Issue No. 312

 

For most Ethiopians, 'next year' began, of course, on 11 September, when Enkutatash, the Ethiopian New Year, was celebrated and marked the start of the Ethiopian year 2018. Nevertheless, following a Gregorian year of heightened internal political fragmentation and a persistent threat of renewed war between Addis and Asmara, few are looking into 2026 with optimism for the country. Once the anchor state of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia today is emblematic of many of the most troublesome issues plaguing the region-- a circling of the wagons by a national elite disinterested in governing an increasingly impoverished and warring periphery.

And next year promises more of the same-- without the hope of political alternation in Somalia. Once hailed as a great democratic reformer, the 7th general elections scheduled for June 2026 will be a process of authoritarian consolidation for PM Abiy Ahmed, rubberstamping his authority and the anticipated upending of the ethnic federal model through constitutional reforms. His Prosperity Party-- a merging of the distinct ethnically-based political parties-- already dominates the federal parliament, while the few remaining opposition movements are already warning of intimidation and rigging. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) has been reshaped into a cudgel, banning the Enat Party and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from running and endorsing a host of thinly-veiled proxy parties across the country. Expect more of the same next year as the 'campaigns' begin in earnest.

And due to insecurity, it remains virtually impossible to consider holding elections in most of Amhara and swathes of Oromia as well —and with instability simmering now in eastern Afar, much of the Somali Regional State (SRS), and Benishangul-Gumuz to boot. Tigray's constitutional and political stasis make it a uniquely concerning case as well, with the region still not integrated back into Ethiopia's institutions and the Pretoria agreement that ended the 2020-2022 war unfulfilled. And so, in many areas, the polls will be a weaponised coronation for the ruling elite-- as nearly every election in Ethiopia has been. In areas with a more active political opposition, such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front in the SRS, the contestation could well turn violent, while the Fano and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) may attempt to target polling stations and electoral officials in Amhara and Oromia, respectively.

Unlike many of his counterparts in the Horn, Abiy is a young leader —just 49 —and has repeatedly told officials in private that he intends to rule Ethiopia for decades. Whether the country can survive decades of his rule is another matter entirely. Of late, Abiy has taken to ruling Ethiopia as if in a medieval court with Addis as its swollen centre, building new palaces and Potemkin naval headquarters with foreign backing. His trusted lieutenants administer their regions akin to fiefdoms, their principal responsibilities being collecting taxation and suppressing threats to the 'Dubai-ification' of Addis. But even within the capital, simmering discontent over the state of the economy and the country's trajectory is increasingly evident, despite the crackdown on opposition and militarisation of politics.

Meanwhile, this year has seen Addis move closer to Moscow and Beijing, procuring Russian fighter jets from the former and promises of nuclear energy, while Chinese investment now accounts for nearly 50% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Due to Ethiopia's size and strategic importance, Western powers are caught in an awkward bind of how to engage with the Abiy government. Above all, though, is the Emirates, with Addis remaining a central plank of its Horn of Africa strategy, and Ethiopia still heeding the UAE's beck-and-call. The economic constraints on the Ethiopian government have made Emirati largesse all the more critical for Abiy to sustain his dwindling support base. But the recent revelation of a new Emirati military base being built on the border of Sudan has given all pause for concern, threatening to-- voluntarily-- drag Ethiopia into the most destructive conflict in the region. In 2026, if Addis moves more decisively into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) camp, the Sudanese army — and particularly its Egyptian patrons —may well respond in kind. The contested fertile region of Al-Fashaga could prove another flashpoint.

But, of course, the biggest question of all for 2026 is whether Addis decides to invade Tigray or Eritrea, as senior Ethiopian officials have repeatedly threatened this year-- particularly over the dubious argument of 'reclaiming' Assab. Today, the status quo of unstable peripheries has allowed Addis to survive, but a broader resumption of war in northern Ethiopia may tip the country over the edge. And yet despite the abundant signs of preparation for conflict, the activation of the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation, the building of drone facilities and the war-footing of the government, there has been a dearth of pre-emptive diplomacy towards preventing Addis and Asmara from hurtling towards another conflict. Now, at the backend of 2025, that has finally begun to shift, but the number of actors and the stakes of such a conflict remain incredibly high and could easily tip over the edge. 

