Putting the Ceasefire Cart before the Humanitarian Horse
One hundred sixty-five years ago, a Swiss businessman named Henry Dunant wandered the field following the fierce Battle of Solferino in Italy. Narrating his harrowing experiences in 'A Memory of Solferino,' Dunant urged the creation of an organisation that might care for all wounded during armed conflict. Dunant's advocacy for humanitarian rights would later birth the Red Cross and Red Crescent, as well as inspire the signing of the first Geneva Convention in 1864.
Decades later, in the aftermath of World War II, the Geneva Conventions were formalised– updating older treaties alongside two new ones. Dozens of nations signed up to the accords in building the liberal international order with the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Initially, the Conventions were designed for cross-border invasions but were updated in 1977 with protocols to cover internal conflicts. One of the Conventions requires all belligerents to "allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need." The Fourth Convention further required all sides to "allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores," which was later broadened to cover the "rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel," including in internal civil wars.
These provisions are currently being broken at will by the warring belligerents in Sudan, predominantly the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The military government out of Port Sudan is wielding its instruments of de jure sovereignty to strangle humanitarian access into all areas of RSF control. Millions are at risk of starvation and malnutrition, with the already catastrophic situation expected to deteriorate further in the coming weeks. The RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militia that ravaged Darfur two decades ago, continues its predatory looting while seizing more territory in central and eastern Sudan. The evisceration of the country's agriculture has compounded food insecurities like never before.
Despite promises made in Jeddah, SAF Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan declared in February that there would be no humanitarian access until his forces prevailed. Al-Burhan styles himself as Sudan's head of state and is recognised as such by the UN and the international community, but his comments were a blatant contradiction of the Geneva Conventions that he, as leader of Sudan, is obligated to subscribe to. His comments reflect a decades-old grudge in the army against the international humanitarian community, with many senior officials still resenting the 1990s Operation Lifeline Sudan that airlifted immense support to communities in now-South Sudan.
The ongoing weaponisation of humanitarian aid by the belligerents in Sudan and Israel in Gaza is part of an alarming trend in recent years of governments driving man-made famines during wartime. During the Tigray War, the Ethiopian federal government blockaded the delivery of humanitarian aid into the region, resulting in the starvation of hundreds of thousands of civilians. In Tigray, Gaza, and Sudan, the UN and the 'international community' have largely abdicated their responsibilities to uphold the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This is partly due to the grim reality that mass starvation deaths are no longer motivating Western populations or governments in the way they once did. Administrations are increasingly reluctant to expend political capital, particularly in the Gulf, when they cannot see a win.
The momentum for allowing humanitarian access did result in some indirect talks between the belligerents in July in Geneva, facilitated by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, but little came of it. Geneva has been proposed again as the site of negotiations between the RSF, which has readily agreed, and the more recalcitrant SAF.
Following the 'assassination' attempt on al-Burhan yesterday at a military base near Port Sudan, the SAF Commander insisted that there would be no talks. The negotiations are scheduled to begin on 14 August, to be overseen by the US and Saudi Arabia, and with the UAE, UN, and African Union as observers, so there is a short window to draw SAF back to the table.
More broadly, in two of the world's largest conflicts today, Gaza and Sudan, the US strategy has been built around a push for an immediate ceasefire, with little thought of what might come next. A ceasefire track is clearly needed with daily casualties and suffering so immense in both countries, but essentially subsuming the Geneva Conventions and IHL under this is a grave mistake. The guarantees of humanitarian access should come before any ceasefire, with all inducements and sticks possible used to compel these belligerents to abide by the fundamental principles of warfare.
None of the conditions of unrestricted humanitarian access were established to be contingent on a ceasefire agreement, nor were the Geneva Conventions created as a bargaining tool to be suspended during internal conflicts. The right to access healthcare, water, and food must not be delayed while waiting on the diplomatic and political machinations to negotiate a ceasefire, particularly given Sudan's long history of armed conflict.
Still, several options remain to compel the RSF and the SAF to abide by IHL. Threatening the withdrawal of the SAF's recognition as rulers over Sudan would be one place to start—it would deny the ability of those in Port Sudan to limit cross-border aid from being delivered from Adre in Chad and South Sudan. If they want to act as a government, they should be compelled to act as such. The UN, too, has been missing in action-- it must be far braver and bolder. It should, for instance, seek to facilitate a UN Security Council exception to allow aid into RSF-controlled border areas similar to one that was obtained during the Syrian conflict.
Henry Dunant’s principles were grounded in the treatment of the wounded, ensuring food and water. Stop putting the cart before the horse. Negotiate humanitarian access for the suffering population first, with a ceasefire as another track ongoing or further down the road. Humanitarian access principles are not based on when the guns are silent but when you can smell cordite in the air.
By the Horn Edition team
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