Mr. Ruto travels to Washington
In late May, Kenyan President William Ruto travelled to the United States for a historic state visit—the first of any African leader for over 15 years. Over three days, country music, a lavish banquet, and multiple photo-ops were laid on for the Kenyan leader, alongside high-level security and trade talks. The trip was an opportunity for both the US and Kenya to reaffirm and strengthen their close ties, which, despite occasional turbulence, have remained strong since Kenyan independence in 1963. And it proved highly profitable for both administrations, with Nairobi positioning itself firmly within the US orbit and receiving a number of trade and security benefits in return.
In one widely-covered announcement, US President Biden announced that Kenya would be designated as a 'Major Non-NATO Ally' of the US—the first in sub-Saharan Africa. While the US will not be obligated to defend Kenya as it would with other NATO allies, it nevertheless will cement their close bilateral security ties as well as offer Kenya greater access to research, training, and equipment. Lamu County already hosts a major US military base from which it conducts much of its regional counter-terror operations, particularly against Al-Shabaab.
President Ruto's support has come at a particularly opportune moment for the US government, a time when it has been compelled to reduce its presence on the African continent in the Sahel and elsewhere. Washington's once-steadfast alliances in Africa have faced pressure from an opportunistic and transactional Russia, disillusionment with Western engagement, and an influx of immense Gulf State investment. And since President Ruto assumed power in 2022, instability across the Horn and Sahel has continued to spread and deepen. Roiling armed conflict has devastated Sudan since mid-April 2023, while Ethiopia continues to battle with two major insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara, and Somalia faces an Al-Shabaab that encroaches ever closer to Mogadishu. In this broader context, for the US, Kenya is seen as a political and security bulwark against chaos.
Kenya has further taken on increasing importance as the regional 'anchor state.' Nairobi has played important roles in negotiating peace agreements in the Great Lakes, South Sudan, and is a guarantor of the November 2022 Pretoria agreement between Addis and Mekelle. Militarily, Kenya Defence Forces also form a significant contingent of the African Union peacekeeping forces in Somalia, particularly Jubaland. And within the African Union, former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga appears to be well-placed to assume the influential African Union Commission Chair position in 2025.
Kenya's rising stature in Washington contrasts with the presently deteriorated relations between Addis and the US. Ethiopia was once the principal ally of the US in the Horn, particularly during the 'War on Terror' years and Meles Zenawi's period of government. At the time, Addis was viewed as a central ally of Washington in pursuing its counter-terror agenda and reaped significant American support in exchange. The federal government's prosecution of the Tigray War and ongoing instability within Ethiopia is further contributing to Washington's pivot towards Nairobi.
The Kenyan President arrived in the US with Nairobi still saddled with a significant amount of debt, over USD 76 billion, despite recent economic and financial reforms. While the Kenyan Shilling (KES) has stabilised against the US Dollar (USD) in recent months, the financial crunch the Ruto administration has faced since coming to power has forced it to implement a raft of new unpopular taxes. An agreement reached during the visit to speed up Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations will be a welcome relief for Nairobi, which should ease bilateral trade and investment. Kenya will further be re-authorised as a member of countries to benefit from the duty-free African Growth and Opportunity Act—a major economic boon from which Ethiopia has been excluded since the federal government's prosecution of the Tigray War. On the debt front, Biden has lent support to Ruto's administration's push for debt relief and financial support for developing countries, including Kenya. Other economic inducements included private-sector investments in Kenya, which could generate an additional USD 250 million in apparel exports and greater collaboration between the tech industries in the US and Kenya.
In a politically savvy move, Kenya seems to have spied an opportunity to capitalise on an under-pressure US. Part of the price tag of this deepening relationship appears to be the continued Kenyan commitment to deploying 1,000 police officers to Haiti as part of the UN-backed initiative, largely underwritten by the US. President Ruto has repeatedly emphasised Global South cooperation as an element of his foreign policy agenda, and the deployment of Kenyan forces to Haiti arguably fits into this rationale. However, the security situation there has continued to deteriorate since the total collapse of the government following the departure of then-Prime Minister Ariel Henry to Nairobi in late February 2024. Haiti will be an immensely challenging security situation for Kenyan forces to deploy into, and they may well struggle to fulfil their complex mandate.
Initially reticent about the election of William Ruto as Kenyan President in 2022, the Biden administration has lain aside any concerns and fully embraced the savvy leader in a true realpolitik manner. President Ruto will still face a careful balancing act as his administration seeks to retain its ties with the Gulf, particularly Abu Dhabi, and China—one of its major creditors. It is still eminently possible to maintain these relationships, but comprehensive Russian engagement looks much less likely now. At any rate, Nairobi's engagement with Moscow has been limited, barring the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in May 2023. While the November US elections loom on the horizon, for now, the historic visit has rewarded Kenya's relative electoral, political and economic stability.
By the Horn Edition team
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