In particular, the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region has metastasised, far larger today than a year ago, with expectations it will grow further still into 2026. Two leaders have been prominent in its unification, the former Amhara Special Forces Commander General Tefera Mamo and Zemane Kassie, who have forged a far more cohesive fighting force numbering tens of thousands. In Oromia, meanwhile, although Addis may have signed a peace agreement with one faction of the OLA in December 2024, this insurgency, too, shows no sign of abating and will hit the 8-year mark in April 2026. Though the conflict often ebbs and flows, its epicentre remains in western Oromia and the conflict is still pockmarked by human rights violations carried out by both the insurgents and the government.

Hand-in-hand with the threat of renewed war with Tigray and/or Eritrea has been the growing convergence among Addis's opposition —with reports of meetings among the OLA, Fano, TPLF, and Asmara in Sudan. Any grand alliance between Addis's enemies is not born of ideological convergence — both the OLA and Fano are explicitly ethno-nationalists — but from strategic positioning. Asmara continues to provide substantial weaponry and training to the assorted Fano militias active in Amhara, as well as backdoor coordination and discussions with particular factions within the TPLF. How these alliances pan out next year will have to be seen, but any war with Eritrea or Tigray could well suck in another host of actors, spilling over both regions and borders. And a war with Eritrea would naturally diminish Ethiopia's international standing as well, likely leading to a suspension of budgetary and developmental assistance from donors and threatening to make it a pariah within the region.

But Abiy's apparent calculation may well be right that the sum of his enemies cannot currently pose a threat to Addis. The closest to come were the Tigrayans in mid-2021, when they advanced to within around 200 kilometres of the capital. Today, the fracturing of Tigrayan politics between Addis and Asmara —and the chokehold the government maintains over the region —means it cannot currently unify against external threats. The Tigray Peace Force, the government's proxy forces in Afar, now reportedly number several thousand and are keeping Mekelle occupied by probing attacks from Afar into Southern Tigray. Within Tigray, too, is the possibility of serious political escalation, despite ongoing internal efforts to negotiate a truce within the Tigrayan body politic. In recent days, Tigrayan troops have abandoned their posts and protested in Mekelle, following months without salary, while the failure to implement Pretoria-- weaponised by all sides-- has cemented the 'no war, no peace' limbo the region remains in.

More broadly, the once vast Ethiopian state is badly wounded, struggling to project much beyond a militarised force into its peripheries. The nation's healthcare and education systems, once lauded by the international community, are now in disarray, with over 4 million children out of school in Amhara alone. Ethiopia enters 2026 amid one of the world's largest internal displacement crises, with an estimated 7–8 million people uprooted by conflict and drought and more than 20 million facing acute food insecurity.

Macroeconomic stabilisation efforts, including tighter monetary policy at the behest of the International Monetary Fund, have slowed inflation somewhat. But the government is still broke, and the foundations of the economy are creaking or badly damaged, while there remains a high risk of external debt distress. A lack of fertiliser, the climate crisis, and insecurity are all eroding the agriculture-dependent economy. Incessant drone strikes against the Fano insurgents have left much of the region's infrastructure in ruins as well, as it did in Tigray-- where the prospects of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated socio-economic pillars remain nil. The limited economic activity in Tigray has been restricted to the 'Wild West' gold mining, a highly corrupt and dangerous process involving a host of armed actors. 

But predicting politics is a challenging game at the best of times, let alone with such a mercurial figure like PM Abiy Ahmed. Few could have seen the Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding coming at the beginning of 2024. And while war with Eritrea remains a distinct possibility —or even a probability, according to some analysts —his attention may turn to another unknown prize, or he may feel he has secured a 'win' with the attention from the Americans. In September, the messianic Pentecostalist leader standing atop the completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) sought to project an image of triumph and inevitability, an Ethiopia reborn and ready to claim centre stage in world politics. And yet, as the country enters 2026, Ethiopia's multi-fold crises point to its darkest moments since the Tigray war-- and with the prospect of war with Asmara, it could still get much, much worse.
 

The Ethiopian Cable Team

As the year comes to a close, we're keen to hear your thoughts on our publications through our 2025 survey. It takes just 3-5 minutes, is anonymous, and will help us ensure our bulletins remain relevant and valuable. Your feedback is greatly appreciated. Thank you for helping us shape the future of our publications!