Voltaire and Somalia's federal, parliamentary republic
The 18th-century French philosopher Voltaire once famously quipped that the "agglomeration which was called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire." The satirical critique was such that the empire had become little more than an amorphous collection of states and territories that was bound together by neither a common religion, nor a direct lineage to ancient Rome, nor even by a centralised authority. Historians may continue to debate the extent to which Voltaire exaggerated the fragility and nature of the empire, but there are likely to be fewer disputes about the status of Somalia's putative 'federal parliamentary republic'. The federation is in tatters, its parliamentary system bulldozed by an overweening presidency, and its public so thoroughly disenfranchised that the term 'republic' resembles less an aspiration than a cruel joke.
During his reopening of the federal parliament last month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) pledged that the legislature would have the "honour and courage to take on the completion of the constitution." Around 18 months have passed since the 'approval' of amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution, which represented such an overreach by Villa Somalia that it triggered Puntland's withdrawal of recognition of the federal government's authority. Since then, the constitutional crisis deepened even further, with Jubaland also suspending relations with the federal government, while Al-Shabaab has marauded across central Somalia, positioning itself on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Now, with the supine Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) having resurfaced, revisions to Chapters 5-9 are anticipated in the coming weeks.
But to what purpose? There are effectively two constitutions in force at this current moment in Somalia (three, including Somaliland), with an almost equal territorial split. Puntland and Jubaland recognise the unabridged 2012 Provisional Constitution, while Mogadishu and its allies in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West are working under the partially amended 2024 model. 'Allies' should be nuanced, however, with all three leaders, as well as those from North-Eastern State, coerced and cajoled into a largely unenthusiastic coalition with Mogadishu. Indeed, the influence of the federal government beyond the confines of the capital can be best described as 'mediated,' since it must negotiate access via local proxies to operate. Hirshabelle's unilateral closure of its airspace to unauthorised military aircraft is just one recent example of how tenuous this relationship can be.
The 2012 Provisional Constitution ordained consensus-oriented negotiations to determine the allocation of powers and resources between federal and state governments, and to address thorny, outstanding issues such as the status of Banaadir and Somaliland's pursuit of recognition. Instead, under Villa Somalia's thumb, the process has become mangled, with no substantive negotiations with the federal member states, no formal engagement with their legislatures to debate the proposed amendments, nor a referendum for its enactment. As a result, HSM's constitutional text has earned lip service from just three member states, legislative endorsement from none, and has nowhere entered into force pending a referendum.
The very notion of whether Somalia still retains a 'federal' model of government is questionable as well, given the persistent erosion of the country's federal architecture by successive presidents. While Hassan Sheikh has never been a committed federalist, it was under Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo that the concerted subversion of power-sharing began in earnest as he sought to forcibly consolidate power within the presidency and centralise the state. This trend has now reached its zenith under Hassan Sheikh's second term, with the incumbent president even seeking to cleave 'Federal Member States' out of single clan enclaves in Sool and Gedo – in direct contravention of Article 48(2) of the Provisional Constitution.
Somalia's parliamentary system of government is also under threat – if indeed it can even be said to still function. Few seem to remember that under Article 97 of the Provisional Constitution, supreme executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head -- not the president. The president may be the titular Commander-in-Chief, "receive foreign diplomats and consuls," and address the Lower House of Parliament, but beyond that, nearly all his powers (and all Somali presidents to date have been men) are contingent on the "recommendation of the Council of Ministers," including appointing and dismissing senior officials and service chiefs. In the coming weeks, Villa Somalia may well take another step away from parliamentary rule by amending Article 97 to formalise the centralisation of executive power in the presidency.
And whether Somalia remains a republic-- drawn from the Latin term of 'res publica' that translates as 'a public affair' is arguably a matter of perspective. The president's proposed single-vote, closed-list electoral model would, in one fell swoop, sever the link between MP and constituent by allowing anonymous voters in Mogadishu and a handful of other south-central municipalities to elect representatives for the entire nation. In essence, a handful of party bosses would be responsible for the selection of parliamentarians rather than their clans. MPs for Puntland and Jubaland would, in purely statistical terms, be elected by votes from places like Jowhar and Wanle Weyne, rendering the principle of public political participation meaningless.
If Voltaire were still alive today and perhaps somehow interested in Somali politics, he might well conclude that Somalia is neither federal, nor parliamentary, nor a republic. What is left is an "agglomeration" of contested polities, divided by duelling constitutions, and – in the absence of capable, committed political leadership - bound together by little more than name.
The Horn Edition Team
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