Chairing Africa's Future
With elections scheduled for February 2025, campaigning is now well underway for the position of the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson and four commissioners. This next set of elections may prove to be the most consequential in the short history of Africa's premier organisation. A combination of a growing disregard for multilateralism, intensifying climate disasters, and splintering armed conflict makes for a grim picture during the upcoming 2025-2029 term. Still, the AU is best placed to make a persuasive case for the need for positive, collective action within Africa.
These elections are the second to follow the 'Kagame Reforms,' which emerged from the Rwandan president's oversight of the organisation's institutional reform process. Alongside broader structural changes, these reforms proposed a shift to a regional rotation of the AUC Chairperson and greater gender equality across political positions. The past 5 elections have seen the Chairperson elected from every region, barring North and Eastern Africa. This time around, following a Heads of State Summit in February 2024, the principle of rotationality is expected to be applied, giving East Africa the chance to front candidates to lead the multilateral. The principle of gender parity, however, will not be implemented, continuing the trend of predominantly male candidates assuming the AU's top positions.
Several East African countries have subsequently proposed candidates for the influential AUC Chair position. Most prominent is Kenya's long-serving political opposition figurehead and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who appears to have the backing of South Sudan's Salva Kiir, South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa, and Tanzania's Samia Suluhu Hassan, among others. Djibouti has also fronted a strong candidate- Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssef- ensuring a degree of division within the regional multilaterals of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community. Somalia's candidate, former Foreign Affairs Minister Fawzia Adam, has also announced her interest, though she is widely regarded as a less competitive contender. It appears certain that the tradition of former senior government officials assuming the AUC Chair will thus continue, rather than any technocratic figure who could perhaps better pursue internal structural reform.
The outgoing Chair and former Chadian Prime Minister Moussa Mahamat Faki has served in the position since 2017, having been re-elected with the support of 51 out of 55 member states in February 2021. But his tenure has been marked by accusations of a watering down of AU principles, a failure to engage with crises such as the Tigray War and ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, and haphazard political leadership.
The spate of coups across West Africa since 2020 has encapsulated the recent struggles facing the AU. The multilateral has suspended 6 countries under the Lomé Convention of 2000, which established suspension as the primary tool in the face of military coups and other unconstitutional regime changes. The AU could, and should, go further, however. With foreign powers such as Russia waiting in the wings to offer military and economic support to embattled putschists, the AU should stand firm in its support for democratic ideals. The multilateral should more forcefully call out the undermining of elections and constitutions in countries such as Somalia and South Sudan.
Consequently, the AU 2025 elections offer a critical opportunity to deliver on the stagnating Agenda 2063, which includes realising a peaceful, democratic, and stable Africa. A visionary leader who can re-focus and re-orient the body towards these aspirations and the AU's founding principles that emphasise the 'primacy of politics' is desperately needed. With many African administrations reluctant to invest in collective action amid the lucrative offers from Gulf powers and others, it will require a Chairperson that has the clout and influence to draw bunkered governments from their narrow self-interest. If it fails to do so, it risks a return to the grim days of the ineffective and paralysed of the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
Among the issues facing the next AUC Chairperson will be the rising inequalities and humanitarian crises facing the continent. Africa has the dubious honour of being host to the world's largest humanitarian emergency in Sudan-- with well over 8 million internally displaced and millions more requiring humanitarian assistance. Flooding, drought, armed conflict, and lack of opportunity for a young, fast-growing population continue to drive internal and external displacement. With the world set to warm further and many African countries particularly vulnerable and underprepared for its ongoing impact, the pressures on governance and stability will continue to grow.
Economically, the continent is faring little better. Three countries have now defaulted on their sovereign debt, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia, while others, including Kenya, remain at risk. Persistent inflation has driven high costs of living and a necessary reduction in social services spending to service debt payments. The prospect of a rapidly growing youthful population without job prospects is a further recipe for yet more instability. Like other multilaterals, the AU is currently facing major budgetary squeezes, while ever more is expected and required of the body.
Whoever emerges victorious next February, the next AUC Chairperson should be a consensus leader who can balance both continental interests while dealing with the ever-more complicated internal dynamics. Resisting the pernicious influence of administrations that are seeking to exploit countries' internal weaknesses and Africa's mineral wealth is particularly pressing. And with elections scheduled in 13 African countries in 2025, ranging from the genuinely democratic to likely sham polls, the Chair will have to move decisively to prevent any further democratic backsliding. Similarly, administrations should publicly restate their support, both political and financial, in the multilateral to empower it to reassert its founding principles. The coming years cannot be predicted, but what is clear is that the AUC Chair position has never been more important.
By the Horn Edition team
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