Issue No. 53

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow: South Sudan delays elections-- again

Will democratic elections ever be held in South Sudan? It has now been over 13 years since the world's youngest country was formally recognised in July 2011, but the prospect of its first elections remains as distant as ever. On 13 September, South Sudanese unelected leaders pushed the December 2024 date by two years to December 2026– the fourth time they have been postponed. The delay was little surprise, following months of warnings that the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) peace agreement had not been sufficiently implemented for free and fair elections. 

Initially scheduled for 2015, the polls have repeatedly been delayed due to armed conflict, incomplete political reforms, and logistical challenges. But at the heart of the issue is that South Sudan's political elites, who control the disparate ethnic-based armed forces across the country, have little interest in threatening their profitable grip on power. Despite the country having been led by a small cabal of individuals for the past 13 years, there remains no willingness to countenance any succession strategy. For years, the South Sudanese political elite has instead sought to sustain the profitable flow of oil money that props up the patronage that just about holds the fragile peace in Juba– even with much of the country remaining unstable.

Following the announced delay, South Sudan's politicians engaged in their usual posturing, promising a renewed commitment to implementing R-ARCSS and holding elections. This time around, government officials attributed the postponement to unresolved security issues and the need for a permanent constitution—two key elements of R-ARCSS. However, numerous issues made the possibility of free and fair elections dubious at best. 

Large segments of the population, particularly displaced citizens, remain cut off from voter registration and civic education. Out of a population of around 11 million people, over 2.2 million are internally displaced, particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei, where access to voter registration and civic education remains limited. Since April 2023, the civil war in Sudan has exerted immense political, economic, and humanitarian pressure on its impoverished southern neighbour, particularly from the vast flow of refugees and returnees into South Sudan. For much of 2024, the arterial oil pipeline from South Sudan to Port Sudan has been non-functional, compounding an intense economic crisis that left the South Sudanese Pound in freefall and slashed the budgetary preparations for elections. Civil servants and soldiers have gone unpaid for months, and the minimal government services provided have collapsed. 

Yet while committees were established for voter registration, electoral laws, and drafting a permanent constitution, elections were always going to be a tall ask without the necessary political buy-in. In July, the tabling of a highly controversial national security law that proposes handing greater, unchecked powers to the National Security Service (NSS) spoke volumes about where Juba's priorities still lie. And without the necessary political and security groundwork, the prospect of armed conflict erupting over the elections continued to rise.

In recent weeks, civil society groups raised concerns over the credibility and inclusiveness of the elections, warning of potential violence and manipulation. The failure to unify the country's disparate armed forces, again partially due to budgetary concerns, meant that the probable contestation of the election's legitimacy could have easily triggered widespread violence and a return to civil war. For the elites and the networks that extend from individuals like President Salva Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar, violence and armed conflict are part of the 'real' negotiations that are used to secure their political futures, with minimal space for a genuine democratic transition. In this light, there was no real alternative but to delay the polls. But the decision to do so by two years rather than a few months was simply another indication of the stagnated politics of the country.

The response from the international community to the latest delay has been largely dismissive. For months, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan Nicholas Haysom and others have warned that the electoral preparations were insufficient to the indifference of South Sudan's politicians. Following the recent postponement, international guarantors of the 2018 peace agreement—including the UK, US, Norway, and the EU—issued statements expressing their disappointment. They have criticised the government for failing to deliver on the promises outlined in the 2022 'roadmap' for the peace process and accused the ruling elites of prioritising their own political survival over the welfare of the South Sudanese people.

The hope of South Sudan's citizens to cast their first votes has also been dashed, with the ecstasy of independence from Sudan having long faded after years of instability and corruption. The intense humanitarian crisis that is consuming large parts of the country means that most are focused on securing their everyday survival rather than the political movements in the capital. Still, with Kiir and Machar playing off their communities, the Dinka and Nuer, respectively, the leaders are able to sustain their positions and popularity. However, there is an understandable weariness, considering that South Sudan remains so troubled with the civil war having ended four years ago and reached independence 13 years ago. The decision to delay the election also leaves the Tumaini Initiative, the Kenyan-negotiated political process between hold-out groups and Juba, in doubt. Still, all parties have been aware that the polls were likely to be postponed for months, and some critical progress has been made, including over 8 protocols—chief among them to peacefully negotiate political reforms and draft a new constitution. 

It can be debated whether John Garang, the former leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) for two decades, was a democrat, but he was an undeniable visionary. Killed in a suspicious helicopter crash in 2005, the SPLM and, by extension, the politics of South Sudan have never recovered from his untimely death just weeks after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Today, the political rot behind the decision to postpone elections is just the latest example of a self-interested elite and political economy that does not work for the vast majority of the country. And despite the promises coming from Juba, there remains little suggestion that this will willingly change and that elections will suddenly become feasible-- even in two years' time.

by the Horn Edition team