Two Shocks, Same Coin: Drought and Rain in Pastoralist Kenya
Since the end of March, Nairobi and swathes of the country have been inundated with deluges of rain, which have swamped drainage systems, burst riverbanks, and badly damaged critical infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and dams. Over 180 people have been killed, and thousands have been displaced, with yet more heavy rainfall forecast in the coming days.
The torrential rain and deadly flooding across Kenya have come on the heels of a multi-year drought. Though overlooked by the immediate flooding in Nairobi and riverain areas, the above-average rainfall is set to further complicate ongoing drought recovery efforts in arid and semi-arid (ASAL) counties, especially among pastoralists. While favourable weather at the end of 2023 may have loaned pastoralists time to restock their herds, and while floods have not devastated pastoralists as severely as agriculturalists elsewhere in Kenya, their sustained vulnerability nonetheless makes them vulnerable to the knock-on effects of erratic weather far from pastoralist regions – in addition to the constant threat of relapsed drought.
Even with the rains set to continue, pastoralists still reeling from years of drought should not be overlooked. Focusing on this group in anticipation of more erratic weather—be it rain or a lack thereof—should be a cornerstone of Nairobi's drought and flood response strategies. For pastoralists, risks linked to droughts and floods are two sides of the same coin, even if these shocks are climatic opposites. Responding to and recovering quickly from one is key to preventing even more dire consequences from the other.
After consecutive failed rainy seasons, El Nino's long-awaited return in October, November, and December 2023 brought some relief to pastoralists living in ASAL counties. Livestock body conditions in these counties have considerably improved, in part due to restored pastures and replenished water sources within shorter distances. Food security and malnutrition rates have improved as a result, as have market prices for cattle meat. Better terms of trade have also stabilised market prices more generally across ASAL counties.
Recent improvements do not, however, mean pastoralists have gained long-term resilience, nor have the long-term drivers of pastoralists' vulnerability been addressed. Their situation remains serious and has only been made more so since the start of this rainy season. For example, even with a nearly 15% reduction in acute malnutrition levels since 2023, the combined effects of previous hardships and poor feeding practices mean 850,000 children still experience stubbornly high malnutrition. Additionally, more than 1.6 million Kenyans in ASAL counties continue facing "crisis" levels of food insecurity, while another 300,000 suffer even more severe "emergency" conditions. The ongoing deluge of rain has prompted fresh sanitation concerns, damage to infrastructure, livestock loss and diseases, and increased volatility to food prices and market supply chains across ASAL counties.
If pastoralists are to overcome challenges posed by drought and rain, their peripheral position in national politics must give way to inclusion. This will be difficult. The "colonial legacy of marginalisation" towards ASAL pastoralists, according to Syracuse University Professor Martin Shanguhyia, continues primarily because modern viewpoints consign pastoral lands as a hostile periphery, contributing little to national productivity.
This perceived lack of productivity is not necessarily accurate. First, pastoralists practice sophisticated, nature-centred migratory patterns that play an important part in conserving and restoring ecosystems. Second, mobile pastoral systems can actually be very productive, even in harsh environments. In one study comparing the pastoralist and ranching productivity, the Maasai produced more kilograms of protein per hectare per year than East African commercial ranches writ large. In USAID's recent primer, 'Pastoralism in Africa,' the authors also found that per hectare, pastoralism typically produces more products at a rate cheaper than any commercial range. Third, unlike large-scale ranches, which go to expensive lengths to control variable weather, unpredictability is not always a limiting factor in pastoralist production. Only when shocks are sustained or recurring – as they are now – do pastoralists suffer greater long-term losses.
Building pastoralists' resiliency will require more than what Kenya's National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) currently provides. Nationwide, there are just 5 proposed drought resiliency infrastructure projects in four counties, amounting to a little more than USD one million dollars of investment, a third of which comes from partner contributions. The most expensive project in Makueni County, the Uyi Earth Dam, will take years to construct and will not relieve pastoralists of their immediate problems. Far more effective would be an emergency scale-up of the NDMA's Hunger Safety Net Program, which facilitates cash transfers benefitting the arid counties most in need– Turkana, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, Garissa, Tana River, Isiolo, and Samburu. During climate-related crises, the program can adjust to sustained shocks, allowing pastoralists immediate relief and time to assess and recover their losses.
Pastoralism is unique in its ability to withstand, and even utilise, unpredictability in harsh environments. If this were not the case, the livelihood would have long ago been outright abandoned. Still, this is no reason to overlook opportunities for pastoral development. Preserving pastoralists' livelihoods and culture will require lasting commitments from Nairobi that guarantee the provision of essential services and durable investments. At present, many ASAL counties subsist with neither.
By the Horn Edition team
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