Issue No. 31

The Old Guard and Transitions in the Horn

A new wave of political leaders may be on the horizon in the Horn of Africa, not because of any war or internal coup, but simply because age is catching up with the old guards. Eritrea, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Uganda, four of the 7 member states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional bloc, have been governed by the same leader for much of their independence – with Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, 79, just shy of approaching his fourth decade as president. In Djibouti, 76-year-old President Guelleh came into power in 1999 as the country's second president, following in the footsteps of his uncle, who ruled for over two decades. Similarly, in Eritrea, 78-year-old President Afwerki has been at the helm since the country gained independence in 1993, making him one of Africa's longest-serving leaders. And South Sudan's President Salva Kiir, 72, has held power since the country's independence in 2011, albeit amidst a civil war and a fragile peace process. 

This is not to suggest that there will be a sudden wave of pro-democracy uprisings or that a more human rights amenable administration will suddenly emerge in these countries. Indeed, in three of the four aforementioned countries, a military-government fusion exists, and with repressed or non-existent political opposition in all, sudden regime change does not appear on the cards in the coming months. However, political transitions are a risky business, and the unexpected death of leaders can precipitate major change. Perhaps no clearer example was the death of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi at just 57 in 2012, which signalled the beginning of the end of two decades of relative internal stability in the country. When a political leader exerts total control and suddenly dies or departs office, there are numerous examples of armed conflict erupting

In late March 2024, long-standing Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni appointed his son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as the country's new Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), with many believing that he may be in the running for the presidency in the future. In Eritrea, meanwhile, there are growing reports that Isaias Afwerki is grooming his son, Abraham Afwerki, to assume his position. However, General Kainerugaba is a far better-known quantity than Abraham Afwerki. The Ugandan general has enjoyed a publicly meteoric rise through the military's ranks, with his latest appointment to CDF perceived by some as a precursor for assuming the presidency from his father. We know little about Abraham Afwerki, on the other hand, but he is believed to have served in the Eritrean military, is married and is in his 40s.

The iron grip that Isaias Afwerki exerts over Eritrea makes the question of succession a more complex proposition. With no freedom of the press or any political opposition, there has been no internal scrutiny on what Afwerki plans next for his fiefdom. Unlike his counterparts in Uganda and Djibouti, he has not felt the need or faced political pressure to hold elections for over three decades. A small cadre of generals and politicians, such as Information Minister Yemene Meskel, exercise total control over Eritrea and will be sure to carefully choreograph any succession plan, if there is one, and limit any possible influence of the growing diaspora opposition movement, Brigade Nehamedu.

In Djibouti, there is also growing speculation about the potential successor for Guelleh, with elections scheduled for 2026. Guelleh's ruling Union for Presidential Majority (UPM) holds 57 of the country's 65 legislative seats and exerts complete control over the government and military institutions. It is widely anticipated that the Djboutian president will step down at the next vote, with reports that rival factions are already jockeying for their respective candidates to succeed him. South Sudan's case is more complicated, though, given the country's years of civil war and fragile peace in the wake of splintering political parties and the dominance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Government. With no permanent constitution and a deeply flawed roadmap to already-delayed elections scheduled for December 2024, there is a real prospect of violence erupting in any possible transition.

Still, despite elections being on the horizon, it appears that several of these aged leaders may seek to unilaterally extend their terms or continue to suppress nascent democratic opposition. In early March, Museveni, for example, launched the update of the ruling party's voters' register, sending a strong signal that he will seek a 7th term in 2026, even while he grooms his son for the presidency. Salva Kiir, too, appears set on contesting the upcoming elections in December 2024 despite reports of his serious health concerns. 

With elections in Djibouti, Uganda, and South Sudan all falling within the span of two years, the question of succession of the ageing rulers will surely intensify. In Uganda, the fairly vibrant opposition has made succession politics the centrepiece of political debate. While the hopes for a democratic transition vary within each of these states, the corrosive influence of the Gulf and the global waning of democracy, the end of these dictators' rule may not result in any change of political structure. Three of the four leaders of Eritrea, South Sudan, Uganda, and Djibouti emerged from armed groups fighting autocratic regimes, a sign of the broader history of liberation to democracy is not a smooth line. 

Still, as the former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld once said, it is the "unknown unknowns" that one has to watch out for. We can predict what might happen in these four countries with ageing despots, but a secretive succession plan in Eritrea may be turned on its head if Afwerki were to suddenly pass away. And the increasingly assertive Gulf states will likely seek to influence whatever government comes next in Juba, Asmara, Djibouti City, or Kampala. No matter how carefully they can organise their political futures, none of the four presidents can prevent the harsh realities of life and death. In a few years' time, the IGAD Heads of State summits are sure to look radically different.

 By the Horn Edition team