Issue No. 52

Published 19 Sep 2024

R2P: The International Community's Failure in Sudan

Published on 19 Sep 2024 17:15 min
R2P: The International Community's Failure in Sudan

In early September, the UN fact-finding mission established to investigate human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sudan released its first report. It confirmed much of what is already known-- that the principal belligerents of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have committed "large-scale violations" that include indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, and torture, among other crimes on civilians. Further, there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the RSF and its allied Arab militias have committed "numerous crimes against humanity," including enslavement, forcible displacement, and persecution on ethnic grounds.
 
Of particular note was the UN mission's Chair, Mohamed Chande Othman, comments that "given the failure of the warring parties to spare civilians, it is imperative that an independent and impartial force with a mandate to safeguard civilians be deployed without delay." Though not explicitly recalling the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), the report picks up on similar themes of an international responsibility to protect civilians due to the belligerent's euphemistic 'failure.' The concept was borne in the late 1990s, formed after horrific crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the Balkans, and, critically, the international community's lack of intervention. At its foundation are three tenets– every state has a responsibility to protect their "population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity," the international community must support each other to reach these obligations, and they must intervene if the state is "manifestly failing" to protect their populations.
 
There is no perhaps clearer case for a state and warring parties actively failing to protect its own population than in Sudan today. Indeed, much of the fundamental tactics of the two sides are predicated on inflicting suffering on civilian populations-- the RSF through its predatory looting and the SAF through inducing hunger. And many of the human rights violations and war crimes being committed by the two main warring parties are only increasing in frequency and volume. RSF has once again ramped up its shelling of residential neighbourhoods in North Darfur's capital of El Fasher-- the only regional capital in Darfur not in RSF control. Dozens of civilians have been killed in the crowded city, packed with displaced persons who have fled successive iterations of violence over the years. Earlier this month, yet another attempt to take El Fasher from the SAF and its allied Juba Peace Agreement signatory forces was repelled by heavy bombardments and intense fighting, albeit with high civilian cost. But the paramilitaries have warned that it will continue fighting for the city, outlining highly dubious conditions to lift its siege, including the end of the SAF bombardment.
 
It was also of little surprise that Sudan's military government publicly pushed back against the UN mission's proposal to deploy peacekeepers. The history between the SAF and much of the UN is a fraught one, with military officials still rueing allowing 'Operation Lifeline Sudan' to tackle the war-induced famine in what is now South Sudan in the 1990s. The current conflict has seen a return to some of these tactics, with SAF seeking to deny international scrutiny and weaponise starvation.
 
Sudan's foreign ministry said it considered the UN Human Rights Council a "political and illegal body" and that the recommendations were a "flagrant violation of their mandate." Considering that the military government does not even control the ruined capital, its insistence on 'sovereignty' is dubious at best. The SAF may not come out as severely in the UN fact-finding mission's report as the RSF, but it is still responsible for indiscriminate bombing in large parts of the country. Equally grim has been its deliberate policy of choking aid to areas under not only RSF control but other areas as well, such as the Nuba mountains that are controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). The reports eking out of these areas are harrowing, hundreds are starving to death.
 
Despite all this, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is still expected to address the UN General Assembly as Sudan's head of state this month. The bestowing of international legitimacy on al-Burhan, even though the country's membership in the African Union remains suspended, has handed carte blanche to repeatedly delay and deny cross-border humanitarian aid through Chad and South Sudan. It is driving a man-made famine that could rival the most significant in 100 years, with potentially millions of Sudanese starving to death if the response remains inadequate.
 
The UN fact-finding mission further called for a nationwide arms embargo to be imposed on the principal belligerents. The arms embargo on Darfur, which has been lacklustrely applied for two decades, is being entirely disregarded by a host of actors. An Amnesty International report in July revealed that military equipment and weapons from Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE, among others, are being imported on a massive scale into Sudan. The renewal of the sanctions by the UN Security Council on 11 September for another year was a missed opportunity to expand the sanctions regime to cover the entirety of Sudan and broaden its scope. It is not just China and Russia on the Permanent 5 that are reticent to call out those breaking the sanctions regime, but the UK too-- the UN's 'penholder' on Sudan-- has been woefully absent, seemingly afraid of undermining its relations with the Emiratis.
 
The likelihood of any deployment of a UN-backed multilateral peacekeeping force remains low. The principle of R2P has been only occasionally applied, though cited in some 150 resolutions, but its deployment to justify the West's bombing of Libya in 2011 essentially killed it due to its misused politicisation. But that does not mean a civilian protection force is not urgently needed, and as the international community continues to wring its hands about massive war crimes and human rights violations, the humanitarian situation is continuing to deteriorate markedly. Already declared in North Darfur, famine is spreading like wildfire through the country, with hundreds estimated to be dying every day from starvation in displacement camps like Zamzam. El Fasher remains at particular risk of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
 
The assembling of world leaders in New York at the UN should be an opportunity to press the belligerents and their enablers in the Gulf. Even in the increasingly multi-polar world, there is enough geopolitical clout-- if governments are willing to deploy it-- to make some progress in civilian protection, even if not regarding the elusive ceasefire. A failure to do so will be another collective blot on the disturbingly indifferent international community.

by the Horn Edition team

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