Four Pathways to Peace-building for Tigray
Over ten weeks have passed since members of the Tigrayan leadership and Ethiopia’s federal government agreed to a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) in Pretoria. So far, progress has been made in demobilizing the Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF) and increasing humanitarian assistance. Notably absent are tangible details regarding the future of the country’s peace process. Formal negotiations are certainly needed to determine and implement a sufficient post-conflict security arrangement. But Tigray will also require an inclusive and effective peace-building agenda if it is to restore pre-war conditions and fully participate in Ethiopian political life.
Peace-building is a complicated process of recovery and development, touching nearly every sector of public service provision and government. For Tigray, the following are several important ways forward:
1. Unfettered access to integrated humanitarian assistance. Praise for increased numbers of Tigrayans receiving humanitarian aid is warranted, but premature celebration in the media may obscure unmet needs, especially for the third of Tigrayans (nearly 2 million) who remain without food assistance. The federal government should work with the Tigrayan leadership to resolve issues related to humanitarian access and resources. Before any long- term dialogue or reconciliation can be conceptualized, Tigrayans deserve a guarantee of survival, with unfettered access to aid.
2. Meaningful reintegration of combatants. Many of those in need are Tigrayan soldiers, left without homes and economic opportunities after laying down arms. The TDF, now set to be demobilized, numbered some 250,000 troops. Economic assistance to these soldiers is not only a requirement for maintaining security, but a highly advantageous opportunity for rebuilding trust in government at all levels.
3. Multi-level dialogue(s). When immediate needs have been met, authorities should turn toward inclusive and productive dialogue at all levels. Parallel dialogues at the local, regional, and national levels, challenging the traditional top-down nature of Ethiopian politics, are required to ensure that the Interim Regional Administration (IRA) prescribed in the Pretoria agreement is designed with the needs and desires of ordinary Tigrayans in mind. Moreover, community consultations will help Tigrayan leaders convey unified and practical political messaging about public needs around which international actors as well as local civil society can organize. These dialogues will also need to address deep seated problems that existed long before the last two years of fighting. Divisions among Tigrayan, Oromo, and Amhara leaders are at least partially the result of a process of institutional disintegration that began over a decade ago. The fate of Western Tigray, occupied by Amhara forces for over two years, is likely to set a critical precedent for the resolution (or aggravation) of violent land disputes across Ethiopia. Given the scale and nature of the impact of this conflict, a national, all-inclusive dialogue appears essential. And international level dialogue plays an important role in dealing with spoilers to Ethiopia’s peace-building agenda, namely Eritrea. This small country has yet proven to be a formidable threat to security across a large part of East Africa, demonstrated in part by the increased training of foreign soldiers in Eritrean military camps. Reports suggest that Eritrean troops are digging in their heels on Tigray’s northern border, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s office is not in a strong position to negotiate the removal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopian soil, having previously depended on them to quell the TDF.
4. Comprehensive transitional justice. A comprehensive transitional justice efforts will be key to addressing generational trauma, and recovering social networks in which economic development have been rooted. Tens of thousands of mainly women and children have faced some form of brutal sexual violence over the past two years. The perpetrators of massacres and mass rape should be tried in courts of law. Perhaps even more important will be reparations to the survivors, in the form of monetary, health, and livelihood-related benefits. A fully independent investigation will also be required, covering human rights violations committed in all parts of Tigray against the population there, as well as Tigrayans detained or otherwise abused in other parts of Ethiopia. Collaboration with Tigrayan and other Ethiopian civil society representatives, both at home and in the diaspora, may be immensely useful in this regard. Activists in country
have already made commendable efforts to document assaults and civilian deaths from the war’s beginning.
Finally, over the past two years, many Ethiopians, not only Tigrayans, have questioned their identity as Ethiopians. Peace-building is as much about care, community and trust as it is about restoring public services and improving governance. Access to humanitarian assistance, reintegration of combatants, multi-level dialogue, and comprehensive transitional justice are not just development initiatives but exercises in trust-building, which will benefit the whole country. They should be the guiding nprinciples for recovery over the coming months and years in Tigray.
By the Ethiopia Cable Team
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