Anticipatory Action in Kenya: Another Approach to Disaster Risk Reduction
Anticipatory action refers to an increasingly popular humanitarian response that seeks to improve disaster management. It is based on a simple premise - early warnings of impending disasters trigger humanitarian responses using pre-arranged financing to prevent the most extreme scenarios. Evidence collected from global pilot projects has repeatedly proven that acting ahead of a catastrophe saves both lives and livelihoods. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), anticipatory action is "more cost-effective" and offers a "higher return on investment" than more traditional humanitarian interventions. Kenya, in particular, is in an ideal position to benefit from its growing credibility.
Three components form successful anticipatory action. The first is a trigger system that monitors relevant hazards, whether disease-related or climactic. The trigger will launch the second component when specific thresholds are surpassed – say, a certain amount of excess rain in a landslide-prone area or a dry season has lasted 90 days longer than expected. The second element is a set of pre-arranged responses that support populations vulnerable to the respective shock. Timing here is critical. Activities must begin in the short period after the trigger and before the full effects of the shock are felt. The third component is pre-arranged, guaranteed financing that rapidly funds and scales up responses.
Perhaps more than any other region, the Horn's various national social protection systems have the potential to complement anticipatory action measures. In recent years, these protection systems have been described, much like anticipatory action, as "scalable." Ethiopia's Safety New Program (PSNP) and Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) can both, in theory, expand to reach more people experiencing secondary shocks while also addressing larger, chronic vulnerability issues. Because these national systems account for both acute short-term and chronic long-term challenges, they are clear entry points for humanitarians to align anticipatory action activities. The World Food Programme (WFP) has alluded to this before when describing anticipatory action as being "humanitarian and development programming and financing under the same objective."
However, simply having a national social protection system is by no means a cure-all. During the punishing 2022 drought, Kenya and Ethiopia struggled to quell a foreseeable regional food crisis. Kenya recorded its worst period of food insecurity and malnutrition in the country's history, in part due to financing complications. And Ethiopia's humanitarian situation remains dire, with millions internally displaced and tens of millions requiring humanitarian assistance. Established in 2005, while the PSNP remains an integral part of Ethiopia's food security safety net and rural fabric, it is facing increasing budgetary cuts and demands on its resources.
Beyond complications linking national protection systems with anticipatory action, there are several operational challenges to implementing these components by themselves. One glaring flaw is that certain shocks and their triggers, such as cyclones, landslides, and flooding, leave little time for humanitarians to mobilise. Even if there is substantial warning, poor or missing data could muddle forecasts, create donor reluctance, and lead to a missed window of opportunity. Another issue is that funding for humanitarian crises remains sporadic and reactive, typically only triggered when livelihood loss is reported. Anticipatory action measures funded centrally by the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund are promising solutions being spearheaded by FAO and WFP, but this would represent a substantial and frankly revolutionary change in how humanitarian action is currently funded. At least in the immediate future, the likelihood of central funding becoming mainstream is low.
The most difficult hurdle is the lack of an international standard for implementation. Supporting either immediate needs or potentially more severe risks later is a catch inherent in all anticipatory action measures. Communities, humanitarians, and donors have yet to create a standard for balancing this dilemma. Because Kenya's arid and semi-arid counties experience both chronic and acute deprivation, there could be irregularities in which areas receive assistance. This would be a violation of the impartiality principle of humanitarian action.
Still, these challenges do not detract from anticipatory action's promise, and many international organisations continue to work in tandem with local partners to mainstream and improve the approach. In 2020, for example, Welthungerhilfe built a forecast system to address drought-induced food insecurity in Kenya. Welthungerhilfe's drought triggers launch early action protocols (EAPs) to "reduce the risks of food insecurity among vulnerable communities, prevent negative coping strategies, and reduce loss and damages among drought-affected households." Red Cross Societies are also institutionalising EAPs in the face of regional climactic shock, with cash and voucher programs being a preferred means of assistance.
An immediate priority for all organisations pursuing anticipatory action should be establishing closer collaboration with UN and government agencies. This can ensure the national synchronisation of both the relevant triggers and projects undertaken in a given crisis scenario. Another priority should be determining how humanitarian actors can integrate informal warning systems and local actors within broader anticipatory action measures. This would focus attention on local perceptions of crises while factoring in community needs. Finally, humanitarian actors and donors need to seriously rectify how they balance growing short and long-term needs against limited funding. Because shocks vary greatly, weighing the balance will only be possible on a case-by-case basis. It will also require greater data sharing and coordination to ensure maximum return on the money invested.
The alternative to anticipatory action is traditional, reactive crisis response. In Kenya and beyond, the number of times this approach has failed to act early and at scale to crises should make humanitarians, donors, and governments uncomfortable. With the climate crisis intensifying, displacement numbers increasing, and food insecurity growing across the Horn of Africa, effective cost-saving measures that can prevent more communities from falling into impoverished hunger are needed more than ever. Anticipatory action can help rectify this, but only if actors can overcome its sizable – but manageable – operational barriers.
by the Horn Edition team
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