The 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review
The Horn of Africa has been battered by a series of climate disasters in recent years. No region has remained safe, with natural disasters both driving humanitarian catastrophes and contributing to fragility and insecurity. We have repeatedly witnessed how climate-driven displacement has contributed to inter-communal tensions and conflict.
For instance, in Turkana, dwindling grazing land due to unprecedented drought has escalated and intensified cattle raiding as communities become ever more desperate for vital resources. In Somalia, meanwhile, major flooding in late 2023 displaced over a million people in just a few weeks, adding to a displacement that now exceeds four million Somalis. This has led to increased strain on urban environments, marginalisation of communities displaced from their lands, and resource-based, ethnicised conflict.
Looking at the Horn of Africa, connections between climate and conflict may seem self-evident, but they don't appear so from how the topic is treated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Paralysed by the threat of veto, some Permanent Members are loathe to discuss issues outside their typical wheelhouse, so linkages between climate and security are woefully neglected. This neglect was most clearly demonstrated by the Russian veto of a resolution co-sponsored by over 100 countries in 2021 that sought to cast climate change as a danger to international security. Crucially, though, the Security Council is not the only game in town, with the upcoming Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) offering an opportunity to move the dial on crucial discussion shamefully curtailed.
Local peacebuilders in the Horn of Africa have always understood the linkages between climate, security, development and peace. Though they may not frame their responses as a humanitarian-development-peace nexus, grassroots approaches innately presume the interrelatedness of these arenas, as well as the importance of culturally relevant decision-making and action. Communities know they cannot afford to wait for discussions in the Global North to catch up with them, so they have forged ahead, building resilience to withstand climate change and guard against armed conflict.
As affirmed by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office 2023 review of climate security and peacebuilding, local engagement has proved to be one of the most effective means to reach peacebuilding goals. Peacebuilding that incorporates climate concerns has been most attuned to communities' priorities, and has been a pathway to mitigate intra-communal violence and provide a route to address systemic challenges, such as women's marginalisation.
The Peacebuilding Architecture was first established in 2005 through a joint UN General Assembly/UNSC resolution and encompasses the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Architecture is reviewed every 5 years, and includes consideration reviews of peacekeeping mandates. In 2025, the PBAR is due to take stock of both UN peacebuilding and sustaining initiatives, with a particular focus on the implementation and impact of UN actions at the field level.
The PBC is an intergovernmental advisory group of 31 countries (including Kenya in 2023-24). While it is viewed as less influential than the UNGA or the UNSC, it is relatively dynamic and less bound by restrictive mechanisms compared to the bodies. Indeed, it is the only global forum specifically dedicated to assisting countries in peacebuilding. Moreover, it is not adversarial but driven by consensus, so countries that come onto its agenda are often more willing to discuss the vulnerabilities and challenges they face. This has allowed the PBC to play an important role in leading discussions on topics such as climate-related security risks as well as conflict and food insecurity. Unlike the UNSC, where no country wants to be on its radar, being a country of interest to the PBC does not risk political stigma and can even bring resources via the Peacebuilding Fund.
Instead, the Peacebuilding Fund acts as an independent instrument for investing in peacebuilding efforts; in essence, it is the resourcing branch of the Architecture. A particular feature of its mandate-- compared to other funds-- is its great appetite for risk, with a major percentage of its portfolio dedicated to climate and security projects. As a pioneering fund, it can also offer 'proof of concept' to other funds and donors to encourage them to scale up investments in these areas.
It would be beneficial if the Peacebuilding Fund, which has already started to move in the right direction, could invest even more heavily in climate and security. This would be another significant step in expanding its mandate to cover a broader range of risks, including the non-military threats of inequality and food insecurity. The Fund could also lean more heavily into engaging with intermediary organisations with a demonstrated understanding of local communities.
Some of the quieter but more successful efforts by peacekeeping and political projects to integrate climate and security could also be drawn upon in the PBAR. The Review could also bolster the positive role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, and increase support for the UN Climate, Peace and Security Hub for the Horn of Africa.
Discussions on the 2025 PBAR and its preparatory processes now taking place could offer support to local peacebuilders doing the heavy lifting in their communities. If done right, they can ensure that the UN adjusts its tools, mechanisms and procedures to better fit with and complement community-level action. The true measure of the success of the Review will be the degree to which it reveals itself as relevant to those delivering peace on the ground.
By the Horn Edition team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.
On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.
Turkey yesterday crossed a perilous threshold in Somalia when it used its military air assets not for counterterrorism purposes but as a partisan tool in local Somali political warfare.
The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) strategy to assert central authority over federal states and enforce its brand of limited plebiscite – the so-called “one-person-one-vote” (OPOV) – appears to be going awry.
Delegates from Somalia's influential Darood clan family are currently gathering in Nairobi, Kenya, for a crucial "pre-conference" planning session. Driven largely by clan chiefs, the meeting is designed to formulate a unified strategy and coordinate responses to ‘fundamental issues’ (arrimo masiiri ah) within Somalia, principally centre-periphery tensions and the future of federalism. The anticipated culmination of these talks is a comprehensive Pan-Darood congress in Garowe. This development represents a rare and significant intervention, serving as a clear indicator of accelerating political polarisation and fragmentation.