Issue No. 314

Too little, too late? Abiy visits Djibouti

The Ethiopian premier is playing catch-up. Having stood atop the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) last September during its inauguration, PM Abiy Ahmed's vision for the country was unequivocal —he was ushering in another golden age in Ethiopian history. Diplomacy be damned, the GERD was proof of Ethiopia's mightiness and 'restoring sea access' was next. But just a few months later, the Ethiopian PM is being forced to fight a geostrategic rear-guard action of his own making, travelling to Djibouti after yet another neighbour signed a cooperation deal with Egypt.

The Ethiopia-Djibouti relationship is a complex one. Historically, their relations have been among the few bilateral relationships that have not broken down in a volatile regional environment characterised by warring or squabbling neighbours. Today, wholly reliant on one another for trade since the late 1990s, neither can afford a collapse in relations, particularly in an election year for both leaders —even if their coronations are inevitable. And yet, the two countries find themselves on increasingly divergent geopolitical tracks; on opposing sides in Sudan, Somaliland, and now, even, on Eritrea-- all underwritten by the rivalrous Arab states. One issue easily spills into another—Djibouti's concerns about Addis's sabre-rattling in recent months have overlapped with the broader pull and opportunities offered by the Cairo-Riyadh axis. Ethiopia, on the other hand, enjoys the largesse of the Emirates, which also recently lost a bitter arbitration case in London to Djibouti over the termination of the DP World concession to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018.

And so, Djibouti, displeased with Ethiopia's bellicose rhetoric and militarised posturing last year, has drawn itself further into the Cairo-Riyadh alliance. Egypt-- furious about its inability to stall the grand unveiling of the GERD-- has eagerly sought to isolate and encircle Ethiopia within the broader Horn of Africa. And Addis's folly has only benefited Egypt, with Eritrea and Djibouti readily accepting offers of development assistance and, in the case of Asmara, military support. Now, any military incursion into Eritrea risks even greater regional isolation, as well as a cascade of allies of Asmara joining the fray, not least the Sudanese army and an awakened hegemon in Saudi Arabia. In this context, in late December, Cairo and Djibouti settled on three cooperation agreements covering renewable energy, port development, and logistics, further encircling landlocked Ethiopia.

At the same time, there have been glimmers of discontent in Djibouti over Addis's revival and stoking of Afar sentiments on unification as part of its schemes to secure sea access in Eritrea's Assab last year. Such sentiments—though designed to threaten Asmara—have similarly generated significant frustration in Djibouti, whose politics remain a high-wire act in Issa-Afar relations. The amplification—and weaponisation—of the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO) and others advocating greater rights and respect for the Afar people by Addis has come at an awkward moment for Djibouti's succession politics. Last January, Djibouti even conducted a drone strike into Ethiopian territory, targeting what it alleged to be a "terrorist group"-- though later investigations asserted that civilians had been killed.

But it was the series of pledges and events led by Egyptian officials last month that appears to have proven too much for Addis, with PM Abiy Ahmed travelling to Djibouti and touring the port just a couple of weeks later. On the surface, little has changed, with a show of bonhomie put on between the two leaders, papering over the growing political cleavages. This, too, is little surprise, with Djibouti unable to afford any serious deterioration in its trade agreements with Ethiopia. And for Addis, its dependence on Djibouti for import/export is difficult to overstate, with estimates placing it at 90-95% of Ethiopia's trade transiting through the Port of Djibouti and the Doraleh terminal. A shared financial dependence on Beijing in both Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well, may act as a quiet ballast, serving as Addis's largest bilateral creditor and financier for Djiboutian infrastructure.

But the Djiboutian economy, on the other hand, is little more than the rents cobbled together from the port and auctioning off its territory to a host of foreign militaries, including the French, Chinese and Americans. Its politics are not much better; a frayed coalition of ageing elites dominated by the outsized influence of the 'first family.' So great were the concerns about succession planning for Ismail Omar Guelleh and the state of Afar-Issa relations that the ailing incumbent is running for an inevitable 6th term. Political transitions can be a messy business at the best of times, but Djibouti's leaders will harbour few illusions that their position depends on external actors regarding it as stable. 

The future of Somaliland is also another point of contention between Ethiopia and Djibouti and is likely to have been a topic of discussion between Abiy and Guelleh in recent days. While Ethiopia has not yet fulfilled Meles Zenawi's famous maxim that Addis would not be the first or third state to recognise Somaliland, it nevertheless enjoys extremely close ties with Hargeisa, and both bask in the patronage of the Emirates. Ethiopia, too, is purportedly coming under significant pressure from Riyadh not to recognise Somaliland. Meanwhile, though careful not to upset Ethiopia during the fallout over the Addis-Hargeisa Memorandum of Understanding in 2024, Djibouti has persistently sought to destabilise Somaliland and wield cross-border clan linkages to do so. It was Guelleh who rallied the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as the chairperson of the regional body to publicly oppose Israeli recognition. Djibouti's opposition to Somaliland independence is — in part — motivated by a fear that Ethiopia will diversify trade away from the Port of Djibouti. Today, Ethiopian spy chief Redwan Hussein has made a surprise visit to Mogadishu and is expected to meet both his counterpart, Mahad Salad, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Here, too, is Somaliland's independence all but certain to be the focus of talks. 

But while Addis has repeatedly flirted with diversifying trade away from the Port of Djibouti, the infrastructure is not in place to use the ports in Lamu or Berbera to the same degree. Another obstacle to increasing Ethiopian import/export through the DP World-run Port of Berbera is the absence of a trade framework and agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Still, as Ethiopia's population continues to grow—over 120 million and counting—there will be a need for greater imports across the board, and Djibouti's ageing port infrastructure may not be up to the task. Eventually, Djibouti City may have to accept that others, too, will profit from Ethiopian trade, whether through the LAPSSET Corridor or Berbera.

Last year, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos delivered a speech on economic and regional integration, calling for Eritrea to open up to the Horn of Africa. Against a backdrop of domestic instability and hostility toward Eritrea, it was challenging to assess the merits of such a speech; however, the Addis-Djibouti dynamic is arguably the perfect example of how economic integration and interdependence provide a natural floor against deteriorating relations. It is the same logic on which the European Union was partially founded. But right now, it is Cairo that is dictating such logic of integration and setting the terms of new alliances in the Horn of Africa. Ironically, Ethiopia's assertion of sovereign power through the GERD has produced not strategic autonomy but deeper regional entanglement, hemming in the very freedom that Abiy once claimed it would secure.

The Ethiopian Cable Team