Issue No. 38

The Fall of El Fasher

After weeks of intense fighting, the fall of El Fasher to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) appears imminent. This week, the US Envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, warned that the city could fall to the RSF at any moment following the near-total collapse of Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signatories fighting on the side of the Sudanese army. Since the failure of a third ceasefire in the capital of North Darfur in mid-April 2024, intense clashes have continued to escalate in scale and ferocity. Hundreds of thousands of civilians remain trapped in the city amid reports of starvation, with fears of ethnic-based genocidal violence high.
 
The military situation for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its Sudan Liberation Movement- Minnawi (SLM-M) and Justice Equality Movement (JEM) allies looks increasingly desperate. Outnumbered by the RSF and its allied Arab militias, air drops by the Sudanese Airforce have been unable to provide adequate resupply, while ammunition supplies are reported to be running low. RSF forces are currently pushing deeper into the city towards the SAF 6th Infantry Division headquarters.
 
Encircled on three sides by the RSF, no humanitarian aid has been entering the city since 10 May. El Fasher is home to hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians from elsewhere in Darfur and has served as a major humanitarian hub since the Janjaweed first set the region ablaze two decades ago. In recent weeks, the densely populated neighbourhoods have witnessed intense shelling and heavy fighting, causing dozens of civilian casualties on a daily basis. And on 8 June, the last major operational hospital was attacked by the RSF, whose fighters shot medical staff and patients while the remaining medical supplies were looted.
 
It is believed that the RSF's offensive is an attempt to consolidate control over El Fasher, and West Darfur, before the onset of seasonal rains. Expected to last until September, the rains will likely limit the manoeuvrability of both the RSF and SAF and harden the battlefield lines. The capture of El Fasher would also remove the last SAF stronghold in West Darfur and allow the paramilitaries to consolidate their position against opposed JPA forces. This includes the Sudan Liberation Movement – al-Nur (SLM-AW), which occupies a stronghold in the Marra Mountains located to the east of El Fasher, but also against the SLM and JEM, which hold territory to its east and north.
 
Despite the scale of the fighting and the international attention it has attracted, the commander of the RSF and former number two on the Sovereignty Council, Gen. Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti', has remained silent. It is likely that he is biding his time, waiting for the fighting and the controversy it is fuelling to ease before embarking on another UAE-funded regional tour like the one undertaken in January 2024. As such, battlefield decisions have likely been left in the hands of his brother and senior RSF commander Abdelrahim Dagalo, who was sanctioned by the US in September 2023.
 
This absence has also led to speculation that the capture of El Fasher is part of broader attempts by the RSF command to declare an independent state in Darfur and other territories under paramilitary control. While unconfirmed, this threat to create a 'second Libya,' where the country is split in two by warring forces, prompted the US Envoy to Sudan to declare that Washington would not recognise an independent Darfur "under any circumstances."
 
Fears of genocide in El Fasher are being driven not only by the brutality of the fighting in the city but also by other massacres perpetrated by the RSF during Sudan's 14-month-long armed conflict. The Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations has warned that the conflict in Sudan "bears all the marks of risk of genocide," and the International Criminal Court has also called for videos and photos from El Fasher that may be evidence of war crimes. On 5 June, RSF forces killed over 100 civilians in the village of Wad al-Noora in Gezira State after defeating a local militia force. And scenes of RSF personnel forcing Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit civilians to march through the streets of El Fasher and emit animal noises have only added to concerns of potential massacres and other human rights atrocities.
 
Any large-scale massacre in El Fasher risks triggering a far more intense conflict between the RSF's support base among the Riezegat and other Baggara Arab tribes with non-state actors whose support lies among the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit communities. Such an event could further serve to heal some of the internal divisions between the armed SLM-M and SLM-AW, as well as tilt other officially neutral Darfur-based groups to join the fight against the RSF. These include the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council (SLM-TC) and the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), which have remained on the sidelines of the fighting. Moreover, the SLM-M's leader, Minni Minnawi, has remained in communication with other JPA forces despite joining the side of the SAF in November 2023. Even in the event that the RSF do not commit acts of genocide, the widespread killing and abuse of civilians already risks triggering an intensification of the ethnic-tribal nature of the conflict and will likely reverberate in yet-to-be-known ways.
 
A massacre of ethnic Zaghawa civilians would also likely complicate the relationship between the RSF and Chad's political leadership. Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby has been largely supportive of the RSF in recent months, in large part due to significant injections of Emirati monetary support, but much of his political base and military leadership are from the Zaghawa. While there are several complicated consequences for the RSF to seize El Fasher, the paramilitary group is fundamentally a predatory force that remains reliant on looting and pillaging new territory to sustain its myriad Arab militia forces.
 
With attempts to pressure the RSF to call off its assault having failed, it is time for the international community to demand greater action from those actors with the capability to exert influence on the belligerents, such as the UAE and Egypt. Still, while this may be successful in limiting some of the violence in the conflict, it should be recognised that the RSF may not be able to control some of its own allies in Darfur and that the dynamics on the ground are not currently conducive to a ceasefire. Repeatedly appealing to the RSF's 'better nature' to call off the assault on El Fasher has gone nowhere, and the multiple dormant peace tracks have been unable to offer serious inducements to prevent the continued atrocities and fighting in Sudan. Political bravery and concerted attention from the international community have been shockingly absent in Sudan, and the imminent fall of El Fasher is a direct consequence of these repeated failures.

By the Horn Edition team