure. Odinga has been put forward as the Kenyan candidate for the African Union Commission Chair position with strong support from Ruto, which would make him ineligible for the presidential elections in 2027. Simultaneously, a bill was tabled in October to extend the presidential term in office from 5 to 7 years, as well as for MPs and governors. Meanwhile, the ODM alliance has been used strategically to undercut the nationwide Gen Z protests, including in Ruto's strongholds of Rift Valley and Mount Kenya. 

Yet the recent incorporation of senior figures from ODM into the 'broad-based' government has not only reshaped the executive but also blurred the lines within Parliament. Once a fierce opposition party, ODM now supports government bills and policies, and during the impeachment motion, both the majority and minority leaders stood in full agreement. This hybrid form of government is not new to Kenya. It is an established creation of expediency for political stability resorted to when ethnic and class elites in Kenya have major regime-threatening crises. Only this time has it been leveraged differently—securing the parliamentary majority needed to impeach the Deputy President. While the dissolution of the cabinet and accommodation of opposition regional and ethnic elites into the government was made under the banner of inclusivity, it has clearly had detrimental impacts on scrutinising legislation and holding the government to account. And as Gachagua faces the Senate impeachment hearing this week, his future in office remains doubtful.

While the Kenyan elite has once again moved to secure their political interests, the ongoing class fall-out from the Gen Z protests bears watching. Building for several years, while youth initiated the protests, it morphed into a broader uprising by workers, the unemployed, and the impoverished against the ostentatious corruption of the ruling class. This movement is issue-driven, with the slogans of 'leaderless' and 'tribeless' resonating among youth whose unity is rooted in shared economic struggles that intersect with ethnic identities. Fury was particularly focused on the sweeping tax hikes amid the steep cost of living characterised by inflation, high commodity and fuel prices, rising unemployment, and deepening poverty across the country. Ironically, it was this resentment that Ruto rode to power on, promising to break the post-colonial dynastic grip on politics. 

Unlike previous iterations, where elite-driven agitation was focused on securing elite inclusivity in government, today's movement stems from broader demands for meaningful socio-economic change. Yet the pressure to shift from elite-driven politics toward a bottom-up push for societal transformation has run into the harsh realities of Kenya's post-colonial political settlement. The co-opting of the ODM has left the concerted opposition to the government not in Parliament but rather on the streets and on social media. Recent weeks have cemented the fact that the Kenyan president has shifted from his 'hustler nation' stance towards wielding the classic instruments of Kenya's elite-centred political settlement.

By the Horn Edition team

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