In early September, the UN fact-finding mission established to investigate human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sudan released its first report. It confirmed much of what is already known-- that the principal belligerents of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have committed "large-scale violations" that include indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, and torture, among other crimes on civilians. Further, there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the RSF and its allied Arab militias have committed "numerous crimes against humanity," including enslavement, forcible displacement, and persecution on ethnic grounds.
Of particular note was the UN mission's Chair, Mohamed Chande Othman, comments that "given the failure of the warring parties to spare civilians, it is imperative that an independent and impartial force with a mandate to safeguard civilians be deployed without delay." Though not explicitly recalling the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), the report picks up on similar themes of an international responsibility to protect civilians due to the belligerent's euphemistic 'failure.' The concept was borne in the late 1990s, formed after horrific crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the Balkans, and, critically, the international community's lack of intervention. At its foundation are three tenets– every state has a responsibility to protect their "population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity," the international community must support each other to reach these obligations, and they must intervene if the state is "manifestly failing" to protect their populations.
There is no perhaps clearer case for a state and warring parties actively failing to protect its own population than in Sudan today. Indeed, much of the fundamental tactics of the two sides are predicated on inflicting suffering on civilian populations-- the RSF through its predatory looting and the SAF through inducing hunger. And many of the human rights violations and war crimes being committed by the two main warring parties are only increasing in frequency and volume. RSF has once again ramped up its shelling of residential neighbourhoods in North Darfur's capital of El Fasher-- the only regional capital in Darfur not in RSF control. Dozens of civilians have been killed in the crowded city, packed with displaced persons who have fled successive iterations of violence over the years. Earlier this month, yet another attempt to take El Fasher from the SAF and its allied Juba Peace Agreement signatory forces was repelled by heavy bombardments and intense fighting, albeit with high civilian cost. But the paramilitaries have warned that it will continue fighting for the city, outlining highly dubious conditions to lift its siege, including the end of the SAF bombardment.
It was also of little surprise that Sudan's military government publicly pushed back against the UN mission's proposal to deploy peacekeepers. The history between the SAF and much of the UN is a fraught one, with military officials still rueing allowing 'Operation Lifeline Sudan' to tackle the war-induced famine in what is now South Sudan in the 1990s. The current conflict has seen a return to some of these tactics, with SAF seeking to deny international scrutiny and weaponise starvation.
Sudan's foreign ministry said it considered the UN Human Rights Council a "political and illegal body" and that the recommendations were a "flagrant violation of their mandate." Considering that the military government does not even control the ruined capital, its insistence on 'sovereignty' is dubious at best. The SAF may not come out as severely in the UN fact-finding mission's report as the RSF, but it is still responsible for indiscriminate bombing in large parts of the country. Equally grim has been its deliberate policy of choking aid to areas under not only RSF control but other areas as well, such as the Nuba mountains that are controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). The reports eking out of these areas are harrowing, hundreds are starving to death.
Despite all this, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is still expected to address the UN General Assembly as Sudan's head of state this month. The bestowing of international legitimacy on al-Burhan, even though the country's membership in the African Union remains suspended, has handed carte blanche to repeatedly delay and deny cross-border humanitarian aid through Chad and South Sudan. It is driving a man-made famine that could rival the most significant in 100 years, with potentially millions of Sudanese starving to death if the response remains inadequate.
The UN fact-finding mission further called for a nationwide arms embargo to be imposed on the principal belligerents. The arms embargo on Darfur, which has been lacklustrely applied for two decades, is being entirely disregarded by a host of actors. An Amnesty International report in July revealed that military equipment and weapons from Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE, among others, are being imported on a massive scale into Sudan. The renewal of the sanctions by the UN Security Council on 11 September for another year was a missed opportunity to expand the sanctions regime to cover the entirety of Sudan and broaden its scope. It is not just China and Russia on the Permanent 5 that are reticent to call out those breaking the sanctions regime, but the UK too-- the UN's 'penholder' on Sudan-- has been woefully absent, seemingly afraid of undermining its relations with the Emiratis.
The likelihood of any deployment of a UN-backed multilateral peacekeeping force remains low. The principle of R2P has been only occasionally applied, though cited in some 150 resolutions, but its deployment to justify the West's bombing of Libya in 2011 essentially killed it due to its misused politicisation. But that does not mean a civilian protection force is not urgently needed, and as the international community continues to wring its hands about massive war crimes and human rights violations, the humanitarian situation is continuing to deteriorate markedly. Already declared in North Darfur, famine is spreading like wildfire through the country, with hundreds estimated to be dying every day from starvation in displacement camps like Zamzam. El Fasher remains at particular risk of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The assembling of world leaders in New York at the UN should be an opportunity to press the belligerents and their enablers in the Gulf. Even in the increasingly multi-polar world, there is enough geopolitical clout-- if governments are willing to deploy it-- to make some progress in civilian protection, even if not regarding the elusive ceasefire. A failure to do so will be another collective blot on the disturbingly indifferent international community.
by the Horn Edition team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.