Issue No. 51

The Evolution of the Fano Insurgency

With attention trained on the Ethiopia-Somalia border amid fears of regional war erupting, armed conflict in the Amhara region in north-western Ethiopia continues to escalate. In recent weeks, several factions within the decentralised Fano insurgency have shown a growing propensity toward large-scale attacks, seizing several towns and conducting massive raids on government infrastructure and military positions. The federal government's control of the Amhara region is badly waning as it seeks to divert domestic attention away from the insurgency toward its geopolitical enemy of Egypt and a possible conflagration in Somalia.
 
The increasingly brutal armed conflict is threatening to upend the federal government's fragile hold on Amhara. Convoys are facing ambushes that are siloing government troops to a handful of major cities as Fano militias dominate swathes of rural Amhara. With arterial roads under siege and government machinery geared towards fighting Fano, limited essential services are being reduced as the cost of living continues to rise due to the choking of trade and transport. 

For several months after large-scale fighting erupted in August 2023, Fano's recurring ambushes characterised the low-intensity guerrilla warfare, with hit-and-run attacks on government and military infrastructure and the occasional raid on a major town. Despite sustained drone strikes and successive military offensives by the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in Gojjam and Gondar, Fano not only remains resilient– but is actually increasing its territorial presence and appetite for high-casualty raids. For instance, on Sunday and Monday, Fano fighters in the Kalim area were reported to have captured dozens of government troops, beyond inflicting hundreds of casualties in deadly clashes. Across the Amhara region, the armed conflict has markedly escalated in intensity as Fano factions and government forces engage in larger pitched battles. The cost to communities in Amhara is also growing, with fighting becoming increasingly bloody, ENDF troops more indiscriminate in their targeting, and the months-long humanitarian crisis in parts of the region compounded by a patchy rainy season.
 
Of particular note was the seizure of the border town of Metema in West Gondar near the Sudanese border on 2 September. Gondar Fano militia launched a coordinated attack on Metema, threatening to encircle hundreds of ENDF troops and prompting Sudan's military authorities to shut the border. Rapdily withdrawing Ethiopian soldiers were allowed to cross into Sudan on condition they disarmed. The Fano faction held the town for multiple days and inflicted heavy casualties on government forces– a clear signal that Addis does not have the situation under control. Metema has been the principal entry point for tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees fleeing the calamitous civil war between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since the conflict erupted in April 2023.
 
In Ethiopia, the reasons for Fano's resilience can be attributed to several factors, particularly their decentralised, small-unit nature, making them highly mobile and able to navigate the region's vast mountainous terrain. Public support for Fano remains steady, continuing to draw in urban youth to grow its numbers alongside defectors from experienced Amhara police and soldiers. Reported human rights violations by the ENDF, including mass killings and sexual violence against civilians, have further driven fresh recruits to the Amhara nationalist forces. All the while, the Eritrean military has maintained its relationship with Fano factions, which it forged during the Tigray war, as Asmara seeks to undermine its former ally.
 
Though several Fano factions are showing increasing military potency, the likelihood of their complete unification still appears distant, despite influential elements within the Amhara diaspora advocating for a merger. The diaspora has played a central role in the financing and arming of the various Fano militias, as well as driving the sensationalist rhetoric of an 'Amhara genocide' being committed by the ruling Prosperity Party. While some in the diaspora believe that a unified front would provide the military impetus for seizing– and holding– major cities like Bahir Dar, others support unification to manoeuvre the Fano movement into a more favourable position for possible future negotiations with the federal government. While diaspora figures have sought to negotiate between warring Fano leaders, the decentralised finances that run through personal diaspora relationships reinforce the fractured nature of the movement.
 
Two principal camps have emerged within the Fano movement. The first is led by Zemene Kassie of the Gojjam Fano, which advocates for sustained armed struggle, with Amhara nationalism as the binding factor. The second is a coalition of factions that have aligned themselves with Eskinder Nega, which is centred on Ethiopian nationalism and Amhara political interests. There are over half a dozen factions, including the Amhara Fano in Wollo, led by Mire Wedajo, and the Shewa Fano Governorate, led by Meketaw Mamo. Earlier this year, Nega– the controversial former journalist and politician– formed the Amhara Popular Front (APF), seeking to consolidate his influence, but this has triggered significant tensions among several Fano factions. Competition has even driven inter-Fano militia clashes, including between Mamo's Shewa Fano fighters, who support Nega, and the Shewa Fano faction formerly led by Asegid Mekonnen. Mamo's faction has sought to establish itself as the principal player in North Shewa, seizing advantage of Mekonnen's recent arrest by government forces.
 
Another significant dynamic that has also increasingly played out in 2024, which makes both unification and peace talks under a single Fano 'umbrella' less likely, is the rise of the personality cult within several factions. Among others, Zemene Kassie has become increasingly portrayed as a saviour of the Amhara and a symbol of resistance against the ruling Prosperity Party government. Loyalty to those like Kassie, or Mire Wedajo in Wollo, is being placed ahead of the amorphous and poorly defined political positions in Fano, which range from irredentist claims on Tigray and Oromia to frustrated farmers angered by lack of fertiliser. The sporadic but growing inter-Fano clashes are being driven by the question of who should represent the disparate militia, even while elements of the more extreme positions of Amhara nationalism are shared among them.
 
Addis has neither the political nor the military means to end an insurgency largely of its own making. During the Tigray war, it armed and stoked the extremist ideology of many of these militias against Mekelle, while it has unintentionally drawn more to their cause through its heavy-handed prosecution of conflict in Amhara since August 2023. It has become increasingly clear that there is no single solution to the Fano insurgency; its fractured nature makes it far more challenging to negotiate, as different factions place differing importance on Western Tigray, Amhara representation in the federal system, the role of Orthodox Christianity, and support for farming communities, to name a few concerns.
 
Instead of tackling Ethiopia's governance and security challenges, the ruling Prosperity Party has repeatedly sought to divert attention to an external enemy. And despite months of campaigning, attempts to unify Ethiopia behind restoring sea access have failed to endear the federal government to the country's critical Amhara, Oromia, and Tigrayan constituencies. With the Amhara region ablaze, it is clear that another conflict is something Addis can ill-afford, but as rhetoric and troop manoeuvres continue to escalate, they may nevertheless be drawn in.

by the Horn Edition team