Issue No. 46

Published 08 Aug 2024

Tensions Erupt: The TPLF, the TIA, and Addis

Published on 08 Aug 2024 16:06 min

Tensions Erupt: The TPLF, the TIA, and Addis

The persistent tensions within and between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), and Ethiopia's federal government have erupted into full view. For months, behind closed doors, Tigray's senior leadership has become increasingly divided over several issues, including parts of the Pretoria agreement and the region's future. The latest and most public disagreement between the various parties concerns the possible holding of the TPLF's 14th Party Congress, the first since the war. The breakdown in governance, as alleged by TIA President Getachew Reda, also comes amid escalating humanitarian, security and political challenges facing the region. To name just two-- the restoration of full Tigrayan control over its constitutional boundaries is proving contentious, while drought is compounding a humanitarian crisis ripping through Tigray's woredas.

While the once-dominant Marxist party has lost credibility and support amongst many Tigrayans, it remains highly influential. Many of the senior leadership within the TIA are part of the TPLF, and the party's organs, though diminished, stretch across the region. These internal divisions within the TPLF and TIA, and between the TPLF and Addis, are distracting from the many crises facing Tigray. In this vein, last week, the opposition Baytona, Tigray Independence, and the Salsay Weyane Tigray parties urged the TPLF to resist infighting and prioritise the region's interests. The statement called for unity and neutrality, and reflected many of the sentiments expressed by Tigrayans, who are frustrated that their federal and regional governments appear more concerned with a possible Party Congress than Tigray's many problems.
 
One of the warring factions within the TPLF can be principally understood as the 'old guard,' which includes those such as Alem Gebre-Wahid, a former senior federal government official and brief member of the interim administration. TIA President Getachew Reda best encapsulates the other more 'moderate' faction that has agitated against the holding of the Party Congress. These strains have lain just below the surface for well over a year despite repeated mediated attempts to restore unity. As part of these attempts, at the beginning of 2024, behind closed doors, the TPLF's Central Committee briefly agreed to demote the wartime leader and former regional president Debretsion Gebremichael from chairman of the TPLF and promote Getachew to deputy chair. However, in a subsequent highly unusual move, informal mediation saw the decision to demote Debretsion revoked, and the two paralysing centres of power within a historically highly centralised party were maintained.
 
This dynamic that was distracting from the complex task of governing an increasingly unstable Tigray has now entirely given way to accusatory public briefings. In a bid to set the narrative and position himself against the TPLF's leadership, deputy chair Getachew lambasted the party on several fronts in an explosive interview on 29 July. Referring to the region as a "state of crisis," he asserted that large-scale corruption was ongoing, that the TPLF's internal divisions had eroded effective governance, and that the party was seeking to hold a Party Congress to consolidate its power. This dramatic intervention came after he refused to participate in a recent Central Committee meeting, marking a clear attempt to assert his authority over Tigray's governance. He argued that the TPLF should wait and resolve its legal status before any Congress is held. And, inadvertently or not, his arguments mirrored some of the talking points that PM Abiy Ahmed has revived in recent weeks.
 
At a meeting with several government-aligned opposition political parties in late July, Abiy warned that any attempt by the TPLF to hold the Party Congress without the approval of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) might result in the resumption of war. The rhetoric was unnecessary, and elicited alarm from several fronts. Subsequently, TPLF Chairman Debretsion met with Abiy and NEBE officials to argue again that as the party existed as a political party prior to its outlawing in 2021 and as per the Pretoria agreement, it should not have to re-register as one. The chairman was promised that the NEBE's decision would be made within two weeks, and in a press conference afterwards, Debretsion pledged that the Congress would be briefly delayed until there was more clarity. Clearly, though, the party is far from united in Congress's holding, with representatives in South Tigray now reportedly refusing to participate.
 
Debretsion and others have a fair point about the NEBE restoring the TPLF; it should have been a straightforward process taken months ago as part of the Pretoria agreement. The party's 'terrorist' label was removed by the House of Representatives in 2023. Although new legislation now allows formerly banned parties to be restored, the TPLF argues that this law doesn't apply to them. It appears that these repeated stalling tactics by different wings of the federal government may be a way to keep the TPLF internally divided and distracted.
 
Amid the recriminations about the nuances of legislation and party congresses, it is worth reiterating that there is no peace in Tigray-- just a state of largely 'frozen conflict.' The war should have brought an end to the blockade-induced famine that was consuming the region, yet repeated humanitarian crises since November 2022 have killed thousands of Tigrayans. The latest reports suggest hundreds of thousands are suffering from hunger and could starve to death in the coming months without rapid, comprehensive, and sustained humanitarian support. The NEBE may well choose to restore the TPLF's status, and the latest flare-up between Addis and Mekelle could be smoothed over, but the impact of malnutrition on babies and children will endure. Tackling the humanitarian crisis, the surge in crime and trafficking embedding itself in Tigray, and restoring the region's constitutional borders should be the regional and federal government's priorities above all else.

By the Horn Edition team

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