ATMIS is dead, long live ATMIS
Last Friday, 21 June, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) convened in Addis Ababa to discuss, among other topics, the future of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Discussions surrounding the draw-down of ATMIS and a possible UN-mandated AU-led post-ATMIS force have been ongoing for months amid continued concerns about the capacity of the Somali National Army (SNA). Though long overdue, the AUPSC meeting was intended to provide some clarity on the ATMIS draw-down, as well as the future of any mission.
The subsequent communique had a certain sense of deja vu about it– considering that ATMIS was formed on 1 April 2022 as a successor to the 15-year-old African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to transfer full security responsibilities to Somalia's security forces. It has become all too clear that this mandate remains unfulfilled, so another acronym will now need to be drummed up, more funding will have to be sourced, and the troop composition decided. These are no small questions, however, and the federal government has repeatedly thrown up major obstacles to the withdrawal and future transition, particularly on troop composition.
Of particular note from the communique was the AUPSC's support for the federal government's staggering of the ongoing third draw-down of 4,000 ATMIS troops by July. Two thousand are currently being withdrawn from a series of Forward Operating Bases in South-Central Somalia, while a further 2,000 will now withdraw in September 2024, conditions and funding permitting. So far, in the third draw-down, ATMIS has handed over three FOBs to the SNA– Jowhar, Bariire, and El Eglow. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) were also anticipated to have transferred Kaday, Burgayo, and Abdille Birolle between 18-26 June, with 600 soldiers departing. It is not yet clear whether these bases will still be shuttered, but 8 FOBs are expected to be transferred by the beginning of July. Any withdrawal of the KDF from Abdille Birole and other locations will stretch the SNA capabilities in Jubaland, though, with concerns about their ability to assume responsibility for security in the Gedo region. Even with the support of the ENDF, the SNA and the National Intelligence and Security Agency have been unable to break the Al-Shabaab blockade around Luuq.
More broadly, the AUPSC-endorsed plan is for ATMIS to transition into another mission of around 12,000 personnel, including civilian and police components. This may involve some shuffling of responsibilities and deployments of the various troop-contributing countries, but any major withdrawal is now highly unlikely if funding can be secured. It also appears that the new AU peacekeeping force may have greater scope for offensive operations rather than simply the 'guard force' of 5,000-8,000 personnel to guard critical urban infrastructure that was initially envisaged.
Funding remains a major hurdle for the staggered withdrawal and the post-ATMIS force, though. The EU's budgets are already spoken for in 2024 and are facing immense humanitarian and political demands, particularly from Gaza and Ukraine. The AUPSC communique only "noted" that funding shortfalls could impede the draw-down– it was published on 21 June– three weeks into the initially planned withdrawal of 4,000 ATMIS forces. Moreover, the glacial decision-making by the federal government on these repeated delays and the future of ATMIS has proven repeatedly extremely costly. ATMIS ran a financial deficit for much of 2023 due to two requests for technical pauses of troops.
Senior US officials have reportedly suggested that the EU could retain primary responsibility for funding over the next two years of deployment before Washington joins with other partners to assume part of the ongoing burden. However, with US presidential elections approaching in November 2024, this plan could collapse before it begins. It is difficult to imagine either candidate's administration contributing tens or hundreds of USD millions to sustain the next iteration of foreign troops in Somalia.
To be clear, ATMIS is not, and has not been, a panacea to Somalia's perennial instability. Notably, ATMIS does not typically conduct offensive operations but is rather used as a patrolling and holding force. Further, many Somalis are frustrated with the variation in professionalism and competence of the differing deployments. However, it is also clear that when ATMIS troops withdraw, the Somali National Army (SNA) still lacks the capacity to assume responsibility for securing the environs of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). In the past 12 months, on multiple occasions across South-Central Somalia, ATMIS troops have been replaced at FOBs by SNA troops before coming under sustained pressure from Al-Shabaab and are eventually overrun.
Another major question surrounding the post-ATMIS force, which will need support from the UN, will be the regional troop composition. The furore surrounding National Security Advisor Hussein Moalim's insistence that Ethiopian soldiers will play no part in securing Somalia beyond December 2024 shows no sign of easing. Somalia's Permanent Representative to the UN, Dahir Abukar Osman 'Baale', recently insisted that it was not the fears of a security vacuum that was forcing the ATMIS withdrawal delay but rather "illegal" Ethiopian troop crossings into Somalia. In the past two weeks, large contingents of Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) soldiers have crossed into Somalia as far as Mataban before withdrawing, meeting with community representatives in various settlements. It is a bizarre argument from Baale that ATMIS needs to be retained, which includes thousands of Ethiopian troops, due to the ENDF's recent incursions. Further, it is unclear if the federal government and the African Union have factored in whether the several thousand ENDF soldiers across South West State will withdraw in their post-ATMIS calculations.
While ATMIS withdrawal and funding discussions have sparked into life once again, significant plans to reform the SNA under Turkish direction continue. Nothing is set in stone, but what has been announced is the creation of four new commands— special operations, training, logistics, and intelligence, as well as their commanders. Elements of these reforms should be welcomed, particularly the injection of fresh leadership, but we will have to wait and see how the changes shakedown in their entirety. The ATMIS saga, in the meantime, appears set to stagger on for the immediate future.
By the Horn Edition team
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