Impeded talks, growing famine: Sudan's Escalating Catastrophe
The humanitarian situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate rapidly. Recent estimates suggest that every day, 100 people are now dying of starvation in the country, on top of untold numbers being killed and injured. The numbers of displaced people are beyond belief, with over 10 million civilians estimated to have fled their homes and who are now internally displaced-- meaning that, including refugees, around 20% of Sudan's pre-war population are displaced. Basic necessities are hard or impossible to come by. Medical care is scarce. Trade routes are interrupted, and humanitarian organisations have little or no access to the civilian populations in need of their assistance.
After more than 15 months of the latest brutal round of war in a country that has endured decades of devastating conflict, there is now a looming scenario of widespread famine. Sudanese civilians throughout the country, particularly in areas already weakened by previous violence, are on the brink. Famine has already been declared in North Darfur's Zamzam displaced person camp by the Famine Review Committee, which is linked to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a famously cautious body restricted to the limited data it can access. Reports from the Nuba Mountains have revealed that people are stripping trees of their leaves and boiling them down to have at least something to feed their children. A manmade disaster is unfolding at an accelerating pace.
Against this backdrop, a new round of ceasefire talks was scheduled to begin on 14 August in Geneva. Of the two key protagonists, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' initially confirmed that his Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would attend, but on the eve of the negotiations, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reiterated that it would not participate. For months, the army has been internally divided on engaging with the Jeddah process and elsewhere, with the influential Islamist elements within SAF opposed to negotiations with the paramilitary group. With SAF having ceded significant territory in central Sudan in recent weeks, coming to the negotiating table at this moment could appear as capitulating to the RSF. Previous attempts, be it the Jeddah process or an Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) initiative, have also failed to reach a breakthrough, with limited promises on humanitarian access being consistently broken by both parties. The latest talks have been organised by the US and co-hosted with Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, a demotion from its role in Jeddah, with representatives from the African Union, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Nations present as well.
With SAF and the RSF having withdrawn from the talks, the immediate hopes of reaching a ceasefire are dashed if they were even feasible in the first instance. Though the RSF has attempted to cast itself as a steadfast supporter of peace in Sudan, its forces have continued to commit heinous human rights violations in Khartoum, El Fasher and as it has advanced east into Gedaref. With the ongoing rainy season limiting possible advances, the RSF may have been more receptive to a ceasefire to end the SAF's continued bombardment, but it does not seriously wish to end the violence.
With neither the RSF nor SAF at the table, the immediate concern of the Switzerland talks must still be the unfolding humanitarian disaster affecting the civilian population of Sudan. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said, the talks were focused on a "nationwide cessation of violence, enabling humanitarian access to all those in need, and developing a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure the implementation of any ceasefire agreement." But with a general ceasefire now elusive, measures that vastly improve humanitarian access cannot be further delayed.
Sudan has not seen any semblance of rule of law since war erupted in Khartoum on 15 April last year. This includes a lack of respect for even the most fundamental, minimal protections civilians must enjoy during conflict. Numerous examples demonstrate that civilians have not only been lacking such protection, but they and civilian infrastructure have been both deliberately and indiscriminately attacked. Even wars have limits, and what is currently occurring in Sudan is far beyond the bounds accepted by the community of nations in the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols. The framework is there and not negotiable. What can and needs to be discussed in Switzerland now are practical arrangements to compel the parties to respect the law. The assembled international community, including RSF patrons, still has the opportunity to develop the necessary 'carrots' and 'sticks' to compel the principal belligerents to abide by their responsibilities under basic International Humanitarian Law. This should include discussions of a targeted sanctions regime, which would be a far more effective tactic than the US simply appealing to the SAF's better instincts to engage in talks on X, formerly Twitter.
The absence of the SAF and RSF from the Geneva talks is an expected disappointment, but they can still be productive, with the international community able to develop a strategy for pushing humanitarian access in El Fasher and elsewhere. In theory, if the belligerents were at the table, such practical humanitarian arrangements are quite simple and straightforward-- certain roads or entire access routes, selected villages and towns, for example, can be agreed to be temporarily or permanently off limits to any combat. Hospitals and other vital civilian infrastructure can be included in such agreements, but it should not be necessary to do so as they are, by applicable law, already protected from attack. Another integral part of practical arrangements is establishing lines of communication, whether directly or through a monitor/facilitator body and establishing accountability within each fighting force.
If the belligerents can be compelled to return to the table, which is highly unlikely in the immediate future, considering both their external support and their own internal political calculations, these accountability mechanisms will still have to be established. But the combatants will also have to make a critical concession-- that civilians and other non-combatants should not be collateral damage or perceived as targets. In a country deeply divided along ethnic lines and historically subject to centrifugal forces linked to regional identities, such an admission may be one of the most challenging elements of the process.
Blinken had already made it clear that the Switzerland talks would not address Sudan's broader political issues. These issues are labyrinthine and immense, touching on everything from transitional justice to law and order in a post-conflict setting to rebuilding a shattered economy in a more equal image. A temporary ceasefire between the two generals, though absolutely critical for the civilian population, will not solve the root ills of Sudan. Instead, a more comprehensive peace agreement would necessitate a much broader spectrum of Sudanese society and the space to negotiate what the country could look like. Civilians and the smaller armed groups do not possess the capacity to end the war, but they must have a role in shaping what comes next. Building a broader political process involving Sudanese from across the country and political dispensation should be a priority for all.
By the Horn Edition team
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