Issue No. 313

Ethiopia and the long wait to be second

In an exchange with a British politician in 2004, former Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi once famously remarked that "Ethiopia won't be the first to recognise Somaliland, but it won't be the third either." Now that Israel has become the first nation to recognise Somaliland as a sovereign nation on 26 December 2025, the question is whether Addis Ababa is planning to fulfil Meles's prediction and become the second to do so.

 

In the wake of Israel's staggering pronouncement, Ethiopia's ambassador to Somalia, Suleiman Daddafee, stated that Addis is "closely watching" Israel's decision to recognise Somaliland. Beyond that, Addis officials have largely kept their lips sealed on Ethiopia's next move, seemingly waiting and seeing how the recognition plays out. So far, while Mogadishu has again rallied international opposition and its array of allies to condemn the recognition, neither Ethiopia nor its principal patron, the UAE—working in quiet tandem with Israel—proffered an opinion. Addis and Abu Dhabi are widely considered the closest allies of Somaliland, with the former jutting up against the littoral administration on the Gulf of Aden and the Emirates operating the aortic Port of Berbera.

Privately, signals from senior officials in Addis are positive regarding Somaliland's recognition, and it appears that Ethiopia may be on the cusp of making the leap. Rumours from Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, too, suggest that Ethiopia is preparing to recognise Somaliland, potentially followed by the UAE and India, recognition motivated in large part by Somaliland's geostrategic position on the Gulf of Aden, at the edge of the world's most strategic waterway, the Red Sea. One of the remaining members of the Abraham Accords, the Emirates — also one of the key sponsors of Hargeisa — has sought to facilitate Israeli recognition and has helped steer its arrayed allies in the Horn, including Addis, the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, and Puntland, into closer alignment.

But for Ethiopia, the final call—as ever—will lie with PM Abiy Ahmed, who has repeatedly confounded logic and expectations since 2018. Abiy undoubtedly enjoys making bold gestures, and the mercurial leader may be drawn toward recognition if the Emirates encourage him to make a decision, as they seemingly did to establish a military base on Sudan's eastern flank in Benishangul-Gumuz in 2025. And yet even while Ethiopian officials are purportedly preparing the ground for recognition, Abiy may yet be gun-shy, having been politically bruised by the international backlash to his Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland two years ago. His concerns remain both domestic-- wars in Oromia and Amhara-- and external, particularly the prospect of a conflict with Eritrea. This time around, however, Israel's recognition may finally provide the cover and precedent to allow Addis to realise Meles's statement.

It would undoubtedly represent a major coup for Somaliland if Ethiopia does indeed recognise Hargeisa's authority, and could precipitate a wave of other sympathetic African states to follow suit. Even so, once the bastion of stability as the 'anchor state' of the Horn, Addis's foreign policy can best be described as erratic, reflecting a mix of Abiy's messianic vision and Emirati talking points. Nor is it the authority and regional power that it once was, and the riven Gulf-powered politics of the Horn of Africa mean that others-- particularly Eritrea and Sudan's military government-- are unlikely to shift from their Mogadishu-aligned position. But if Ethiopia's rumoured recognition does indeed come to pass, it could well stymie Egypt and Somalia's machinations at the African Union and United Nations. Further, if Addis steps in now, it would no doubt help to shift the narrative away from Israel back to the African continent and the implications for the Horn region itself, while shattering any possibility of a return to the status quo ante.

While Abiy's advisor on East African Affairs and Tigrayan politician Getachew Reda may have reiterated Meles's stance on Somaliland in October 2025, there is naturally a gulf between a theoretical position and pursuing such a political path of recognition, which will inevitably result in geostrategic blowback from the Saudi-Egypt-Somalia-Eritrea bloc. This, too, remains an active concern of Ethiopia, which, having seemingly abandoned the prospect of sea access via Somaliland, repeatedly threatened to seize the Eritrean port of Assab on the Gulf of Aden last year. In the case of a war with Eritrea—and, by extension, a host of Asmara's patrons and allies—Ethiopia may have to contend with a furious Mogadishu working to destabilise its southern flank. Delivering the 'second' recognition, particularly following Israel's pariah status, would represent a significant decision from Addis, with possible implications beyond the recognition accorded in Hargeisa, Tel Aviv, and Abu Dhabi.

Yet what is not likely to have influenced Ethiopia's thinking has been harrying pressure from Mogadishu alone. Relations with the Somali federal government have been strained for much of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's second term, particularly over the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding, which promised Somaliland recognition in exchange for Ethiopian 'sea access' on the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, Mogadishu's persistent destabilisation of the tri-border strategic Gedo region has also frustrated both Kenya and Ethiopia, who regard Ahmed Madoobe, the Jubaland president, as an ally against Al-Shabaab. That is not to say that Ethiopia or Kenya will inevitably recognise Somaliland; rather, it will not be the pressure from Hassan Sheikh's administration that tips the balance either way.

Meanwhile, Somaliland's case in Nairobi remains strong, though perhaps diminished by the death of long-serving opposition leader and advocate for Somaliland, Raila Odinga, last year. Much like Ethiopia, Nairobi's growing linkages with the Emirates and historic affinity with Somaliland—though it enjoys more marginal economic and diplomatic ties—are fuelling speculation that Kenya might also be in line for recognition. Its principal response so far has been limited to the joint East African Community (EAC) statement that reasserted support for Somalia's sovereignty. Still, a significant segment of the Somali elite within the upper echelons of Kenyan politics remains hostile to the issue of Somaliland's independence, including those affiliated with Al-I'tisaam, the influential and wealthy transnational Salafi movement. 

Abiy has spent much of his tenure attempting to shake the shadow of Meles, the titanic Tigrayan leader who ushered Ethiopia into the 21st century. In 2004, Meles understood that Somaliland recognition could not be a matter of merit or legality alone, but also of timing and consequences, acutely aware of the risks of diplomatic isolation. Now, two decades later, Abiy faces the same dilemma, but without the regional ballast that once anchored Addis and a region aflame from foreign meddling.