The Rise of the BRICS and Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions
The past fortnight has seen tensions across the Horn of Africa escalate at an alarming rate. The geopolitical competitors of Ethiopia and Egypt are facing off over the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia, with the danger of yet another internationalised conflict erupting in the Horn rising. Other countries are quietly assembling behind their respective allies. So far, this has largely broken down along the Saudi-Emirati schism that is playing out across the increasingly anarchic 'Red Sea Arena.' The current crisis can also be understood in the context of the interconnected rise of the BRICS, a paralysed multi-lateral system, and a regional order in flux.
As is the case in the Sudanese conflict, Egypt and Ethiopia fall on opposing sides of the Saudi-Emirati divide across the Red Sea. Despite the reports of a UAE bailout earlier this year, Cairo remains aligned with Saudi Arabia, particularly over Israel's invasion of Gaza and their mutual support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the ongoing civil war. Others, to greater and lesser extents, are also aligned with Riyadh, including Eritrea and Djibouti. Within the Saudi orbit, not all relations between these actors are equal or peaceable, but most enjoy Riyadh’s largesse and investment, which has come in the form of major port deals in Djibouti and mining extraction licenses in Eritrea. By extension, the Abu Dhabi-oriented actors, particularly Ethiopia, Somaliland, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Chad, make up the other flank of the schism. Within Somalia, the Emiratis also enjoy a close relationship with the Jubaland and Puntland administrations.
Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, among others, perceive the littoral states on the Red Sea as an extension of their security and political spheres of interest. The zero-sum game to deny their competitors access, previously Qatar and Iran, has seen a neo-colonial scramble for natural resources in the Horn as well as a securitisation of the Red Sea countries. Today, on either side of the Red Sea, armed conflict, mass displacement, and food insecurity are becoming the norm-- not the exception. Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among others, are all grappling with intersecting and compounding security, humanitarian and governance crises, which have eroded government presence in the peripheries. Consequently, unstable and irrational regimes have become answerable to their Gulf patrons, who care little for democracy and have driven a renewed focus on a distorted 'sovereignty' that is centred on extracting international and domestic rents.
What is also notable about the latest political crisis engulfing the Horn is that both Ethiopia and Egypt are members of the insurgent BRICS bloc. On 1 January, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, and Ethiopia officially joined the group, while Saudi Arabia and Argentina were also invited. The bloc is far from ideologically united, but they share an interest in de-dollarisation, the undermining of the supremacy of the US currency, and a shared vision of illiberal international relations. Iran and Russia want to undermine US hegemony and 'sanctions-bust,' while China seeks to erode, not entirely dismantle, the USD. Most member states are concerned not about the massive displacement and food crises roiling the Horn or issues of democracy and governance but about strategic investments in critical resources such as agricultural land and water.
The petro-monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested USD billions in shoring up their vulnerability to the climate crisis and food insecurity by buying up vast tracts of land across the Horn, particularly in Sudan. In particular, Abu Dhabi, or more accurately, Dubai, has monopolised the largely informal Sahelian gold trade-- one of the principal resources that underpins currency. And it was only a matter of time before Turkey, though a NATO member, sought to join BRICS, as announced on 2 September. For several years, the Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration has been operating with a kind of BRICS rationale, balancing a relationship with Russia and the West while pursuing strategic relationships with countries like Ethiopia and Somalia.
The ongoing 9th Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing also points to where we can expect regimes to align if Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia end up clashing, through proxies or otherwise. Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), his Eritrean counterpart Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed were all present in the Chinese capital. Since his return to office in 2022, HSM and Afwerki have struck up a close alliance, with the former travelling half a dozen times to Asmara, including soon after the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was announced on 1 January 2024.
In Beijing, HSM and Afwerki met again alongside their foreign ministers and proclaimed their support for each other once more. Eritrea is firmly in the Cairo/ Mogadishu camp, supportive of any agenda that might destabilise or undermine its southern neighbour. The calamitous partnership between Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is long gone, collapsing in the aftermath of the war on Tigray. The former allies are now facing off in Ethiopia's Amhara region, with Asmara providing clandestine military support to select Fano militias, with which it forged close ties during the ethnic cleansing of Western Tigray. Proxy forces have long been a feature of armed conflict in the Horn of Africa, but an increasingly militarily assertive Gulf has also warped this dynamic.
The BRICS is not a multi-lateral designed to soothe internal conflict or establish a new vision of governance and security. Though Egypt and Ethiopia are both member-states, do not expect the organisation to step in to facilitate dialogue. ‘Pax Americana’ was always something of a misnomer, underwritten by immense military and economic force, but the next iteration of the regional and global order does not promise to offer greater stability or equitable governance. Tensions are rising once more in the Horn, with few easy off-ramps and plenty of room for miscalculation.
by the Horn Edition team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.