Issue No. 43

Between Jeddah and Geneva: Negotiations on Sudan

Prospects for a comprehensive ceasefire in Sudan remain extremely gloomy. Neither the battlefield nor the political dynamics are conducive to a halt in the destructive fighting. To date, peace efforts remain fractured and have primarily relied on appealing to the belligerents' better nature rather than attempting to develop effective deterrents and incentives. Still, the current push toward humanitarian access and civilian protection is a sensible one, considering the brief attention on the world's largest humanitarian crisis, but concerted political negotiations are nowhere on the horizon.

The latest talks, a set of indirect discussions in Geneva between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overseen by the UN, concern the still-deteriorating humanitarian crisis. Beginning 12 July, the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, continues to shuttle between the two delegations, pushing for civilian protection and access. Some progress has reportedly been made, including an agreement for the RSF's aid body to help deliver assistance. However, considering the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe overwhelming Sudan, only partial progress will not begin to tackle the needs of the millions requiring urgent assistance. All taps need to be turned on at once-- immense aid needs to be delivered through every cross-border and cross-line outlet available.

While the belligerents eke out humanitarian promises in Geneva that they have previously failed to adhere to, the SAF and RSF are still intent on brutally weaponising starvation. The SAF continues to block access through the Chadian border town of Adre into Darfur and choke cross-line access through Sudan, forcing humanitarian agencies to route aid through the limited Tine border point. Their logic is that by starving RSF-held territories, the fractious coalition of paramilitaries and allied Arab militias will splinter and turn inward. Meanwhile, for the first time in a century, Africa's largest irrigation project, the Gezira Scheme, will produce nothing due to the RSF's predatory looting. Neither side will be compelled to adhere to any agreement in Geneva out of the kindness of their hearts.

Consequently, much more pressure will also need to be exerted on their Gulf patrons to bring the RSF and SAF in line regarding humanitarian access. There is little material inducement for the immensely wealthy Gulf monarchies, but the threat of reputational damage could be wielded more effectively. More broadly and particularly critical, there will be no prospects for peace without assuring these Gulf states that their security and commercial interests in Sudan can be secured. 

The oft-used 'African solutions for African problems' or 'Sudanese solutions for Sudanese problems' is a handy get-out clause for those unwilling to acknowledge that this is a war being directed from the Gulf. These Gulf players, as well as Turkey and Egypt, among others, should be brought to a shared understanding of the crisis through the argument that while they all have their preferred actors, if the war is allowed to run its path and utterly destroy Sudan, it will be calamitous for all.

Similarly, without concerted inducements and pressure from multiple angles, neither the SAF nor the RSF are likely to come to the table to strike a deal. The main peace track that continues to be touted is the US-Saudi Jeddah process, but this has been dead in the water for several months despite the best efforts of US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. In the initial days of the war, the ceasefire initiative had logic, but since then, it has become a wholly strategic tool that is being wielded by both the RSF and the SAF.

For SAF, its repeated rejection of Jeddah and comprehensive talks, most recently by hardliner Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasser Al-Atta, allows it to dubiously claim that it is winning the war while still losing ground. Negotiating would be humiliating for those like Al-Atta, so he continues to project confidence in their eventual victory, even while morale crumbles among the rank-and-file. Meanwhile, for the RSF, Jeddah has been used as diplomatic cover to commit severe human rights atrocities. In the first phase of Jeddah last year, RSF troops committed genocidal attacks in West Darfur, including carrying out the shocking murder of West Darfur Governor Khamis Abakar. The dynamic was further repeated in the second round of talks.

The SAF and RSF have repeatedly shown their skill at manipulating mediation platforms and negotiators, appeasing diplomats while continuing military operations. These actors can readily switch between the negotiating table and the battlefield, while foreign diplomats unfamiliar with Sudan's historical precedents are easily manipulated. Both sides have abrogated every agreement or promise on humanitarian access so far.

The belligerents are doing this partly because both understand that they will not financially or materially benefit from any peace agreement. Unlike the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which promised debt relief and two viable states, no incentives have been placed on the table for the SAF or the RSF. And so, much like the Gulf actors, without knowing that their positions will be at least somewhat secured, neither will seriously countenance comprehensive talks or a ceasefire. On the other hand, 'sticks,' such as substantial sanctions by the US that could impact decision-making, have also not been brought to the fore.

In recent weeks, plenty of noise has emerged from Addis and Cairo about the parallel civilian political tracks. It is positive that the civilian movements are increasingly talking and hashing out where they stand on various issues, but the civilians fundamentally do not possess the capacity to end this war.

No matter what comes next, it is critical to note the history of Sudan's armed conflicts– they tend to last decades, and the current war bears many of the same hallmarks. Yet we should not write off the prospect of a surprise deal in Sudan. There are so many moving parts that, at some given moment, the Gulf powers may be able to come together and agree on a temporary ceasefire, likely based on their financial interests. But any politically engineered deal will be inherently fragile and not speak to the roots of the violence consuming Sudan today. In the meantime, thousands more will starve to death in the coming months as the international community continues to desert its duty.

By the Horn Edition team