From Asmara to the Alps: Girmay's Historic Ride
Since its independence 30 years ago, Eritreans have had little cause to celebrate on the international stage. The 'hermit kingdom' on the Red Sea remains one of the most repressed and poorest nations in the world—all overseen by the likely dictator-for-life President Isaias Afwerki. The few stories that emerge from the country focus on its dire human rights record or the destabilisation of neighbouring countries. Internally, there is little access to the outside world, with print media and internet availability heavily curtailed.
It has been all the more joyful, then, to see an Eritrean cyclist– Biniam Girmay– storming to victory at three stages at this year's Tour de France, the most celebrated cycling event in the world. Girmay is not only the first black African to win a stage at the event, but he also won the prestigious 'green jersey' on 21 July– a prize handed to the race's finest sprinter. Videos of hundreds of Eritreans thronging to celebrate Girmay's victories in the streets of Asmara have been widely shared. Many Eritreans across the diaspora, too, have warmly welcomed his victories.
Girmay, or 'Bini' to his family and fans, comes from a cycling family, with his cousin being the African champion Meron Teshome and his brother another professional cyclist. He won his first mountain bike competition at the age of 12 and began representing his country as a junior in the African Championships as a teenager. At 17, Girmay travelled to Switzerland to train in Europe, battling with homesickness, competing in a white-dominated sport, and visa troubles to establish himself in a number of teams. After being let go by Delko, Girmay joined his current team, Intermarché–Wanty–Gobert Matériaux, with whom he just extended his contract until 2028.
Since the turn of the century, Eritrean athletes have perhaps been better known for absconding to claim asylum when representing their country at sporting events rather than their personal successes. The 1998-2000 Badme War between Ethiopia and Eritrea precipitated the total erasure of any remaining civil society and political rights, as well as the deeper militarisation of Eritrea. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans are estimated to have fled. In 2012, Weynay Ghebresilasie, a middle-distance runner and flag-carrier at that year's London Olympics, walked out of the Olympic village and claimed asylum in Britain. And in 2015, 10 Eritrean football players refused to return to the country from Botswana after playing a World Cup qualifying match. Ten Eritreans who have claimed asylum in other nations will compete for their new home countries at the Paris Olympic Games that open tomorrow.
One of the more straightforward legacies of Italian colonialism is the Eritreans' love of cycling. Italian settlers brought their bikes to Eritrea in the 20th century and would regularly race through the cities and mountains of the country. In 1946, the Tour of Eritrea was established, with 34 participants joining the inaugural race. The race was resurrected in 2001 after a 50-year gap, though the route was changed-- now beginning at the Massawa beaches before ending up in Asmara. Much like Tigray, the mountainous terrain is the perfect breeding ground for talented cyclists, acclimated to high altitudes with greater lung capacity than their rivals. But cyclists from Eritrea are typical 'climbers'-- not sprinters like Girmay. The poverty of the country further contributes to a certain ubiquitousness of cycling. Unlike Nairobi, Addis, or Lagos, which are often choked with smog and car fumes, Asmara's residents are mostly unable to afford cars, so more affordable bicycles are one of the principal modes of transport. Throughout the year, bike races are held in the Eritrean capital to the adoration of hundreds of spectators.
Girmay's victories are not the only reason Eritrea has been in international news of late. The growing anti-regime, pro-democratic 'Brigade N'Hamedu' movement has been widely covered, though coverage has been badly skewed towards the violence ensuing from its confrontational tactics. Formed in late 2022 by mostly recent refugees and second-generation diaspora, the movement has superseded the divisions of the older generation of Eritrea's exiled opposition. In particular, it has sought to forcibly shut down the regime-organised so-called 'cultural festivals' that serve to intimidate the diaspora, pump out Asmara's propaganda, and reproduce hate speech against Tigrayans and others. The ensuing violence in Switzerland, the US, Germany, the UK, and others has garnered some negative headlines, but there is no doubt that Brigade N'Hamedu has brought far more scrutiny to the Eritrean regime than previous movements. In part due to the pressure of these young Eritreans, the Norwegian parliament passed a law banning 'transnational repression' earlier this year.
Unsurprisingly, Girmay's victories have been seized upon by pro-regime commentators as an example of Eritrea flourishing. But Girmay's victories are his own– not the Eritrean regime's, just as the Afghan men's cricket teams' victories are their own, not the Taliban's. Indeed, one might argue that Girmay has succeeded in spite of the regime and surely not because of it. With so few public-facing role models from Eritrea, Girmay's successes have been a welcome departure from the norm for those in the diaspora as well as at home.
By the Horn Edition team
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